[379]. Parker v. Langley, 10 Mod. 209; Whitworth v. Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; Mellor v. Baddeley, 2 Cr. & M. 675; Watkins v. Lee, 5 M. & W. 270; McCann v. Preneveau, 10 Ont. 573; Poitras v. LeBeau, 14 Can. S. C. 742; Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Steel v. Williams, 18 Ind. 161; West v. Hayes, 104 Ind. 251; Olson v. Neal, 63 Ia. 214; Wood v. Laycock, 3 Met. (Ky.) 192; Smith v. Brown, 119 Md. 236; Hamilburgh v. Shepard, 119 Mass. 30; Wilson v. Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Pixley v. Reed, 26 Minn. 80; Lowe v. Wartman, 47 N. J. Law, 413; Clark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344; Searll v. McCracken, 16 How. Pr. 262; Swartwout v. Dickelman, 12 Hun, 358; Johnson v. Finch, 93 N. C. 205; Forster v. Orr. 17 Or. 447; Scheibler v. Steinburg, 129 Tenn. 614; Luby v. Bennett, 111 Wis. 613 Accord.
Consequently, the Statute of Limitations does not run until the prosecution is terminated. Mayor v. Hall, 12 Can. S. C. 74; Printup v. Smith, 74 Ga. 157; Rider v. Kite, 61 N. J. Law, 8.
Also although discharged by a magistrate, plaintiff can not sue if the grand jury afterwards indict. Hartshorn v. Smith, 104 Ga. 235; Weglein v. Trow Directory Co., 152 App. Div. 705. See Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567; Knott v. Sargent, 125 Mass. 95. Compare Simmons v. Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523 (amended or substitute information, altering the charge); Mistich v. Collette, 136 La. 294 (second prosecution instituted after termination of first and still pending).
[380]. Everything is omitted, except the opinion of the court on the question of the termination of the prosecution.
[381]. Cotton v. Wilson, Minor, 203; Hurgren v. Union Co., 141 Cal. 585; Chapman v. Woods, 6 Blackf. 504; Richter v. Koster, 45 Ind. 440; Coffey v. Myers, 84 Ind. 105; Kelley v. Sage, 12 Kan. 109; Bell v. Matthews, 37 Kan. 686; Yocum v. Polly, 1 B. Mon. 358; Stanton v. Hart, 27 Mich. 539; Swensgaard v. Davis, 33 Minn. 368 (semble); Kennedy v. Holladay, 25 Mo. App. 503; Casebeer v. Drahoble, 13 Neb. 465; Casebeer v. Rice, 18 Neb. 203; Apgar v. Woolston, 43 N. J. Law, 57; Lowe v. Wartman, 47 N. J. Law, 413; Clark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill, 344 (semble); Moulton v. Beecher, 8 Hun, 100; Fay v. O’Neill, 36 N. Y. 11 (semble); Murray v. Lackey, 2 Murph. 368; Rice v. Ponder, 7 Ired. 390; Hatch v. Cohen, 84 N. C. 602; Marcus v. Bernstein, 117 N. C. 31; Douglas v. Allen, 56 Ohio St. 156; Murphy v. Moore, (Pa.) 11 Atl. 665; Driggs v. Burton, 44 Vt. 124; Woodworth v. Mills, 61 Wis. 44; Manz v. Klippel, 158 Wis. 557; McCrosson v. Cummings, 5 Hawn, 391 Accord.
Massachusetts formerly held to the contrary. Parker v. Farley, 10 Cush. 279. But see Graves v. Dawson, 130 Mass. 78, 133 Mass. 419; Langford v. Boston R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; Briggs v. Shepard Mfg. Co., 217 Mass. 446.
Indictment quashed, see Simmons v. Sullivan, 42 App. D. C. 523; Wilkerson v. McGee, 265 Mo. 574; Reit v. Meyer, 160 App. Div. 752.
Case stricken from docket because sent to wrong court, Sandlin v. Anders, 187 Ala. 473.
Termination of a previous civil action.—If a party sues for a malicious arrest or seizure of property in a civil action, a voluntary abandonment of the latter action by the plaintiff therein is equivalent to its termination in favor of his adversary. Arundell v. White, 14 East, 216; Nicholson v. Coghill, 4 B. & C. 21; Pierce v. Street, 3 B. & Ad. 397; Watkins v. Lee, 5 M. & W. 270; Ross v. Norman, 5 Ex. 359; Emery v. Ginnan, 24 Ill. App. 65; Cardival v. Smith, 109 Mass. 158; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104; Mayer v. Walter, 64 Pa. St. 283. Compare Hales v. Raines, 162 Mo. App. 46 (action recommenced after voluntary nonsuit).
The rule is the same as to malicious prosecutions of civil actions without arrest or attachment in jurisdictions where one is allowed to sue for malicious prosecution of a civil action, without more. Wall v. Toomey, 52 Conn. 35; Marbourg v. Smith, 11 Kan. 554; Mitchell v. Sullivan, 30 Kan. 231. See also Wilson v. Hale, 178 Mass. 111; Luby v. Bennett, 111 Wis. 613.