[68]. Compare Fenneman v. Holden, 75 Md. 1; Karl v. Juniata, 206 Pa. St. 633; Thompson v. Salt Lake Co., 16 Utah 281.
[69]. Statement abridged. Only so much of the opinion is given as relates to a single point.
[70]. Compare Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113; Austin v. Manchester R. Co., 10 C. B. 454; Grill v. General Collier Co., L. R. 1 C. P. 600; Steamboat New World v. King, 16 How. 469; Purple v. Union R. Co., 114 Fed. 123; Oregon Co. v. Roe, 176 Fed. 715; Stringer v. Alabama R. Co., 99 Ala. 397; Louisville R. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; Denny v. Chicago R. Co., 150 Ia. 460; Raymond v. Portland R. Co., 100 Me. 529; McPheeters v. Hannibal R. Co., 45 Mo. 22; Reed v. Telegraph Co., 135 Mo. 661; Village v. Holliday, 50 Neb. 229; Perkins v. New York R. Co., 24 N. Y. 196; McAdoo v. Richmond R. Co., 105 N. C. 140; Fitzgerald v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 4 Ont. App. 601 Accord.
In Wilson v. Brett, supra, Rolfe, B., said: “I could see no difference between negligence and gross negligence—... it was the same thing with the addition of a vituperative epithet.”
[71]. Maryland R. Co. v. Tucker, 115 Md. 43; Cates v. Hall, 171 N. C. 360; Lundy v. Southern Tel. Co., 90 S. C. 25 Accord.
See various forms of stating this general doctrine in 2 Hutchinson on Carriers, (3d. ed.) §§ 895, 896; 4 Elliott on Railroads (1st ed.) § 1585; 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (6th ed.) § 51.
In Wharton on Negligence (1st ed.) §§ 636, 637, the author says that the diligence should be “that which a good carrier of the particular grade is accustomed to exert;” i. e., “the diligence and skill which a good business man in his specialty is accustomed to use under similar circumstances.”
For a criticism of Wharton’s statement, see 1 S. & R. Negl. (6th ed.) §§ 43–50. And compare 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.) § 897, note 13.
“It is reasonable care under the existing circumstances that one person has the right to require of another; and that degree of care becomes increased with any increase of the apparent danger involved in its absence or with the increased power of control of one of the parties whose conduct is in question.... A common carrier of passengers either by rail or by water has so complete a control and the consequences of negligence on his part may be so serious that he is justly held to a very high degree of care for their safety; and accordingly it has been often said, both in this and in other jurisdictions, that he is held to the exercise of the highest degree of care. But as was pointed out in Dodge v. Boston & Bangor Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 217, 218, this phrase and similar words which have been used to convey the same idea mean simply that the carrier is bound to use the utmost care consistent with the nature of his undertaking and with a due regard for all other matters that ought to be considered in conducting the business. This conductor was not bound absolutely to exercise the highest degree of care in running his car, but only the highest degree of care which was consistent with the practical performance of all his duties in seeing that the car was run safely without unreasonable delays, and so as to provide for the safety and convenience and properly rapid transit of his passengers. What was required of him was the highest degree of care consistent with the practical management and operation of his car for the carriage of passengers, ‘or in other words, the requirement [was] reasonable care according to the nature of the contract’ with the passengers.” Sheldon, J., in Gardner v. Boston R. Co., 204 Mass. 213, 216. Compare Campbell, J., in Michigan R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440, 449.
[72]. Only so much of the case is given as relates to a single point.