To this clause in the address of the president, I believe but one interpretation was given throughout this whole country, by friend and foe, by whig and democrat, and by the presses of both parties. It was, by every man with whom I conversed on the subject at the time of its appearance, or of whom I have since inquired, construed to mean that the president intended to occupy the Madison ground, and to regard the question of the power to establish a national bank as immovably settled. And I think I may confidently appeal to the senate and to the country, to sustain the fact, that this was the contemporaneous and unanimous judgment of the public. Reverting back to the period of the promulgation of the address, could any other construction have been given to its language? What is it? ‘I shall promptly give my sanction to any constitutional measure, which, originating in congress,’ shall have certain defined objects in view. He concedes the vital importance of a sound circulating medium to industry, and to the public prosperity. He concedes that its origin must be in congress. And to prevent any inference from the qualification, which he prefixes to the measure, being interpreted to mean that a United States bank was unconstitutional, he declares, that in deciding on the adaptation of the measure to the end proposed, and its conformity to the constitution, he will resort to the fathers of the great republican school. And who were they? If the father of his country is to be excluded, are Madison, (the father of the constitution,) Jefferson, Monroe, Gerry, Gallatin, and the long list of republicans who acted with them, not to be regarded as among those fathers? But president Tyler declares, not only that he should appeal to them for advice and instruction, but to the light of their ever glorious EXAMPLE. What example? What other meaning could have been possibly applied to the phrase, than that he intended to refer to what had been done during the administration of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe?
Entertaining this opinion of the address, I came to Washington at the commencement of the session, with the most confident and buoyant hopes that the whigs would be able to carry all their prominent measures, and especially a bank of the United States, by far that one of the greatest immediate importance. I anticipated nothing but cordial coöperation between the two departments of government; and I reflected with pleasure, that I should find, at the head of the executive branch, a personal and political friend, whom I had long and intimately known, and highly esteemed. It will not be my fault, if our amicable relations should unhappily cease, in consequence of any difference of opinion between us on this occasion. The president has been always perfectly familiar with my opinion on this bank question.
Upon the opening of the session, but especially on the receipt of a plan of a national bank, as proposed by the secretary of thetreasury, fears were excited that the president had been misunderstood in his address, and that he had not waived but adhered to his constitutional scruples. Under these circumstances, it was hoped, that, by the indulgence of a mutual spirit of compromise and concession, a bank, competent to fulfil the expectations and satisfy the wants of the people, might be established.
Under the influence of that spirit, the senate and the house agreed, first, as to the name of the proposed bank. I confess, sir, that there was something exceedingly outré and revolting to my ears, in the term ‘fiscal bank;’ but I thought, ‘what is there in a name? A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.’ Looking, therefore, rather to the utility of the substantial faculties, than to the name of the contemplated institution, we consented to that which was proposed.
Secondly, as to the place of location of the bank. Although Washington had passed through my mind as among the cities in which it might be expedient to place the bank, it was believed to be the least eligible of some four or five other cities. Nevertheless, we consented to fix it here.
And, lastly, in respect to the branching power, there was not, probably, a solitary vote given in either house of congress for the bill, that did not greatly prefer the unqualified branching power, as asserted in the charters of the two former banks of the United States, to the sixteenth fundamental condition, as finally incorporated in this bill. It is perfectly manifest, therefore, that it was not in conformity with the opinion and wish of majorities in congress, but in a friendly spirit of concession towards the president and his particular friends, that the clause assumed that form. So repugnant was it to some of the best friends of a national bank in the other house, that they finally voted against the bill, because it contained that compromise of the branching power.
It is true, that in presenting the compromise to the senate, I stated, as was the fact, that I did not know whether it would be acceptable to the president or not; that, according to my opinion, each department of the government should act upon its own responsibility, independently of the other; and that I presented the modification of the branching power because it was necessary to insure the passage of the bill in the senate, having ascertained that the vote would stand twenty-six against it to twenty-five, if the form of that power which had been reported by the committee were persisted in. But I nevertheless did entertain the most confident hopes and expectations, that the bill would receive the sanction of the president; and this motive, although not the immediate one, had great weight in the introduction and adoption of the compromise clause. I knew that our friends who would not vote for the bill as reported, were actuated, as they avowed, by considerations of union and harmony, growing out of supposed views ofthe president, and I presumed that he would not fail to feel and appreciate their sacrifices. But I deeply regret that we were mistaken. Notwithstanding all our concessions, made in a genuine and sincere spirit of conciliation, the sanction of the president could not be obtained, and the bill has been returned by him with his objections.
And I shall now proceed to consider those objections, with as much brevity as possible, but with the most perfect respect, official and personal, towards the chief magistrate.
After stating that the power of congress to establish a national bank, to operate per se, has been a controverted question from the origin of the government, the president remarks:
‘Men most justly and deservedly esteemed for their high intellectual endowments, their virtue and their patriotism, have, in regard to it, entertained different and conflicting opinions. Congress have differed. The approval of one president has been followed by the disapproval of another.’