The Thirteen States have a territory very extensive, and inhabitants very numerous, and every day rapidly increasing; therefore the powers of government necessary to support their union must be great in proportion. If the ship is large the mast must be proportionately great, or it will be impossible to make her sail well. The federal powers must extend to every part of the federal territory, i.e. to the utmost limits of the Thirteen States, and to every part of them; and must carry with them, sufficient [10] authority to secure the execution of them; and these powers must be vested in Congress, and the execution of them must be under their direction and control.
These powers are vast, I know, and the trust is of the most weighty kind that can be committed to human direction; and the execution and administration of it will require the greatest wisdom, knowledge, firmness, and integrity in that august body; and I hope they will have all the abilities and virtues necessary to that important station, and will perform their duty well; but if they fail, the fault is in them, not in the constitution. The best constitution possible, even a divine one, badly administered, will make a bad government.
The members of Congress will be the best we can get; they will all of them derive their appointment from the States, and if the States are not wise enough to send good and suitable men, great blame, great sin will lie at their door. Put I suppose nobody would wish to mend this fault by taking away the election of the people, and directing the appointment of Congress to be made in any other way.
When we have got the best that can be obtained, we ought to be quiet and cease complaining. ’Tis not in the power of human wisdom to do more; ’tis the fate of human nature to be imperfect and to err; and [11] no doubt but Congress, with all their dignity of station and character, with all their opportunities to gain wisdom and information, with all their inducements to virtue and integrity, will err, and abuse or misapply their powers in more or less instances. I have no expectation that they will make a court of angels, or be anything more than men: ’tis probable many of them will be insufficient men, and some of them may be bad men.
The greatest wisdom, care, and caution, has been used in the mode of their appointment; in the restraints and checks under which they must act; in the numerous discussions and deliberations which all their acts must pass through, before they can receive the stamp of authority; in the terrors of punishment if they misbehave. I say, in all these ways the greatest care has been used to procure and form a good Congress.
The dignity and importance of their station and character will afford all the inducements to virtue and effort, which can influence a mind capable of their force.
Their own personal reputation, with the eyes of all the world on them,—the approbation of their fellow citizens, which every man in public station naturally wishes to enjoy,—and the dread of censure and shame, all contribute very forceable and strong inducements to noble, upright and worthy behavior.
[12] The particular interest which every member of Congress has in every public order and resolution, is another strong motive to right action. For every act to which any member gives his sanction, if it be raising an army, levying a tax, instituting a court, or any other act to bind the States,—such act will equally bind himself, his nearest connections, and his posterity.
Another mighty influence to the noblest principle of action will be the fear of God before their eyes; for while they sit in the place of God, to give law, justice, and right to the States, they must be monsters indeed if they do not regard his law, and imitate his character.
If all this will not produce a Congress fit to be trusted, and worthy of the public confidence, I think we may give the matter up as impracticable. But still we must make ourselves as easy as we can, under a mischief which admits no remedy, and bear with patience an evil which can’t be cured: for a government we must have; there is no safety without it; though we know it will be imperfect, we still must prefer it to anarchy or no government at all. ’Tis the height of folly and madness to reject a necessary convenience, because it is not a perfect good.