[53]. Only the judgment of the court is printed.
[54]. Hall v. Jackson, 24 Col. App. 225; Dunn v. Western Co., 2 Ga. App. 845; Goddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722 (semble); Watson v. Dilts, 116 Ia. 249, 124 Ia. 249; Lonergan v. Small, 81 Kan. 48; Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466 (semble); Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569; Buchanan v. Stout, 123 App. Div. 648 (semble); Miller v. R. R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 324 (semble); Butler v. Western Co., 62 S. C. 222 (semble); Western Co. v. Watson, 82 Miss. 101 (semble); Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566; Wilson v. St. Louis R. Co., 160 Mo. App. 649; Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210; Davidson v. Lee, (Tex. Civ. App.) 139 S. W. 904; Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536 Accord.
Threats not amounting to an Assault. Threats of bodily harm sent by letter and causing illness by reason of apprehension of bodily harm are grounds for an action. Houston v. Woolley, 37 Mo. App. 15; Grimes v. Gates, 47 Vt. 594. Compare Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680; Degenhardt v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662.
[55]. The opinion of Cozens-Hardy, M.R., sustaining the award is omitted.
[56]. “On principle, the distinction between cases of physical impact or lesion being necessary as a ground of liability for damage caused seems to have nothing in its favour—always on the footing that the causal connection between the injury and the occurrence is established. If compensation is to be recovered under the statute or at common law in respect of an occurrence which has caused dislocation of a limb, on what principle can it be denied if the same occurrence has caused unhinging of the mind? The personal injury in the latter case may be infinitely graver than in the former, and to what avail—in the incidence of justice, or the principle of law—is it to say that there is a distinction between things physical and mental? This is the broadest difference of all, and it carries with it no principle of legal distinction. Indeed it may be suggested that the proposition that injury so produced to the mind is unaccompanied by physical affection or change might itself be met by modern physiology or pathology with instant challenge.” Lord Shaw in Coyle v. Watson, [1915] A. C. 1, 14.
[57]. Statement abridged.
[58]. Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193; Hyman v. Nye, 6 Q. B. D. 685; Simkin v. London R. Co., 21 Q. B. D. 453; Smith v. Browne, 28 L. R. Ir. 1; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Western R. Co. v. Vaughan, 113 Ga. 354; Chicago R. Co. v. Scott, 42 Ill. 132; City v. Cook, 99 Ind. 10; Needham v. Louisville R. Co., 85 Ky. 423; Merrill v. Bassett, 97 Me. 501; Heinz v. Baltimore R. Co., 113 Md. 582; Chenery v. Fitchburg R. Co., 160 Mass. 211; Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334; Keown v. St. Louis R. Co., 141 Mo. 86; Teepan v. Taylor, 141 Mo. App. 282; Brown v. Merrimack Bank, 67 N. H. 549; Nashville R. Co. v. Wade, 127 Tenn. 154; Coates v. Canaan, 51 Vt. 131; Fowler v. Baltimore R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579; Schrunk v. St. Joseph, 120 Wis. 223 Accord.
“We do not understand that an employer’s liability for the negligent act of his superintendent can be measured by the latter’s poise of temperament, nor that the character of a given act of the superintendent in respect of negligence can be made to depend upon his excitability or the reverse. It is the duty of a superintendent to do what an ordinarily careful and prudent man would do under the same circumstances, and the employer is liable if he fail to do this and injury results to an employe.” Bessemer Land Co. v. Campbell, 121 Ala. 50, 60.
Also it is erroneous to charge the jury that failure to exercise the care of “an ordinary man under like circumstances” or of “a person under similar circumstances” or “just such as one of you, similarly employed, would have exercised under like circumstances” amounts to negligence. Austin R. Co. v. Beatty, 73 Tex. 592; St. Louis R. Co. v. Finley, 79 Tex. 85; Louisville R. Co. v. Gower, 85 Tenn. 465.
[59]. “See Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raym. 422; Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403. Probably an action of trespass might have been brought.” [Reporter’s note.]