From this statement of the case it may be inferred, that the president considers the weight of authority, pro and con, to be equal and balanced. But if he intended to make such an array of it, if he intended to say that it was an equilibrium, I must respectfully, but most decidedly, dissent from him. I think the conjoint testimony of history, tradition, and the knowledge of living witnesses proves the contrary. How stands the question as to the opinion of congresses? The congress of 1791, the congress of 1813–14, the congress of 1815–16, the congress of 1831–32, and, finally, the present congress, have all respectively and unequivocally, affirmed the existence of a power in congress to establish a national bank to operate per se. We behold, then, the concurrent opinion of five different congresses on one side. And what congress is there on the opposite side? The congress of 1811? I was a member of the senate in that year, when it decided, by the casting vote of the vice-president, against the renewal of the charter of the old bank of the United States. And I now here, in my place, add to the testimony already before the public, by declaring that it is within my certain knowledge, that that decision of the senate did not proceed from a disbelief of a majority of the senate in the power of congress to establish a national bank, but from combined considerations of expediency and constitutionality. A majority of the senate, on the contrary, as I know, entertained no doubt as to the power of congress. Thus the account, as to congresses, stands five for and not one, or, at most, not more than one, against the power.
Let us now look into the state of authority derivable from the opinions of presidents of the United States. President Washington believed in the power of congress, and approved a bank bill. President Jefferson approved acts to extend branches into otherparts of the United States, and to punish counterfeiters of the notes of the bank—acts which were devoid of all justification, whatever, upon the assumption of the unconstitutionality of the bank. For how could branches be extended, or punishment be lawfully inflicted, upon the counterfeiters of the paper of a corporation which came into existence without any authority, and in violation of the constitution of the land? James Madison, notwithstanding those early scruples which he had entertained, and which he probably still cherished, sanctioned and signed a bill to charter the late bank of the United States. It is perfectly well known that Mr. Monroe never did entertain any scruples or doubts in regard to the power of congress. Here, then, are four presidents of the United States who have directly or collaterally borne official testimony to the existence of the bank power in congress. And what president is there, that ever bore unequivocally opposite testimony—that disapproved a bank charter, in the sense intended by president Tyler? General Jackson, although he did apply the veto power to the bill for rechartering the late bank of the United States in 1832, it is within the perfect recollection of us all, not only testified to the utility of a bank of the United States, but declared, that, if he had been applied to by congress, he could have furnished the plan of such a bank.
Thus, Mr. President, we perceive, that, in reviewing the action of the legislative and executive departments of the government, there is a vast preponderance of the weight of authority maintaining the existence of the power in congress. But president Tyler has, I presume unintentionally, wholly omitted to notice the judgment and decisions of the third coördinate department of the government upon this controverted question—that department, whose interpretations of the constitution, within its proper jurisdiction and sphere of action, are binding upon all; and which, therefore, may be considered as exercising a controlling power over both the other departments. The supreme court of the United States, with its late chief justice, the illustrious Marshall, at its head, unanimously decided that congress possessed this bank power; and this adjudication was sustained and reaffirmed whenever afterwards the question arose before the court.
After recounting the occasions, during his public career, on which he had expressed an opinion against the power of congress to charter a bank of the United States, the president proceeds to say:
‘Entertaining the opinions alluded to, and having taken this oath, the senate and the country will see that I could not give my sanction to a measure of the character described, without surrendering all claim to the respect of honorable men—all confidence on the part of the people, all self-respect, all regard for moral and religious obligations; without an observance of which no government can be prosperous, and no people can be happy. It would be to commit a crime, which I would not wilfully commit to gain any earthly reward, and which would justly subject me to the ridicule and scorn of all virtuous men.’
Mr. President, I must think, and hope I may be allowed to say, with profound deference to the chief magistrate, that it appears to me, he has viewed with too lively sensibility the personal consequences to himself of his approval of the bill; and that, surrendering himself to a vivid imagination, he has depicted them in much too glowing and exaggerated colors, and that it would have been most happy, if he had looked more to the deplorable consequences of a veto upon the hopes, the interests, and the happiness of his country. Does it follow that a magistrate who yields his private judgment to the concurring authority of numerous decisions, repeatedly and deliberately pronounced, after the lapse of long intervals, by all the departments of government, and by all parties, incurs the dreadful penalties described by the president? Can any man be disgraced and dishonored, who yields his private opinion to the judgment of the nation? In this case, the country, (I mean a majority,) congress, and, according to common fame, a unanimous cabinet, were all united in favor of the bill. Should any man feel himself humbled and degraded in yielding to the conjoint force of such high authority? Does any man, who at one period of his life shall have expressed a particular opinion, and at a subsequent period shall act upon the opposite opinion, expose himself to the terrible consequences which have been portrayed by the president? How is it with the judge, in the case by no means rare, who bows to the authority of repeated precedents, settling a particular question, whilst in his private judgment, the law was otherwise? How is it with that numerous class of public men in this country, and with the two great parties that have divided it, who, at different periods have maintained and acted on opposite opinions in respect to this very bank question?
How is it with James Madison, the father of the constitution—that great man whose services to his country placed him only second to Washington; whose virtues and purity in private life, whose patriotism, intelligence, and wisdom in public councils, stand unsurpassed? He was a member of the national convention that formed, and of the Virginia convention that adopted, the constitution. No man understood it better than he did. He was opposed, in 1791, to the establishment of the bank of the United States, upon constitutional ground; and, in 1816, he approved and signed the charter of the late bank of the United States. It is a part of the secret history connected with the first bank, that James Madison had, at the instance of general Washington, prepared a veto for him in the contingency of his rejection of the bill. Thus stood James Madison, when, in 1815, he applied the veto to a bill to charter a bank upon considerations of expediency, but with a clear and express admission of the existence of a constitutional power of congress to charter one. In 1816, the bill which was then presented to him being free from the objections applicable tothat of the previous year, he sanctioned and signed it. Did James Madison surrender ‘all claim to the respect of honorable men, all confidence on the part of the people, all self-respect, all regard for moral and religious obligations?’ Did the pure, the virtuous, the gifted James Madison, by his sanction and signature to the charter of the late bank of the United States, commit a crime, which justly subjected him ‘to the ridicule and scorn of all virtuous men?’
Not only did the president, as it respectfully appears to me, state entirely too strongly the consequences of his approval of the bill, but is he perfectly correct in treating the question, (as he seems to me to have done,) which he was called upon to decide, as presenting the sole alternative of his direct approval or rejection of the bill? Was the preservation of the consistency and the conscience of the president wholly irreconcilable with the restoration of the blessings of a sound currency, regular and moderate exchanges, and the revival of confidence and business, which congress believes will be secured by a national bank? Was there no alternative but to prolong the sufferings of a bleeding country, or to send us this veto? From the administration of the executive department of the government, during the last twelve years, has sprung most of the public ills which have afflicted the people. Was it necessary that that source of suffering should continue to operate, in order to preserve the conscience of the president unviolated? Was that the only sad and deplorable alternative? I think, Mr. President, there were other alternatives worthy of the serious and patriotic consideration of the president. The bill might have become a law, in virtue of the provision which required its return within ten days. If the president had retained it three days longer, it would have been a law, without his sanction and without his signature. In such a contingency, the president would have remained passive, and would not have been liable to any accusation of having himself violated the constitution. All that could have been justly said would be, that he did not choose to throw himself in the way as an obstacle to the passage of a measure indispensable to the prosperity of the nation, in the judgment of the party which brought him into power, of the whig congress which he first met, and, if public fame speaks true, of the cabinet which the lamented Harrison called around him, and which he voluntarily continued. In an analagous case, Thomas McKean, when governor of Pennsylvania, than whom the United States have produced but few men of equal vigor of mind and firmness of purpose, permitted a bill to become a law, although, in his opinion, it was contrary to the constitution of that state. And I have heard, and, from the creditable nature of the source, I am inclined to believe, although I will not vouch for the fact, that towards the close of the charter of the first bank of the United States during the second term of Mr. Jefferson, someconsideration of the question of the renewal of the charter was entertained, and that he expressed a wish, that, if the charter were renewed, it might be effected by the operation of the ten days’ provision, and his consistency thus preserved.
If it were possible to disinter the venerated remains of James Madison, reanimate his perishing form, and place him once more in that chair of state, which he so much adorned, what would have been his course, if this bill had been presented to him, even supposing him never to have announced his acquiescence in the settled judgment of the nation? He would have said, that human controversy, in regard to a single question, should not be perpetual, and ought to have a termination. This, about the power to establish a bank of the United States, has been long enough continued. The nation, under all the forms of its public action, has often and deliberately decided it. A bank, and associated financial and currency questions, which had long slept, were revived, and have divided the nation during the last ten years of arduous and bitter struggle; and the party which put down the bank, and which occasioned all the disorders in our currency and finances, has itself been signally put down, by one of those great moral and political revolutions which a free, a patriotic people can but seldom arouse itself to make. Human infallibility has not been granted by God; and the chances of error are much greater on the side of one man, than on that of the majority of a whole people and their successive legislatures during a long period of time. I yield to the irresistible force of authority. I will not put myself in opposition to a measure so imperatively demanded by the public voice, and so essential to elevate my depressed and suffering countrymen.
And why should not president Tyler have suffered the bill to become a law without his signature? Without meaning the slightest possible disrespect to him, (nothing is further from my heart than the exhibition of any such feeling towards that distinguished citizen, long my personal friend,) it cannot be forgotten, that he came into his present office under peculiar circumstances. The people did not foresee the contingency which has happened. They voted for him as vice-president. They did not, therefore, scrutinize his opinions with the care which they probably ought to have done, and would have done, if they could have looked into futurity. If the present state of the fact could have been anticipated—if at Harrisburg, or at the polls, it had been foreseen, that general Harrison would die in one short month after the commencement of his administration; that vice-president Tyler would be elevated to the presidential chair; that a bill, passed by decisive majorities of the first whig congress, chartering a national bank, would be presented for his sanction, and that he would veto the bill, do I hazard any thing, when I express the conviction, that he wouldnot have received a solitary vote in the nominating convention nor one solitary electoral vote in any state in the union?