A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 3, part 1: Andrew Jackson (Second Term)

by Unknown

The President, as the chief executive power, must have a free and entirely unfettered communication with the coordinate powers of Government. As the organ of intercourse with other nations, he is the only source from which a knowledge of our relations with them can be conveyed to the legislative branches. It results from this that the utmost freedom from all restraint in the details into which he is obliged to enter of international concerns and of the measures in relation to them is essential to the proper performance of this important part of his functions. He must exercise them without having continually before him the fear of offending the susceptibility of the powers whose conduct he is obliged to notice. In the performance of this duty he is subject to public opinion and his own sense of propriety for an indiscreet, to his constituents for a dangerous, and to his constitutional judges for an illegal, exercise of the power, but to no other censure, foreign or domestic. Were any foreign powers permitted to scan the communications of the Executive, their complaints, whether real or affected, would involve the country in continual controversies; for the right being acknowledged, it would be a duty to exercise it by demanding a disavowal of every phrase they might deem offensive and an explanation of every word to which an improper interpretation could be given. The principle, therefore, has been adopted that no foreign power has a right to ask for explanations of anything that the President, in the exercise of his functions, thinks proper to communicate to Congress, or of any course he may advise them to pursue. This rule is not applicable to the Government of the United States alone, but, in common with it, to all those in which the constitutional powers are distributed into different branches. No such nation desirous of avoiding foreign influence or foreign interference in its councils; no such nation possessing a due sense of its dignity and independence, can long submit to the consequences of this interference. When these are felt, as they soon will be, all must unite in repelling it, and acknowledge that the United States are contending in a cause common to them all, and more important to the liberal Governments of Europe than even to themselves; for it is too obvious to escape the slightest attention that the Monarchies of Europe by which they are surrounded will have all the advantage of this supervision of the domestic councils of their neighbors without being subject to it themselves. It is true that in the representative Governments of Europe executive communications to legislative bodies have not the extension that is given to them in the United States, and that they are therefore less liable to attack on that quarter; but they must not imagine themselves safe. In the opening address, guarded as it commonly is, every proposition made by the ministry, every resolution of either chamber, will offer occasions for the jealous interference of national punctilio, for all occupy the same grounds. No intercommunication of the different branches of Government will be safe, and even the courts of justice will afford no sanctuary for freedom of decision and of debate, and the susceptibility of foreign powers must be consulted in all the departments of Government. Occasions for intervention in the affairs of other countries are but too numerous at present, without opening another door to encroachments; and it is no answer to the argument to say that no complaints will be made but for reasonable cause, and that of this, the nation complained of being the judge, no evil can ensue. But this argument concedes the right of examining the communications in question, which is denied. Allow it and you will have frivolous as well as grave complaints to answer, and must not only heal the wounds of a just national pride, but apply a remedy to those of a morbid susceptibility. To show that my fear of the progressive nature of these encroachments is not imaginary, I pray leave to call your excellency's attention to the inclosed report from the Secretary of State to the President. It is offered for illustration, not for complaint; I am instructed to make none. Because the Government of France has taken exceptions to the President's opening message, the chargé d'affaires of France thinks it his duty to protest against a special communication, and to point out the particular passages in a correspondence of an American minister with his own Government to the publication of which he objects. If the principle I contest is just, the chargé d'affaires is right. He has done his duty as a vigilant supervisor of the President's correspondence. If the principle is admitted, every diplomatic agent at Washington will do the same, and we shall have twenty censors of the correspondence of the Government and of the public press. If the principle is correct, every communication which the President makes in relation to our foreign affairs, either to the Congress or to the public, ought in prudence to be previously submitted to these ministers, in order to avoid disputes and troublesome and humiliating explanations. If the principle be submitted to, neither dignity nor independence is left to the nation. To submit even to a discreet exercise of such a privilege would be troublesome and degrading, and the inevitable abuse of it could not be borne. It must therefore be resisted at the threshold, and its entrance forbidden into the sanctuary of domestic consultations. But whatever may be the principles of other governments, those of the United States are fixed; the right will never be acknowledged, and any attempt to enforce it will be repelled by the undivided energy of the nation.

I pray your excellency to observe that my argument does not deny a right to all foreign powers of taking proper exceptions to the governmental acts and language of another. It is to their interference in its consultations, in its proceedings while yet in an inchoate state, that we object. Should the President do an official executive act affecting a foreign power, or use exceptionable language in addressing it through his minister or through theirs; should a law be passed injurious to the dignity of another nation—in all these and other similar cases a demand for explanation would be respectfully received, and answered in the manner that justice and a regard to the dignity of the complaining nation would require.

After stating these principles, let me add that they have not only been theoretically adopted, but that they have been practically asserted. On two former occasions exceptions of the same nature were taken to the President's message by the Government of France, and in neither did they produce any other explanation than that derived from the nature of our Government, and this seems on those occasions to have been deemed sufficient, for in both cases the objections were virtually abandoned—one when Messrs. Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney were refused to be received, and again in the negotiation between Prince Polignac and Mr. Rives. In the former case, although the message of the President was alleged as the cause of the refusal to receive the ministers, yet without any such explanation their successors were honorably accredited. In the latter case the allusion in the message to an apprehended collision was excepted to, but the reference made by Mr. Rives to the constitutional duties of the President seems to have removed the objection.

Having demonstrated that the United States can not in any case permit their Chief Magistrate to be questioned by any foreign government in relation to his communications with the coordinate branches of his own, it is scarcely necessary to consider the case of such an explanation being required as the condition on which the fulfillment of a treaty or any pecuniary advantage was to depend. The terms of such a proposition need only be stated to show that it would be not only inadmissible, but rejected as offensive to the nation to which it might be addressed. In this case it would be unnecessary as well as inadmissible. France has already received, by the voluntary act of the President, every explanation the nicest sense of national honor could desire. That which could not have been given to a demand, that which can never be given on the condition now under discussion, a fortunate succession of circumstances, as I shall proceed to shew, has brought about. Earnestly desirous of restoring the good understanding between the two nations, as soon as a dissatisfaction with the President's message was shewn I suppressed every feeling which the mode of expressing that dissatisfaction was calculated to produce, and without waiting for instructions I hastened on my own responsibility to make a communication to your predecessor in office on the subject. In this, under the reserve that the President could not be called on for an explanation, I did in fact give one that I thought would have removed all injurious impressions.

This is the first of the fortunate circumstances to which I have alluded—fortunate in being made before any demand implying a right to require it; fortunate in its containing, without any knowledge of the precise parts of the message which gave offense, answers to all that have since come to my knowledge. I can easily conceive that the communication of which I speak, made, as I expressly stated, without previous authority from my Government, might not have had the effect which its matter was intended to produce, but it has since (as I have now the honor to inform your excellency) received from the President his full and unqualified approbation; but it is necessary to add that this was given before he had any intimation of an intention to attach it as a condition to the payment of the indemnity due by the treaty, given not only when he was ignorant of any such intent, but when he was informed by France that she intended to execute the treaty and saw by the law which was introduced that it was not to be fettered by any such condition. Thus that is already done by a voluntary act which could not have been done when required as a right, still less when made, what will unquestionably in the United States be considered degrading, as a condition. At this time, sir, I would for no consideration enter into the details I then did. If I could now so far forget what under present circumstances would be due to the dignity of my country, I should be disavowed, and deservedly disavowed, by the President. It is happy, therefore, I repeat, that the good feeling of my country was evinced in the manner I have stated at the only time when it could be done with honor; and though present circumstances would forbid my making the communication I then did, they do not prevent my referring to it for the purpose of shewing that it contains, as I have stated it does, everything that ought to have been satisfactory. Actual circumstances enable me to do this now. Future events, which I need not explain, may hereafter render it improper, and it may be nugatory unless accepted as satisfactory before the occurrence of those events. Let it be examined with the care which the importance of giving it a true construction requires. The objections to the message, as far as I can understand, for they have never been specified, are:

First. That it impeaches the good faith of His Majesty's Government.

Secondly. That it contains a menace of enforcing the performance of the treaty by reprisals.

On the first head, were I now discussing the terms of the message itself, it would be easy to shew that it contains no such charge. The allegation that the stipulations of a treaty have not been complied with, that engagements made by ministers have not been fulfilled, couched in respectful terms, can never be deemed offensive, even when expressly directed to the party whose infractions are complained of, and consequently can never give cause for a demand of explanation; otherwise it is evident that no consideration of national injuries could ever take place. The message, critically examined on this point, contains nothing more than such an enumeration of the causes of complaint. As to its terms, the most fastidious disposition can not fasten on one that could be excepted to. The first refusal and subsequent delay are complained of, but no unworthy motives for either are charged or insinuated. On the whole, if I were commissioned to explain and defend this part of the message, I should say with the conviction of truth that it is impossible to urge a complaint in milder or more temperate terms; but I am not so commissioned. I am endeavoring to shew not only that every proper explanation is given in my letter to M. de Rigny of the 29th of January last, but that in express terms it declares that the sincerity of His Majesty's Government in their desire to execute the treaty was not doubted. Suffer me to draw your excellency's attention to the passages alluded to. In discussing the nature of M. Sérurier's engagement I say:

"It is clear, therefore, that more was required than the expression of a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers to execute the treaty, a desire the sincerity of which was never doubted, but which might be unavailing, as its accomplishment depended on the vote of the Chambers."

Again, in speaking of the delay which occurred in the month of December, I say: