1. That the new Constitution leaves all the Thirteen States, complete republics, as it found them, but all confederated under the direction and controul of a federal head, for certain defined national purposes only, i. e. it leaves all the dignities, authorities, and internal police of each State in free, full, and perfect condition; unless when national purposes make the controul of them by the federal head, or authority, necessary to the general benefit.
2. These powers of controul by the federal head or authority, are defined in the new constitution, as minutely as may be, in their principle; and any detail of them which may become necessary, is committed to the wisdom of Congress.
3. It extends the controuling power of the federal head to no one case, to which the jurisdiction or power of definitive decision of any one state, can be competent. And,
4. In every such case, the controuling power of the federal head, is absolutely necessary to the support, dignity, and benefit of the national government, and the safety of individuals; neither of which can, by any possibility, be secured without it.
All this falls in pretty well with Brutus’s sentiments; for he does not think that the new Constitution in its present state so very bad, [8] but fears that it will not preserve its purity of institution; but if adopted, will immediately verge to, and terminate in a consolidation, i. e. a destruction of the state governments. For argument, he suggests the avidity of power natural to rulers; and the eager grasp with which they hold it when obtained; and their strong propensity to abuse their power, and encroach on the liberties of the people.
He dwells on the vast powers vested in Congress by the new Constitution, i. e. of levying taxes, raising armies, appointing federal courts, &c.; takes it for granted, that all these powers will be abused, and carried to an oppressive excess; and then harangues on the dreadful case we shall be in, when our wealth is all devoured by taxes, our liberty destroyed by the power of the army, and our civil rights all sacrificed by the unbounded power of the federal courts, &c.
And when he has run himself out of breath with this dreary declamation, he comes to the conclusion he set out with, viz. That the Thirteen States are too big for a republican government, which requires small territory, and can’t be supported in more extensive nations; that in large states liberty will soon be swallowed up, and lost in the magnitude of power requisite in the government, &c.
[9] If any conclusion at all can be drawn from this baseless assemblage of gloomy thoughts, I think it must be against any union at all; against any kind of federal government. For nothing can be plainer than this, viz. that the union can’t by any possibility be supported with success, without adequate and effectual powers of government?
We must have money to support the union, and therefore the power of raising it must be lodged somewhere; we must have a military force, and of consequence the power of raising and directing it must exist; civil and criminal causes of national concern will arise, therefore there must be somewhere a power of appointing courts to hear and determine them.
These powers must be vested in Congress; for nobody pretends to wish to have them vested in any other body of men.