If the fact be that malice is the gist of the action for inducing or procuring an act to be done to the prejudice of another, and not that the act induced or procured is an unlawful one as being a breach of contract or otherwise, I can see no possible ground for confining the action to cases in which the thing induced is the not entering into a contract. It seems to me that it must equally lie in the case of every lawful act which one man induces another to do where his purpose is to injure his neighbor or to benefit himself at his expense. I cannot hold that such a proposition is tenable in principle, and no authority is to be found for it. I should be the last to suggest that the fact that there was no precedent was in all cases conclusive against the right to maintain an action. It is the function of the Courts to apply established legal principles to the changing circumstances and conditions of human life. But the motive of injuring one’s neighbor or of benefiting one’s self at his expense is as old as human nature. It must for centuries have moved men in countless instances to persuade others to do or to refrain from doing particular acts. The fact that under such circumstances no authority for an action founded on these elements has been discovered does go far to show that such an action cannot be maintained.
I now proceed to consider on principle the proposition advanced by the respondents, the alleged authorities for which I have been discussing. I do not doubt that every one has a right to pursue his trade or employment without “molestation” or “obstruction,” if those terms are used to imply some act in itself wrongful. This is only a branch of a much wider proposition, namely, that every one has a right to do any lawful act he pleases without molestation or obstruction. If it be intended to assert that an act not otherwise wrongful always becomes so if it interferes with another’s trade or employment, and needs to be excused or justified, I say that such a proposition in my opinion has no solid foundation in reason to rest upon. A man’s right not to work or not to pursue a particular trade or calling, or to determine when or where or with whom he will work, is in law a right of precisely the same nature, and entitled to just the same protection as a man’s right to trade or work. They are but examples of that wider right of which I have already spoken. That wider right embraces also the right of free speech. A man has a right to say what he pleases, to induce, to advise, to exhort, to command, provided he does not slander or deceive or commit any other of the wrongs known to the law of which speech may be the medium. Unless he is thus shown to have abused his right, why is he to be called upon to excuse or justify himself because his words may interfere with some one else in his calling?
[After stating the case of Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor.]
It was said that this was held lawful because the law sanctions acts which are done in furtherance of trade competition. I do not think the decision rests on so narrow a basis, but rather on this, that the acts by which the competition was pursued were all lawful acts, that they were acts not in themselves wrongful, but a mere exercise of the right to contract with whom, and when, and under what circumstances and upon what conditions they pleased. I am aware of no ground for saying that competition is regarded with special favor by the law; at all events, I see no reason why it should be so regarded. It may often press as hardly on individuals as the defendant’s acts are alleged to have done in the present case. But if the alleged exception could be established, why is not the present case within it? What was the object of the defendant, and the workmen he represented, but to assist themselves in their competition with the shipwrights? A man is entitled to take steps to compete to the best advantage in the employment of his labor, and to shut out, if he can, what he regards as unfair competition, just as much as if he was carrying on the business of a shipowner. The inducement the appellant used to further his end was the prospect that the members of his union would not work in company with what they deemed unfair rivals in their calling. What is the difference between this case and that of a union of shipowners who induce merchants not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs, by the prospect that if at any time they employ the plaintiffs’ ships they will suffer the penalty of being made to pay higher charges than their neighbors at the time when the defendants’ ships alone visit the ports? In my opinion there is no difference in principle between the two cases.
Lord Macnaghten. My Lords, I am sorry to say that I must begin by recapitulating the facts of the case. For the findings of the jury, taken by themselves, do not convey to my mind any definite meaning. The jury have found that the appellant Allen “maliciously induced” the Glengall Iron Company to discharge the respondents from their service, and they have awarded damages in consequence. I do not know what the jury meant by the word “induced;” I am not sure that I know what they meant by the word “maliciously.” Sometimes, indeed, I rather doubt whether I quite understand that unhappy expression myself. I am therefore compelled to turn for help to the evidence at the trial, accepting, as I suppose the jury must have accepted, the account given by the respondents in preference to that offered by the appellant wherever there may be any shadow of difference between them.
[After a full statement of the evidence.]
Now before I proceed to consider the legal grounds on which Kennedy, J., and the Court of Appeal decided the case against Allen, I should like to ask what there was wrong in Allen’s conduct. He had nothing to do with the origin of the ill-feeling against Flood and Taylor. He did nothing to increase it. He went to the dock simply because he was sent for by one of the men of his union. It seems to be considered the duty of a district delegate to listen to the grievances of the members of his union within his district, and to settle the difficulty if possible. The jury found that the settlement of this dispute was a matter within Allen’s discretion. The only way in which he could settle it was by going and seeing the manager. There was surely nothing wrong in that. There was nothing wrong in his telling the manager that the iron-men would leave their work unless the two shipwrights against whom they had a grudge were dismissed, if he really believed that that was what his men intended to do. As far as their employers were concerned, the iron-men were perfectly free to leave their work for any reason, or for no reason, or even for a bad reason; any one of them might have gone singly to the manager, or they might have gone to him all together (if they went quietly and peaceably), and told him that they would not stay any longer with Flood and Taylor at work among them.