He then took the benefit of the insolvent debtors’ act.
Instead of having been employed in the Manchester commission tea trade in the year 1824, as the defendant had stated to the plaintiffs, it appeared that he had, at the recommendation of the defendant, been taken into partnership without any capital by Mr. R. C. Stewart, a warehouseman in London, in July, 1823; but great losses having been incurred in that concern, aggravated by a robbery to some amount, Mr. Stewart closed the concern and dissolved the partnership in October, 1824.
Jacque was then indebted to Stewart in the sum of £800, which he undertook by deed, dated November 13, 1824, to pay by instalments, in two, three, and four years; but nothing was ever paid.
All this was known to the defendant, who had acted throughout for Jacque, and had negotiated the terms of the dissolution of partnership.
Letters were also put in, written by the defendant to Jacque, after the exposure of the Manchester transactions, in which the defendant exhorted Jacque to write various falsehoods to the plaintiffs with a view to the exculpation of the defendant, and to conceal from the plaintiffs his knowledge of some of the transactions at Manchester.
When the defendant was first applied to on the subject by the plaintiffs, he expressed his regret that his house should have been the means of introducing an unworthy agent to the plaintiffs; but that as they had been instrumental in bringing the loss on the plaintiffs, he would see his partner on the subject, and see what could be done towards relieving them from it. No step of that kind having been taken, the present action was commenced.
Tindal, C. J., told the jury to consider whether the representation complained of by the plaintiffs had ever been made, and if made, whether it was false within the knowledge of the defendant; for unless it were false within his knowledge, the action did not lie.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, which was set aside by the Court. [6 Bingham, 396.]
Upon a new trial, Tindal, C. J., told the jury that if the defendant made representations concerning Jacque, the tendency of which was to occasion loss to the plaintiff, knowing such representations to be false, and intending thereby to benefit himself, he was guilty of fraud in the common acceptation of the term; if he made such representations, knowing them to be false, without proposing thereby any advantage to himself, but proposing, perhaps, to benefit a third person, he was guilty of fraud in the legal acceptation of the term, and responsible to the plaintiff for any injury resulting from such representations.
The jury thereupon found for the plaintiff, damages £800; but added: “We consider there was no actual fraud on the part of the defendant, and that he had no fraudulent intention, although what he has done constituted a fraud in the legal acceptation of the term.”