I. Legislature Omnipotent.—Unlike the Federal constitution, the State constitution does not reserve all powers not expressly delegated. It is held by the authorities that in the absence of positive restriction the legislature is omnipotent.
"In a judicial sense, their authority is absolute and unlimited, except by the express restrictions of the fundamental law" (Court of Appeals, 1863, Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467; S. P., Cathcart vs. Fire Department of New York, Id., 529; Supreme Court, 1864, Clark vs. Miller, 42 Barb., 255; Luke vs. City of Brooklyn, 43 Id., 54).
"Only on the ground of express constitutional provisions limiting legislative power, can courts declare void any legislative enactment" (Court of Error. 1838, Cochran vs. Van Surlay, 29 Wend., 365; Newell vs. People, 7 N. Y. [3 Seld.], 9, 109).
"Before proceeding to amend, by judicial sentence, what has been enacted by the law-making power, it should clearly appear that the act cannot be supported by any reasonable intendment or allowable presumption" (Court of Appeals, 1858, People vs. Supervisors of Orange, 17 N. Y., 235; affi'g, 27 Barb., 575).
II. Powers Undefined.—The constitution forbids the legislature to do certain things. Otherwise it does not define or limit the legislature's powers (Art. 3, §§ 3, 18, 19, 24).
III. No Prohibition.—No constitution of New York has ever forbidden the legislature to extend the suffrage beyond the classes specified by such constitution; nor has any ever forbidden unspecified persons to vote. The constitution simply secures the suffrage to certain classes, and there leaves the matter.
IV. Rule of Construction.—The constitution declares that the object of its establishment is to secure the blessings of freedom to the people (Preamble, Revised Statutes, vol. 1., p. 82). Hence it, and all enactments under it, must be understood and construed, where a contrary intent is not clearly expressed, to be aimed at securing freedom to all.
V. Disfranchisement.—The constitution follows this declaration by laying down at its outset, as its fundamental principle, that "No member of this State shall be disfranchised or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizens thereof, except by the law of the land" (Art. 1, § 1, do., do.). Disfranchisement, then, must be express by the law. It cannot constitutionally be inflicted through mere implication or silence.
Rules for the securing of freedom have often been found to cover unforeseen cases. Such was the fact in the famous decision of Lord Mansfield in 1774, that slavery was against the common law, under which slavery was afterward abolished throughout the British empire; and the decision of the highest court of Massachusetts, that the terms of the constitution of 1780 conferred freedom on the slaves of that State.
Women, it is now fully recognized, are citizens, and hence "members of the State," entitled to the security guaranteed. The practice under the constitution has been to treat as disfranchised all persons not specified as entitled to vote. Though this practice is plainly against the declared object and principle of the constitution, it has been general and mostly continuous, and has thus acquired the force of law. This, however, does not impair the legislature's power to correct the practice by express enactment.