A Selection of Cases on the Law of Torts

by Unknown

Jones, Serjt., now contended that this amounted to a verdict for the defendant; and therefore moved that the verdict might be entered for him, instead of the plaintiff.

He urged, at some length, nearly the same arguments as he had advanced on a former occasion, and adverted to the same authorities (see 6 Bing. 402); contending that this action was substituted for the ancient writ of deceit; that the gist of the action was a fraudulent intent on the part of the defendant to injure the plaintiff by deceiving him; that a defendant was not responsible for the consequences of a statement, merely because he knew it to be false; he was not responsible for the consequences of a bare lie; in order to render him responsible, it ought to be shown that he intended to defraud the plaintiff of something by the deceit he had practised. That if a party were responsible for the consequences of a lie told without any intention to defraud the hearer of something, no line could be drawn, and parties might be called on to answer for those excusable untruths, which were sometimes told for the purpose of avoiding a greater mischief.

Tindal, C. J. No sufficient ground has been laid to induce us to disturb the verdict which has been found for the plaintiff. The application arises on a misconception of what the jury have found. They first deliver a verdict for the plaintiff, with damages, and then add, that in point of fact they consider the defendant had no fraudulent intention, although he had been guilty of fraud in the legal acceptation of the term.

Their attention had been drawn by me to two classes of motives possible on the part of the defendant; first, a desire to benefit himself by making a statement which he knew to be false; secondly, a desire to benefit some third person; and I stated that, although there might be no intention on his part to obtain an advantage for himself, it would still be a fraud, for which he was responsible in law, if he made representations productive of loss to another, knowing such representations to be false.

The jury in finding that he had no intention to defraud mean only that he was not actuated by the baser motive of obtaining an advantage for himself, but that he was guilty of fraud in law by stating that which he knew to be false, and which was the cause of loss to the plaintiff.

The question, therefore, is, whether, if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and occasions injury thereby, he is not liable for the consequences of his falsehood.

It would be most dangerous to hold that he is not.

The confusion seems to have arisen from not distinguishing between what is fraud in law and the motives for actual fraud. It is fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues, although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad; the person who makes such representations is responsible for the consequences; and the verdict, therefore, in this case ought not to be disturbed.

Park, J. I am of the same opinion. In what fell from this Court in the case of Tapp v. Lee, and upon the former decision of the present case, the doctrine has been laid down most accurately. It would be unfair to take the expressions of the jury, without connecting them with what the Chief Justice had just presented for their consideration. It is clear that the jury meant to draw the distinction between the sordid motive of personal advantage and the legal fraud which might be committed by a representation false within the knowledge of the speaker, although made without any view to his own advantage. For such a representation the defendant is responsible if mischief ensues, whatever may have been his motive; and as to its being necessary to prove the motive by which he was actuated: when the case was last before the Court, Tindal, C. J., said, “I am not aware of any authority for such a position, nor that it can be material what the motive was; the law will infer an improper motive, if what the defendant says is false within his own knowledge, and is the occasion of damage to the plaintiff.”

Here the defendant said “That his friend was so excellent a young man, that he would rather trust him without security than most men with;” when he knew the contrary to be the fact, he was guilty of a fraud in law in making such a representation; and fraud in law is sufficient to support this action.