[60]. Nitro-Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524; Thompson v. Chicago R. Co., 189 Fed. 723; Fort Smith Co. v. Slover, 58 Ark. 168; Richardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 63; Nolan v. New York R. Co., 53 Conn. 461; Wolf Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 152 Ill. 9; Cincinnati R. Co. v. Peters, 80 Ind. 168; Galloway v. Chicago R. Co., 87 Ia. 458; Schneider v. Little, 184 Mich. 315; Lauritsen v. Bridge Co., 87 Minn. 518; McGraw v. Chicago R. Co., 59 Neb. 397; Roberts v. Boston R. Co., 69 N. H. 354; Drake v. Mount, 33 N. J. Law, 441; Chicago R. Co. v. Watson, 36 Okl. 1; Ahern v. Oregon Co., 24 Or. 276; Houston R. Co. v. Alexander, 103 Tex. 594; Washington v. Baltimore R. Co., 17 W. Va. 190 Accord.
[61]. Sharp v. Powell, L. R. 7. C. P. 253; Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. D. 369; Gregg v. Illinois R. Co., 147 Ill. 550, 560; Missouri R. Co. v. Columbia, 65 Kan. 390, 400; Sutphen v. Hedden, 67 N. J. Law, 324; Crutchfield v. Richmond R. Co., 76 N. C. 320; Martin v. Highland Park Co., 128 N. C. 264; Simpson v. Southern R. Co., 154 N. C. 51; McCauley v. Logan, 152 Pa. St. 202; Bradley v. Lake Shore R. Co., 238 Pa. St. 315 (“only an extreme visionary would have imagined the consequences which followed or that injury could result to person or property therefrom”); Consumers Brewing Co. v. Doyle, 102 Va. 399; Lippert v. Brewing Co., 141 Wis. 453 Accord.
[62]. Only that part of the opinion which relates to this instruction is given.
[63]. “There is no absolute or intrinsic negligence; it is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, or person.” Bramwell, B., in Degg v. Midland R. Co., 1 Hurlst. & N. 773, 781. See also Bowen, L. J., in Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q. B. D. 685, 694.
Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Needham v. San Francisco R. Co., 37 Cal. 409; Diamond Iron Co. v. Giles, 7 Houst. 557; Atlantic R. Co. v. Moore, 8 Ga. App. 185; Chicago R. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 512; Parks v. Yost, 93 Kan. 334; Sheridan v. Baltimore R. Co., 101 Md. 50; Kelly v. Michigan R. Co., 65 Mich. 186; De Bolt v. Kansas City R. Co., 123 Mo. 496; Garland v. Boston R. Co., 76 N. H. 556; New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. Law, 434; McGuire v. Spence, 91 N. Y. 303; Connell v. New York R. Co., 144 App. Div. 664; Anderson v. Atlantic R. Co., 161 N. C. 462; Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82; Frankford Co. v. Philadelphia R. Co., 54 Pa. St. 345; Virginia Power Co. v. Smith, 117 Va. 418; Morrison v. Power Co., 75 W. Va. 608; Davis v. Chicago R. Co., 58 Wis. 646 Accord.
Hence it is incorrect to define ordinary care as “such care as the ordinary person uses in the transaction of the ordinary affairs of life.” Hennesey v. Chicago R. Co., 99 Wis. 109.
[64]. Only part of the opinion is given.
[65]. Rosenthal v. Chicago R. Co., 255 Ill. 552; Indianapolis Traction Co. v. Crawley, 51 Ind. App. 357 (deaf man); O’Flaherty v. Union R. Co., 45 Mo. 70; Simms v. South Carolina R. Co., 27 S. C. 268. Accord.
[66]. Statement abridged. Part of opinion omitted.
[67]. The instruction which the court held should have been given in Winn v. Lowell was: “If the plaintiff was a person of poor sight, common prudence required of her greater care in walking upon the streets, and avoiding obstructions, than is required of persons of good sight.”