The question whether the family is the basis of the State cannot be made an abstract question of political philosophy. Indeed the question is unmeaning when put as an abstract one. We might just as well ask, "Is the climate cold in a State?" or, "Is the English language spoken in a State?" It is only as we ask these questions about a particular State that they have any meaning. "Is it cold in Russia?" "Is English spoken in Connecticut?"
Take the case of a State ruled by a despot. Here the people are not the political basis of the State, either as families or as individuals. They have no political power whatever. The political basis of the State is the will of the despot. He is himself and alone the State politically. He makes the laws himself, and shoots and hangs those who disobey them. The people are indispensable to the State, and so in one sense its basis, just as the square miles that compose its territory are its physical basis, but the people stand in no political relation whatever to the State, any more than the rocks and gravel of its territory. It is only where the people of the State have the whole or a part of its political power, that the question can possibly arise as to whether individuals or families are its political basis. And when it thus arises, it comes up wholly with reference to a particular State, and not as an abstract question. And then it is wholly a question of fact, not one of political philosophy; a matter for simple ascertainment, not for speculation and reasoning. Thus, suppose the question to be, "Is the family or the individual the political basis of the State of Connecticut?" We are to answer the question solely by looking at the constitution and laws of the State. We look there and find that it is as clear as language can make it that the political basis of the State is the individual and not the family. The individual is made the voter—not the family—and that is the whole question. It was perfectly easy for the people, if they had so desired, when they were adopting a constitution, to make families and not individuals the depositaries of political power, but they chose to give the power to individuals, and thus the question is absolutely settled for the State. It is true, the State does not carry out completely its own theory, but this was its theory, and what it did was wholly in this direction and away from the family theory. We go to the constitution of the State to settle this question, just as we would to settle the question whether the governor's term is one year or two, or whether the judges hold office for a term of years or for life. While considering whether either of these provisions ought to be adopted, we are dealing with a matter proper for opinions and argument, but when the provisions have been adopted, the whole question becomes one of fact, and we look only to the constitution to determine it, and treat it as a matter not for discussion but for absolute ascertainment.
When one is advocating the theory that the family should be the political basis of the State, he is simply saying that the constitution ought to be amended and the right of voting taken away from individuals and given to families. But it is idle to urge this. Such a measure would not get even a respectable minority of votes. It is decisive on this point that not a single representative government, so far as the writer knows, has adopted the theory that the family and not the individual should vote. A law peculiar to Russia gives its villages, in the management of their local matters, the right of voting by families—a perfect illustration, on a very small scale, of the family as the political basis of a State. But here woman suffrage is admitted as a necessary result; and where there is no man to represent the family, or he is unable to attend, the woman of the house casts the vote.
The advocates of woman suffrage have no interest whatever in this question, as it is idle to suppose that it can become a practical one. The writer has taken what trouble he has in the matter solely in the interest of correct thinking.
Hartford, May, 1879.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
NEW YORK.
Brief on the Legislature's Power to Extend the Suffrage, Submitted February 19, 1880, to the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly of the State of New York.