Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians, with Illustrations and Speeches

by Unknown

If ever negotiation was to be resorted to, it was clear the time had come. We know but little of what passed in the Confederate Congress at that time. Its proceedings were had in secret session; nor is it now known whether the journals of the body escaped destruction. All that we know is derived from what was published by the members after the fall of the Confederate Government. Among these publications is a paper contributed by Mr. Oldham, then Senator from Texas, to DeBow's Review, in October, 1869, which gives us some information of the proceedings of the Senate at that time. A few days after the conference at Hampton Roads, he informs us, a committee consisting of Messrs. Orr, Graham and Johnson, was appointed to confer with the President, and ascertain what he proposed to do under the existing condition of affairs. In a few days they made a verbal report through Mr. Graham. "Among other things," I quote Mr. Oldham's words, "they stated that they had inquired of the President his views and opinions in regard to proposing to the United States to negotiate for peace upon the basis of the Confederacy returning to the Union, and that he had answered that he had no power to negotiate a treaty upon such a basis; that his authority to make treaties was derived from the Constitution, which he had sworn to support and that such a treaty would operate as an abrogation of the Constitution, and a dissolution of the government; that the States alone, each acting for itself, in its sovereign capacity, could make such a treaty. Mr. Graham said, he gave notice that he would, in a few days, introduce a resolution in favor of opening negotiations with the United States upon the basis of a return to the Union by the States of the Confederacy; that he did not give the notice at the instance or under the instruction of the committee, but upon his own responsibility. The notice was received in such a manner that he never offered his resolution."

I never saw the paper from which the foregoing quotation is made, and was a stranger to this passage of Mr. Graham's life until within the last forty days. I read it with a feeling of profound relief. I have ever regarded him from my earliest years, with the warmest admiration and the most affectionate respect; but his failure, as I thought, to take some action looking to peace after the Hampton Roads conference—when the plainest dictates of humanity so clearly demanded it—left upon my mind the painful impression that he had been wanting to himself in that, the most important, crisis of his life. There is a deep-seated conviction that the blood which was shed after that conference might have been saved. That the waste of the fruits of past centuries of toil—a waste which consigned so many of the present and future generations to want and misery—might have been avoided. It is with gratitude I reflect that not a tittle of responsibility for this bloodshed and waste lay at his door. And when the inevitable hour came to him, I doubt not the thought that he had done what he could to arrest a war attended with such terrible and useless sacrifice, was one of the sweetest reflections of his whole life.

Congress adjourned about the 16th day of March. Impressed with the imminence of the emergency, Mr. Graham stopped but one day at home—that day being the Sabbath—and on Monday proceeded to Raleigh to confer with the Governor. The conference was long and earnest. Mr. Graham laid before the Governor the views of the President, the state of the armies, and earnestly recommended that the Legislature should be convened. He sustained his advice by the opinion of General Lee, and that of many good and able men with whom he had been associated. He ended by telling him that Richmond would fall in less than thirty days, and that event would be followed probably by a rout or dispersion of General Lee's army for want of food, if for no other cause. The Governor was surprised by his statement of facts, and incredulous in some degree as to his conclusions. He agreed to consider the subject, and convened the Council on that day week. Hearing nothing of their action, in a few days Mr. Graham visited Raleigh again. The Governor informed him that on the day appointed, a bare quorum of the Council attended, and being equally divided, he had not summoned the Legislature. He said that Mr. Gilmer, with whom Mr. Graham had advised him to consult, had suggested to him to solicit an interview with General Sherman on the subject of peace. Mr. Graham remarked that if such an interview were held, Mr. Davis should be apprised of it. To this the Governor at once assented. Mr. Graham suggested further that if that course were taken, he (the Governor) should be in a condition to act independently of the President, and convene the Legislature. To this proposition the Governor manifested reluctance; but finally agreed to call the Council of State again. But while negotiation halted, the march of General Sherman's army decided events. In a few days no resource was left but an unconditional surrender. With the part borne by Mr. Graham at that trying time, a gifted authoress of North Carolina has made the public already familiar in the captivating pages of her work, The Last Ninety Days of the War.

There is no part of Mr. Graham's life in which the calm wisdom, for which he was so distinguished, shone more conspicuously than in the closing months of the civil war. When independence was demonstrated to be hopeless, he sought peace; but even then, only in channels admitted to be in accordance with the great principles of our government.

In his opinion, that peace ought to be sought by the State after the failure of the conference at Hampton Roads, he was sustained by our entire delegation in Congress, and a large proportion of the leading citizens of the State. Yet so anxious was he not only to avoid any appearance of conflict among the Confederate States, but to conform to all that the most punctilious deference for the Confederate Government might require, that he did not move in the matter until after a conference with the President, and then only in the track pointed out by him. The President disclaimed all power of making a treaty, which would abrogate the Government, and declared that the "States alone, each acting in its sovereign capacity, could make such a treaty." In the line of action here indicated the State could not be put in a false position; nay, her honor would be put beyond all cavil. It was known that we had no power to arrest General Sherman's march. General Johnston confronted him, and all felt convinced that whatever his great military genius could accomplish would be done. But it was also known that his gallant army was outnumbered six to one. A surrender in a few days would be inevitable. Burning capitals, desolated homes, famine and destruction of life, followed Sherman's march. Was it not worth the effort to put a stop to such frightful calamities? What Mr. Graham urged was that the people might be allowed to determine their fate for themselves. Such a course was in strict conformity to the fundamental principles of our Government. A convention of seven Governors had precipitated the war when peace counsels seemed to be in the ascendant. Was not Mr. Graham justified in the opinion that executive powers which had been so destructively exerted in the beginning, might be beneficently exerted in the end?

In an address delivered by Governor Vance before the Southern Historical Society, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, August 18th, 1875, occurs the following statement:

"Soon after the failure of the Fortress Monroe or Hampton Roads conference, I was visited by Governor Graham (whose death we so recently deplore) who was then a Senator of the Confederate States. After giving all the particulars of that conference which had not appeared in the papers, and the prevailing impressions of congressional circles, about Richmond, etc., he informed me that a number of leading gentlemen there, despairing of obtaining peace through Mr. Davis, and believing the end inevitable and not distant, had requested him to visit me and urge me, as Governor of North Carolina, to take steps for making separate peace with Mr. Lincoln, and thus inaugurate the conclusion; that he agreed to lay their request before me without promising to add his personal advice thereto. I asked who those gentlemen were, and, with some reluctance, he gave me their names, chiefly Senators and Representatives in the Confederate Congress. I asked why these gentlemen did not begin negotiations in their own States with the enemy, and if they would come out in the papers with this request to me. He said they could not take the initiative, they were so surrounded at home, and so trammeled by pledges, etc., as to render it impossible! I declined the proposition of course."

It is with reluctance that I advert to this statement. Had it been given to the press with a sponsor less entitled to consideration, I should have been disposed to let it float with the tide. But it presents itself under imposing circumstances; it proceeds from one who, at the time referred to, was at, the head of the government in North Carolina; it is contained in an address made before a society whose object it is to preserve the memorials of that time. The statement thus passes into history. It will not be waived. It peremptorily challenges attention.