PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
By JAMES STANLEY LITTLE
Author of “South Africa,” “The Progress of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century,” “The United States of Britain,” &c. &c.
The magnificent vagueness of the subject the editor of this volume has, in his wisdom, thought fit to apportion to me might have its conveniences, were it not that such pregnant matters as emigration, federation, education, irrigation, and half-a-dozen subjects besides, all of which bristle with problems and possibilities of the most clamant kind, are ruled out of this paper, in that their consideration has been entrusted to highly competent and patriotic writers, upon whose preserves it would be unbecoming to poach. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to everybody that it will not be possible to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the problems and possibilities of the future, and to keep entirely clear of these all-important factors in the case; seeing that every political, ethnical, financial, and economic problem impinges on these special subjects of which one and all are a part.
THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE TRANSVAAL A BOER FAMILY RETURNING TO THEIR FARM.
Drawing by Chas. M. Sheldon.
As to the political situation to-day, it seems scarcely to be apprehended in this country that the lines of cleavage between parties and factions at the Cape, and indeed in the new colonies, are by no means simple ones. In South Africa generally it is not merely a case of Briton versus Boer; it is not in Cape Colony simply a case of Dutch Africander versus British loyalist. In the Transvaal the problem is not solely how to bring the Boers and English together, or how to conciliate and retain the loyalty of those men, largely of British origin, formerly known as Uitlanders. A labour party, championing a programme practically identical with that with which all students of later-day politico-social questions are familiar, is coming into existence, and is, I think, certain to make itself a power in the land as time advances. It has been frequently, if somewhat hastily, assumed that in South Africa generally parties will follow the lines of division common to most civilised communities, and range themselves in camps, the composition of which will be determined respectively by the place of residence and occupation of the units of the people; the interests, sentiments, and aspirations of the town dwellers being at variance with those of the rural inhabitants. In a sense, we may take the people of Johannesburg to represent what passes for the urban population of old-settled countries. Roughly speaking, the citizens of the older established and smaller towns were dependent for their existence, and are likely to continue to be so dependent, on the agriculturists, since outside the Rand the Transvaal had no industries, no manufactures worth considering: for some time to come she is not likely to have any. So the Rand stood and stands for the towns, and the Uitlanders for the townsmen. The rest of the State stood and stands for the country, and, the agriculturists being mainly Dutch, the Boers stand for the countrymen. In the future, however, the race question, which has practically overruled any dividing lines drawn on the basis of townsmen and countrymen in Cape Colony, should cease to govern, in quite the old way, the political antagonisms of the inhabitants of the Transvaal; in any case, if the various schemes for settling British farmers in the land are crowned with reasonable success, it will no longer be possible to regard the rural Transvaalers as simply Boers, and the townsmen as simply Britishers. At present in the Transvaal there exists, of course, the great and principal division of its people, the British and philo-British versus the Dutch and philo-Dutch. But the interests of the great mining companies are not now, and never can be, on all-fours with those of the operatives; while the traders are likely to find their ideals at variance with those of the mining magnates and operatives alike. Obviously there will be no immediate community of interest and aim between the old Boer farmers and the new British elements introduced on to the land. The differences of the townsmen are likely to be more strictly economic than political; but they must necessarily take a political complexion in the process of their devolution. It would be rash to attempt anything in the shape of a precise forecast; but it certainly seems to me quite unlikely that the future divisions into parties of the citizens of the Transvaal can take the simple form of Briton versus Boer. No doubt the existence of the two races, living side by side, with the remembrance of a century’s differences between them, will continue to give a decided tincture to the parties to be formed in the future. It depends entirely on the kind of statecraft Great Britain brings to bear on the settlement of the new colonies and on its results, whether the progressive elements in the existing population—the population waiting for the gates to be opened to it may, for the purposes of this argument, be considered as entirely progressive—range themselves on the side of British imperialism, or whether they will join themselves to those forces, already existing, which openly or secretly aim at the establishment of a republican régime. It is quite a mistake to suppose that these forces—republican sympathies, that is to say—are at the moment entirely to be sought for in the Boer camp. It is, or it ought to be, common knowledge that the internal movement for reform on the Rand, and for the elimination of the Dopper-Hollander dominance of Pretoria, was not exactly inspired or sustained by men who wished to see the Transvaal an integral portion of the British Empire. At the same time, it is not denied that a great many sympathisers with this movement, and not a few of its active supporters—the late Mr. Rhodes, for instance—were above all things anxious that when the Transvaal flag was hauled down the Union Jack should be run up.
Apart, however, from such considerations, matters of history, it may be allowed that whatever the nationality or preferences of respective Uitlanders at that time of day, a rough sense of justice would reconcile most of them now to the flag of the country, which at enormous sacrifice of treasure and men has procured their release from the bondage of Pretoria. It is equally certain, more so in fact, that their acceptance of the British flag, now and hereafter, is and will be contingent on the treatment they receive at the hands of the new Government. Already many voices are heard in the land declaring that, so far from the new Government having brought relief to the mining industry and to the Uitlanders—and it must be clearly understood by all Englishmen, however much they may resent the fact, that upon the prosperity of the mines not only the welfare of the Transvaal but of all South Africa depends—it has increased its burdens. The limits of space will not permit any exhaustive examination into the basis of this complaint. Mr. Chamberlain, before these lines are in the hands of the public, will doubtless be on the spot examining into the grounds of the complaint. It would be clearly impossible for any one to accuse me, of all persons, of favouring the millionaires, or of holding a brief for their views and interests. But this is not a millionaires’, or a mining question; it is the question of the to be or not to be of South Africa as a British dependency. It may be said at once, that if, as Mr. Chamberlain at one time indicated, the somewhat contradictory and superficial report drawn up by Sir David Barbour, full of inconsistencies and injustices as it is, is to be accepted by the British Government, then I would not care to purchase at any price a seven years’ repairing lease—a repairing lease with a vengeance—of British tenure of South Africa, much less the freehold of the property. Whether he be a financial expert or not, no man who possesses a sound working knowledge, personal knowledge, of South Africa and its affairs can study this report and preserve his equanimity. It fills one with fear and trembling. Sir David Barbour’s proposals savour of the arbitrary confiscation of mining profits. This perhaps, standing alone, would not matter much from a South African point of view, since the loss would mainly fall on the hundreds of thousands of English and foreign shareholders interested in the mines; according to the Statist, the British public has something like £250,000,000 invested in the mines. However, it is not with such losses we are at present concerned. My contention is that if the Transvaal is taxed out of all proportion to its wealth—its immediate or permanent prospects even; if the new colonies, despite the heavy losses from the war, and the serious—for a long time to come it will be serious—dearth of labour contingent thereon, is burdened with taxation, the incidence of which is to be double, or in any case greatly in excess of the monstrous charges levied by Kruger and his advisers; if the Transvaal is to be saddled with a heavy war debt, then the financial, political, and economic ruin of South Africa in general, and the Transvaal in particular, must follow as an inevitable consequence, and this will happen even should a short respite be given. I have set forth again and again, in the columns of the Times and Post, and in the Anglo-African journal I formerly conducted, that apart from the uneconomic and impolitic nature of these suggestions, they are morally unsound. He who calls the tune must pay the piper. The British people, by allowing themselves to be ruled and betrayed by men who persisted in blinding their eyes to the writing on the wall, though there were Daniels in abundance to interpret it to them; by allowing themselves to be served by an army wholly inadequate in numbers, and largely composed of inefficients, are responsible for the cost of a war which never would have taken place had British pro-consuls and colonists on the spot been trusted; their counsel listened to here, and their hands freed and actions upheld yonder.