On the Problem Why the Wicked Prosper and the Righteous Are in Distress[[228]]
Indeed the difficulty about the wicked man who is prosperous seems to be no difficulty at all. For God, who is blessed, is good, and bestows good upon all. He does not withhold good from the wicked, just as He does not withhold from the lions their claws wherewith they tear their prey, for they are needed for the acquisition of their food. In all this the philosopher and the theologian concur; there is no difference between them. The only difference between them is that the philosopher cannot believe that divine Providence should attach itself to an individual, to save him from evils for his righteousness, or to withhold bliss from him for his wickedness; while the theologian believes that Providence attaches itself to an individual just as it attaches itself to the entire species which is permanent. For an individual man’s intellect is as permanent as the species, and hence Providence attaches itself to him, just as it attaches itself to the species. There is a very subtle speculation in this. For it is known that the species exist only in the intellect, and that nothing but individuals actually exist. Aristotle, however, in his Metaphysics has explained that the matter is quite the reverse, that the individuals create the species in their intellects, through repetition.[[229]] Now since the species have no actual existence, and Providence can only attach itself to that which has actual existence, what is the cause of their permanence according to the philosopher? For he is of the opinion that Providence attaches itself only to that which has permanence, and the species is the only thing that has permanence; but the species has no existence, and Providence cannot attach itself to that which has no existence. He therefore says that Providence is confined to the spheres, stars, and separate intelligences, and that the species are preserved through the influence that emanates from them to this mental existence. But as to individuals, all their affairs are abandoned to chance, there being no difference between individuals of the human race and the individuals of animals. The theologian, however, believes that divine Providence attaches itself to individuals on account of their intellect, although it has not the same permanence as the separate intelligences and as the intellect of the spheres. All that is found in this lower world was created for the use of man. Accordingly, from Providence that is attached to each individual man there emanates a Providence to the species of the animals, so that through their preservation the existence of man should be preserved. Upon this matter the philosophers are agreed; when they have investigated the functions of the limbs and the functions of the animals, vegetables, and minerals, they have found them all to be for the benefit of man, either for his food, raiment, sustenance, and dwelling-place, or for curing his diseases. For even in harmful things there may be found a cure and some benefit for man. If a pious man has sometimes been cured with the excrement of a devouring lion, or with the skin of a venomous snake, then that injurious thing was created for the benefit of man. Similarly, if one planted a vineyard, and made wine which a pious man has drunk when stung by a viper and has been cured thereby, then that wine was created for the benefit of that pious man. In a similar manner our saintly teacher[[230]] said, when he was cured of an illness by apple-cider seventy years old that was in the possession of a Gentile: ‘Blessed be He who handed over His world to custodians.’ It is likewise for this reason that our sages of blessed memory said: ‘The Holy One, blessed be He, has only four cubits of the law in His world.’[[231]] They likewise said: ‘The entire world was created to attend to man.’[[232]] Ben Zoma said: ‘Blessed be He who created all these to serve me.’[[233]] Concerning all this I have already written in a preceding chapter. Now it is impossible that all this is by mere chance, and is, therefore, due to divine Providence, as I shall, with the help of God, explain at full length, when treating of the soul.
A strong argument is urged by the theologian against the philosopher in this connection. Since man’s intellect is as permanent as the angels, divine Providence ought to attach itself to the intellect, as it attaches itself to the angels. Moreover, this fact made itself manifest to the senses, as Scripture relates of the punishment of the wicked, that some times hyperphysical and supernatural calamities befall them, having been forewarned by a man renowned as a prophet; at the same time the righteous are delivered from these calamities, and prosper against the laws of nature. This cannot be attributed to chance and accident, for it occurred very frequently, and the warning had been given by a man sent by God, who is blessed, whose message could not be doubted. With all these arguments the theologian establishes his belief that God, who is blessed, supervises every individual of the human race, giving a goodly reward to the righteous, and bringing calamities upon the wicked.
To this the philosopher replies and says that, had the affairs of the world been arranged in this manner, the contention of the theologians would have been justified. But we also see that supernatural calamities befall many righteous men, and, on the other hand, many of the wicked who deserve evil prosper in a manner contrary to natural reason. Had things been arranged by God, who is blessed, as the theologian maintains, the righteous man should have been delivered from the misfortunes which had befallen him, and prosperity should have been withheld from the wicked.
The theologian says with regard to the misfortunes that have come upon the righteous that it is a fallacious contention. The fallacy is due to one of two considerations: either on account of the subject, or on account of the object. As to the subject, it is possible that this man who, according to all appearances, is righteous, is not good at all; for He who understands his secrets knows that he is bad; men are deceived about him, and decide that he is good, but He who understands his thoughts knows him to be bad. Or he may have committed a crime for which he deserves this calamity. As to the object, it is possible that these occurrences which appear to be bad are not bad at all, but are for the good of the sufferer.
In this manner the theologian evades the philosopher’s objection with reference to the righteous upon whom misfortunes have come, and this ramifies into many details. As to the prosperity of the wicked, the theologian likewise says that there is a fallacy due to one of two considerations: either on account of the subject, or on account of the object. As to the subject, it is possible that this wicked man, although his deeds committed openly show him to be undoubtedly bad, must have performed a good deed for which he deserves this prosperity as a recompense. As to the object, it is possible that this prosperity is for his own harm. This, too, is a general argument having many ramifications with which the theologian evades the objection with reference to the wicked who is prosperous.
XXXIX. JOSEPH ALBO
[Spanish theologian and philosopher. He was born about 1380, and died about 1444. His philosophic treatise entitled ‘Ikkarim (Principles) is one of the great favorites of Hebrew readers. He has a clear style, and makes himself readily understood. It is no doubt due to this characteristic that he supplanted his master Hisdai Crescas, author of Or ha-Shem (Light of the Lord).]
The Various Ranks of Prophecy[[234]]
Although all the words of the prophets are doubtless true, nevertheless the degree of the exactitude of a prophet’s words corresponds to his rank and degree in prophecy. There are many prophets who, because of the weakness of their perception, do not perceive things with sufficient clarity. For that which happens to the perceptions of the senses happens also to the perceptions of the prophets: a man whose senses are healthy and strong perceives objects in their exact form, while one whose senses are feeble does not perceive them in their exact form, and perceives only their species, or their genus, without being able to distinguish the species. Thus a man with a strong sense of sight recognizes a color, which he perceives, as it actually is (as, for instance, red or green); he likewise recognizes the degree of redness or greenness. But one whose sense of sight is weak recognizes only the genus, that is to say, that it is a color, and no more; and even if he recognizes the species, that is to say, that it is red or green, he does not know what degree of redness or greenness it is. The same is the case with the sense of hearing and with the other senses. This very thing happens to the prophets as regards their perception. One whose perception is strong perceives the thing as it actually is without a metaphor; his words are explicit, not obscure, and are therefore to be understood as true according to their plain meaning. But the words of a prophet of a lower degree are obscure, couched in riddles and parables, and are not explicit; they are therefore not true according to their plain meaning, but only according to the idea implied in them; for according to the literal sense, something else, different from that which is conveyed by the words, is to be understood. Thou thus findest that Ezekiel, his prophecies being postexilic, spoke in parables and riddles which were not true according to their plain meaning, so that he complained of this to God, who is blessed, and said: ‘They say of me: “Is he not a maker of parables?”’[[235]] Zechariah, likewise, having flourished toward the end of the prophetic period, all his prophecies were in visions which were not true according to their plain meaning, but only according to that which was implied in them. When he says that he saw horses, women, and a golden candlestick with two olive-trees by it, there is no truth in the matter of the candlestick and olive-trees itself, but only in the idea implied in them. But all the prophecies of Jeremiah, who lived before the destruction of the temple, are very clearly explained. God, who is blessed, has already explained this difference between the prophecy of Moses and that of another prophet. Concerning the prophecy of Moses He said: ‘I speak with him mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches.’[[236]] From this it is to be inferred that the other prophets beside Moses speak in riddles which are not explicit, and in visions which are not real. It is therefore necessary that these visions should be explained in such a manner that they harmonize with Moses’ words. Similarly, the words of a prophet of a lower rank should always be explained in such a manner that they harmonize with the words of a prophet of a higher rank and do not dissent from him. It is in accordance with this explanation that we find that Isaiah says: ‘And I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up,’[[237]] while Moses says: ‘For man shall not see Me and live.’[[238]] Had we not known the rank of either of these prophets, we might have thought Isaiah’s words were accurate, and would have said that because of his high rank he perceived of God that which can possibly be perceived of Him, and he therefore said: ‘And I saw the Lord;’ but Moses, who did not reach Isaiah’s rank, and perceived but little of God, said: ‘For man shall not see Me and live,’ because his perception was weak, and his prophetic rank low. Knowing, however, that Moses was master of all prophets (as it is written: ‘And the Lord spoke unto Moses face to face, as a man speaketh unto his friend,’[[239]] and it is likewise written: ‘If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord do make Myself known unto him in a vision, I do speak with him in a dream; My servant Moses is not so.… With him do I speak mouth to mouth, even manifestly, and not in dark speeches’[[240]]), we are assured that Moses’ words are undoubtedly true according to their plain meaning. On the other hand, the words of Isaiah, who was lower than he in rank, are not accurate; it is because of his low rank that he said: ‘And I saw the Lord;’ for he believed that he saw God, while it was not so in reality: it was through the influence of the imaginative faculty. Moses, however, because the imaginative faculty had no influence whatsoever on his prophecy (for his prophecy was the outcome of the rational faculty that was in him, detached from the other corporeal faculties), said: ‘For man shall not see Me and live;’ and this is true. But Isaiah, because in his prophecy he also made use of the imaginative faculty, which our teachers of blessed memory call ‘the speculum which is not lucid,’[[241]] was led to err and to believe, through the imaginative faculty, that he had seen God. He himself made it manifest that this perception of his was erroneous, through the imaginative faculty, and explained that the cause thereof was that his body was not purified as the body of Moses our teacher; and that is the meaning of what he said: ‘Because I am a man of unclean lips.’[[242]] Nor were his qualities adequate; and that is the meaning of what he said: ‘And I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips.’[[243]] For through dwelling among people of bad traits, the qualities of the good man become corrupt. He therefore complained, and said: ‘Woe is me! for I am undone,’[[244]] as if he would say: ‘I was influenced by the imaginative faculty, and my prophecy is not through a lucid speculum like the prophecy of Moses who heard the voice speaking to him, without seeing any form before his eyes. But I, because my prophecy is through a speculum which is not lucid, that is by means of the imaginative faculty, I am not able to comprehend the speech without seeing the form that is speaking. This was caused by my being a man of unclean lips, and by my dwelling in the midst of a people of unclean lips. I therefore complain, and say: Woe is me! for I am undone. For my eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts, and I know that this is the result of the imaginative faculty; since there is no doubt that it is impossible for one who prophesies through the lucid speculum to attribute any form or likeness to Him, who is blessed, even in a prophetic vision.’ This is the meaning of what our sages of blessed memory said: ‘Manasseh slew Isaiah. Whereupon Raba says: He tried him and slew him. He said unto him: Thy master Moses said: For man shall not see Me and live, but thou didst say: And I saw the Lord.’[[245]] They have also remarked that he could have refuted this argument, but he did not reply, because he knew that Manasseh would not accept his answer. The answer that he could have given is that even concerning those that lived in the time of Moses it is written: ‘And they saw the God of Israel;’[[246]] here, too, because their perception was not through the lucid speculum. From all this it is manifest that it is not possible for a prophet of a lower rank to dissent from the words of one who is of a higher rank; but his words must be explained in such a manner that they are not at variance with the words of the greater prophet. Now, since it is explicitly stated in the Torah that Moses’ prophecy is of a rank higher than that of all other prophets, it is not possible for us to hearken to any prophet who dissents from him, and annuls his words. But the question whether it is possible for a prophet to explain the words of Moses, and to say that, although they were written without a qualification, there is a condition or time connected with them, even if it was not explicitly stated, will be treated of in the following, with the help of God.