Here, then, we have a stipulation made under special orders, sent out by a ship dispatched for that express purpose, communicated first verbally in an official conference, afterwards reduced to writing and delivered to the proper officers, for the double purpose of justifying the President for not making an immediate communication at their then session and also to serve as a pledge which he might exhibit if unredeemed at their next. These objects are well stated by Mr. Sérurier to be "that the Government of the Republic may avoid, with a providential solicitude, in this unsettled state of things all that may become a cause of new irritation between the two countries, endanger the treaty, and raise obstacles that may become insurmountable to the views of conciliation and harmony which animate the councils of the King." It was, then, to avoid a communication to Congress, which Mr. Sérurier saw would endanger the peace of the two countries, that this engagement was made. Surely, then, every word of a stipulation made under such circumstances and for such important purposes must have been duly considered and its import properly weighed, first by the cabinet who directed, afterwards by the minister who delivered and the Government which received it.
What, then, was this engagement? First, that the Government of the King will use every legal and constitutional effort which its persevering persuasion of the justice and advantages of the treaty authorize the United States to expect from it. "Son intention est" (I quote literally), "en outre" (that is, besides using those endeavors above mentioned), "de faire tout ce que not re constitution permet pour rapprocher autant que possible l'époque de la presentation nouvelle de la loi rejettée." Your excellency can not fail to have observed two distinct parts in this engagement—one relating to the endeavors the ministry promise to make in order to induce the Chambers to pass the law, for the success of which they could not answer; another relating to the time of presentation of the law, a matter which depended on them alone, restricted only by constitutional forms.
The promise on this point, then, was precise, and could not be misunderstood. Whatever the constitution of France permitted, the Government of France promised to do in order to hasten the presentation of the law. What was the cause of this desire to bring the business before the Chambers at an early day? No one can doubt it who knows the situation of the two countries, still less anyone who has read the correspondence. It was to enable the President to make those statements to the next Congress which, relying on the engagements of the French minister, he had omitted to make to this.
It was clear, therefore, that more was required than the expression of a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers to execute the treaty—a desire the sincerity of which was not doubted, but which might be unavailing, as its accomplishment depended on the vote of the Chambers. For the President's satisfaction, and for his justification too, an engagement was offered and accepted for the performance of an act which depended on His Majesty's Government alone. This engagement was couched in the unequivocal terms I have literally quoted.
This, sir, is not all. That there might be no misunderstanding on the subject, this promise, with the sense in which it was understood, the important object for which it was given, and the serious consequences that might attend a failure to comply with it, were urged in conversation, and repeated in my official letters, particularly those of the 26th and 29th of July and 3d and 9th of August last, in which its performance was strongly pressed.
The answers to these letters left no hope that the question would be submitted to the Chambers in time to have the result known before the adjournment of Congress, and by the refusal to hasten the convocation of the Chambers before the last of December showed unequivocally that, so far from taking all measures permitted by the constitution to hasten the period of presenting the law, it was to be left to the most remote period of the ordinary course of legislation.
This decision of His Majesty's Government, contained in your excellency's note to me of the 7th August, was duly transmitted to the President, and it naturally produced upon his mind the impressions which I anticipated in my letters to your excellency that it would produce. He saw with the deepest regret that a positive assurance for convening the Chambers as soon as the constitution would permit was construed to mean only a disposition to do so, and that this disposition had yielded to objections which he could not think of sufficient force to justify a delay even if there had intervened no promise, especially as the serious consequences of that delay had been earnestly and repeatedly brought to the consideration of His Majesty's Government. In fact, sir, what were those objections? I do not speak of those which were made to presenting the law in the session of July last, for although no constitutional impediment offered itself, yet it was not strongly insisted on, because an early session in the autumn, would have the same effect; and the President, for the same reason, says that it might have been overlooked if an early call of the Chambers had been made. They are the objections to this call, then, which immediately demand our attention. What, in fact, were they? None derived from the constitutional charter have been or could have been asserted. What, then, were they? Your excellency's letter of the 3d of August to me contains none but this: "His Majesty's Government finds it impossible to make any positive engagement on that point." In that of the 7th of August there are two reasons assigned: First, the general inconvenience to the members. This the President could surely not think of alleging to Congress as a sufficient reason for omitting to lay the matter before them. The next, I confess, has a little more weight, and might have excused a delay if the assurance given by Mr. Sérurier had been, as your excellency construes it, merely of a disposition to hasten the presentation of the law. If the engagement had amounted to no more than this, and His Majesty's ministers thought that an early call would endanger the passage of the law, it might possibly justify them in not making it. But the President, who relied on the promise he had received, who in consequence of it had deferred the performance of an important duty; the President, who had given timely and official notice that this duty must be performed at the opening of the next Congress; the President, who could see no greater prospect of the passage of the law in a winter than in an autumnal session—how was he to justify himself and redeem the pledge he had made to his country? He did it in the way he always does—by a strict performance.
From this detail your excellency will, I hope, see that the President's causes of complaint can not, as you suppose, be confined within the narrow limit you have assigned to them. The failure to present the law in the session of July was not the only, nor even the principal, point in which he thought the engagement of Mr. Sérurier uncomplied with; for although he saw no reason for the omission that could be called a constitutional one, yet he expressly says that might have been overlooked. He always (it can not too often be repeated) looked to the promise of Mr. Sérurier as it was given at Washington, not as it was interpreted at Paris, and he had a right to believe that as on previous occasions the Legislature had, in the years 1819, 1822, 1825, and 1830, held their sessions for the transaction of the ordinary business in the months of July and August, he had a right, I say, to believe that there was no insurmountable objection to the consideration of this extraordinary case, enforced by a positive promise. Yet, as I have remarked, he did not make this his principal cause of complaint; it was the omission to call the Chambers at an earlier period than the very end of the year.
On this head your excellency is pleased to observe that the same reasons, drawn from the usual course of administration, which rendered the presentation of the law in the session of July impossible applied with nearly the same force to a call before the end of the year; and you appeal to the President's knowledge of the "fixed principles of a constitutional system" to prove that the administration under such a government is subject to regular and permanent forms, "from which no special interest, however important, should induce it to deviate." For this branch of the argument it unfortunately happens that no regular form of administration, no fixed principle, no usage whatever, would have opposed a call of the Chambers at an early day, and the rule which your excellency states would not be broken "in favor of any interest, however important," has actually been made to yield to one of domestic occurrence. The Chambers have just been convened before the period which was declared to be the soonest at which they could possibly meet. Your excellency will also excuse me for remarking that since the first institution of the Chambers, in 1814, there have been convocations for every month of the year, without exception, which I will take the liberty of bringing to your recollection by enumerating the different dates. The Chambers were summoned for the month of January in the years 1823, 1826, and 1829; for February, in the years 1827 and 1829; for March, in 1815, 1824, and 1830; for April, in 1833; for May, in 1814; for June, in 1815, 1822, and 1825; for July, in 1834; for August, in 1830 and 1831; for September, in 1815; for October, in 1816; for November, in 1817, 1818, 1819, 1821, and 1832; and for December, in 1820, 1824, 1826, and 1833. It is, then, clear to demonstration that neither constitutional impediment nor stern, inflexible usage prevented such a call of the Chambers as would have complied with the letter of Mr. Sérurier's engagement. Since I have alluded to the actual meeting of the Chambers on the 1st of December, it is but candid to allow that even this period would not have enabled the President to have attained one of his objects—the presenting of the result of their deliberations to Congress in his opening message. But even that slight concession, if it had been made to my unceasing applications, might have given an opportunity of conveying their decision to Congress before the 4th of March, when they must adjourn, because, had that day been then determined on, everything would have been ready to lay before the Chambers on the opening of the session; but a meeting a month or six weeks earlier would have given ample time for deliberation and decision in season to have it known at Washington on the 1st of December.
The necessity of giving time to the new members to inform themselves of the nature of the question and the old ones to recover from the impression which erroneous statements had made upon their minds I understand to be the remaining motive of His Majesty's ministers for delaying the meeting; but this was a precaution which, relying on the plain obligation of the treaty, the President could not appreciate, and he must, moreover, have thought that if a long discussion was necessary to understand the merits of the question it was an additional reason for hastening the meeting where those merits were to be discussed. The delay that occurred between the meeting of the Chambers and the 1st of January need not have entered into the discussion, because, not long known at Washington, it could not have had any influence on the message. It is referred to, I presume, in order to show that it was produced by a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers the better to assure the passage of the law. Of this, sir, I never had a doubt, and immediately so advised my Government, and informed it (as was the fact) that I perfectly acquiesced in the delay; first, because of the circumstance to which you allude; secondly, because the statements originally intended to be ready by the 1st of January were not yet prepared. There is a slight error in this part of your excellency's letter; the delay was not made at my request, but was fully approved of, for the reasons which I have stated.