Proceedings for compensation having been taken, the county court judge found as a fact that there was a genuine incapacity to work which was due to the nervous shock which he sustained in October, 1909, when it clearly was his duty to his employers to go to the assistance of the injured collier who shouted for help from the next working place, and that his doing so arose both “in course of” and “out of” his employment. The learned county court judge accordingly awarded the applicant compensation at 19s. a week to the date of the award, and 10s. a week till further order.
The respondents appealed.[[55]]
Farwell, L. J. I am of the same opinion. It is rightly conceded that it was part of the man’s duty to go to the assistance of his fellow workman. Therefore there is no question that the events arose “out of and in the course of the employment.” The learned county court judge has found as a fact that there was a genuine incapacity to work, which was due to the nervous shock which the applicant sustained in October last. In my opinion nervous shock due to accident which causes personal incapacity to work is as much “personal injury by accident” as a broken leg, for the reasons already expressed by this court in the case of Eaves v. Blaenclydach Colliery Co., [1909] 2 K. B. 73. In truth I find it difficult, when the medical evidence is that as a fact a workman is suffering from a known complaint arising from nervous shock, to draw any distinction between that case and the case of a broken limb. I see no distinction for this purpose between the case of the guard who is not in fact physically injured by an accident to his train, but who, after assisting to carry away the wounded and dead, breaks down from nervous shock, and the case of the guard who in similar circumstances stumbles over some of the débris and breaks his leg.[[56]] The difficulty is to prove the facts so as to avoid the risk of malingering, but when the facts have been proved, the injury causing incapacity to work arises from the accident in the one case just as much as in the other. I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the learned county court judge must be affirmed.
Kennedy, L. J. I am of the same opinion. It is beyond question that the incapacity of the applicant has arisen in the course of and out of the employment; and when you have a finding of fact by the learned county court judge that there has been a nervous shock, and that that nervous shock has produced a genuine condition of neurasthenia, I think myself the recent authorities show that this judgment ought to be supported. One knows perfectly well that neurasthenia, although there may be no outward sign if you merely look at the person, is treated, and successfully treated in some cases at any rate, by a treatment of the body. Directly you have that which requires treatment of the body, it means that a portion of that body (visible or invisible does not matter) is in a state of ill-health, and, if the condition of neurasthenia produces incapacity to work which has been brought about by something in the nature of an accident which arose “out of and in the course of the employment,” you have a case of “personal injury by accident” which is within the Act.
Appeal dismissed.
Section III
The Standard of Care
VAUGHAN v. MENLOVE
In the Common Pleas, January 23, 1837.
Reported in 3 Bingham’s New Cases, 468.
The declaration alleged, in substance, that plaintiff was the owner of two cottages; that defendant owned land near to the said cottages; that defendant had a rick or stack of hay near the boundary of his land which was liable and likely to ignite, and thereby was dangerous to the plaintiff’s cottages; that the defendant, well knowing the premises, wrongfully and negligently kept and continued the rick in the aforesaid dangerous condition; that the rick did ignite, and that plaintiff’s cottages were burned by fire communicated from the rick or from certain buildings of defendant’s which were set on fire by flames from the rick.
Defendant pleaded the general issue; and also several special pleas, denying negligence.
At the trial it appeared that the rick in question had been made by the defendant near the boundary of his own premises; that the hay was in such a state when put together, as to give rise to discussions on the probability of fire; that though there were conflicting opinions on the subject, yet during a period of five weeks the defendant was repeatedly warned of his peril; that his stock was insured; and that upon one occasion, being advised to take the rick down to avoid all danger, he said “he would chance it.” He made an aperture or chimney through the rick; but in spite, or perhaps in consequence of this precaution, the rick at length burst into flames from the spontaneous heating of its materials; the flames communicated to the defendant’s barn and stables, and thence to the plaintiff’s cottages, which were entirely destroyed.