"It is referred to, I presume, in order to shew that it was produced by a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers the better to assure the passage of the law. Of this, sir, I never had a doubt, and immediately so advised my Government, and informed it, as was the fact, that I perfectly acquiesced in the delay."
Thus it must be evident, not only that no offensive charge of ill faith is made in the message, but that, as is expressly stated in the first extract, full justice was done at Washington to the intentions of the French Government. While the delay is complained of us a wrong, no improper motives are attributed to the Government in causing it. Again, sir, the whole tenor of that part of my letter which relates to the inexecution of the promise made by M. Sérurier, while it asserts the construction put upon it by the President to be the true one, and appeals to facts and circumstances to support that construction, yet it avoids charging the French Government with any intentional violation, by attributing their delay to an erroneous construction only; for in the letter (I again quote literally) I say:
"I have entered into this detail with the object of showing that although the ministers of the King, under the interpretation they seem to have given to M. Sérurier's promise, may have considered themselves at liberty to defer the presentation of the law until the period which they thought would best secure its success, yet the President, interpreting that promise differently, feeling that in consequence of it he had forborne to do what might be strictly called a duty, and seeing that its performance had not taken place, could not avoid stating the whole case clearly and distinctly to Congress."
Thus, sir, the President, in stating the acts of which he thought his country had reason to complain, does not make a single imputation of improper motive, and to avoid all misconstruction he offers a voluntary declaration that none such were entertained.
The part of the message which seems to have caused the greatest sensation in France is that in which, after a statement of the causes of complaint, it enters into a consideration of the measures to obtain redress which in similar cases are sanctioned by the laws of nations. The complaint seems to be that, in a discussion it was impossible to avoid, of the efficacy and convenience of each, a preference was given to reprisals, considered as a remedial, not as a hostile, measure, and this has been construed into a menace. If any explanations were necessary on this head, they are given in the message itself. It is there expressly disavowed, and the power and high character of France are appealed to to shew that it never could be induced by threats to do what its sense of justice denied. If the measure to which I have more than once alluded should be resorted to, and the humiliation attending a compliance with it could be endured; if it were possible under such circumstances to give an explanation, what more could be required than that which is contained in the message itself that it was not intended as a menace? If the measure to which I alluded should be adopted and submitted to, what would His Majesty's Government require? The disavowal of any intent to influence the councils of France by threats? They have it already. It forms a part of the very instrument which caused the offense, and I will not do them the injustice to think that they could form the offensive idea of requiring more. The necessity of discussing the nature of the remedies for the nonexecution of the treaty, the character and spirit in which it was done, are explained in my letter so often referred to, and I pray your excellency to consider the concluding part of it, beginning with the quotation I have last made. But if I wanted any argument to shew that no explanation of this part of the message was necessary or could be required, I should find it in the opinion—certainly a just one—expressed by His Majesty's ministers, that the recommendation of the President not having been adopted by the other branches of the Government it was not a national act, and could not be complained of as such. Nay, in the note presented by M. Sérurier to the Government at Washington and the measures which it announces (his recall and the offer of my passports) the Government of His Majesty seem to have done all that they thought its dignity required, for they at the same time declare that the law providing for the payment will be presented, but give no intimation of any previous condition and annex none to the bill which they present. The account of dignity being thus declared by this demonstration to be settled, it can not be supposed that it will again be introduced as a set-off against an acknowledged pecuniary balance. Before I conclude my observations on this part of the subject it will be well to inquire in what light exceptions are taken to this part of the message, whether as a menace generally or to the particular measure proposed. In the first view, if every measure that a Government having claims on another declares it must pursue if those claims are not allowed (whatever may be the terms employed) is a menace, it is necessary, and not objectionable unless couched in offensive language; it is a fair declaration of what course the party making it intends to pursue, and except in cases where pretexts were wanted for a rupture have rarely been objected to, even when avowedly the act of the nation, not, as in this case, a proposal made by one branch of its Government to another. Instances of this are not wanting, but need not be here enumerated. One, however, ought to be mentioned, because it is intimately connected with the subject now under discussion. While the commerce of the United States was suffering under the aggressions of the two most powerful nations of the world the American Government, in this sense of the word, menaced them both. It passed a law in express terms declaring to them that unless they ceased their aggressions America would hold no intercourse with them; that their ships would be seized if they ventured into American ports; that the productions of their soil or industry should be forfeited. Here was an undisguised menace in clear, unequivocal terms, and of course, according to the argument against which I contend, neither France nor England could deliberate under its pressure without dishonor. Yet the Emperor of France, certainly an unexceptionable judge of what the dignity of his country required, did deliberate, did accept the condition, did repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees, did not make any complaint of the act as a threat, though he called it an injury. Great Britain, too, although at that time on not very friendly terms with the United States, made no complaint that her pride was offended. Her minister on the spot even made a declaration that the obnoxious orders were repealed. It is true he was disavowed, but the disavowal was accompanied by no objections to the law as a threat. Should the objection be to the nature of the remedy proposed, and that the recommendation of reprisals is the offensive part, it would be easy to show that it stands on the same ground with any other remedy; that it is not hostile in its nature; that it has been resorted to by France to procure redress from other powers, and by them against her, without producing war. But such an argument is not necessary. This is not the case of a national measure, either of menace or action; it is a recommendation only of one branch of Government to another, and France has itself shown that a proposal of this nature could not be noticed as an offense. In the year 1808 the Senate of the United States annexed to the bill of nonintercourse a section which not only advised but actually authorized the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against both France and England, if the one did not repeal the Berlin and Milan decrees and the other did not revoke the orders in council. This clause was not acceded to by the Representatives, but it was complete as the act of the Senate; yet neither France nor England complained of it as an indignity. Both powers had ministers on the spot, and the dignity of neither seems to have been offended.
If the view I have now taken of the subject be correct; if I have succeeded in conveying to His Majesty's ministers the conviction I myself feel that no right exists in any foreign nation to ask explanations of or even to notice any communications between the different branches of our Government; that to admit it even in a single instance would be a dangerous precedent and a derogation from national dignity, and that in the present instance an explanation that ought to be satisfactory has been voluntarily given, I have then demonstrated that any measure founded on such supposed right is not only inadmissible, but is totally unnecessary, and consequently that His Majesty's ministers may at once declare that previous explanations given by the minister of the United States, and subsequently approved by the President, had satisfied them on the subject of the message.
The motives of my Government during the whole course of this controversy have been misunderstood or not properly appreciated, and the question is daily changing its character. A negotiation entered into for procuring compensation to individuals involved no positive obligation on their Governments to prosecute it to extremities. A solemn treaty, ratified by the constitutional organs of the two powers, changed the private into a public right. The Government acquires by it a perfect right to insist on its stipulations. All doubts as to their justice seem now to have been removed, and every objection to the payment of a debt acknowledged to be just will be severely scrutinized by the impartial world. What character will be given to a refusal to pay such a debt on the allegation, whether well or ill founded, of an offense to national honor it does not become me to say. The French nation are the last that would ever appreciate national honor by any number of millions it could withhold as a compensation for an injury offered to it. The United States, commercial as they are, are the last that would settle such an account. The proposition I allude to would be unworthy of both, and it is sincerely to be hoped that it will never be made.
To avoid the possibility of misapprehension, I repeat that this communication is made with the single view of apprising His Majesty's Government of the consequences attending a measure which without such notice they might be inclined to pursue; that although I am not authorized to state what measures will be taken by the United States, yet I speak confidently of the principles they have adopted, and have no doubt they will never be abandoned.
This is the last communication I shall have the honor to make. It is dictated by a sincere desire to restore a good intelligence, which seems to be endangered by the very measure intended to consolidate it. Whatever be the result, the United States may appeal to the world to bear witness that in the assertion of the rights of their citizens and the dignity of their Government they have never swerved from the respect due to themselves and from that which they owe to the Government of France.
I pray your excellency to receive the assurance of the high consideration with which I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,