Moreover, all such heroic schemes of taxation in the interest of the British taxpayer, of which Sir David Barbour’s report is a type, are based on proleptic statistics of an expansion which after all is problematical, and which in any case will not become solid fact if onerous conditions are imposed upon the Rand in advance of that expansion. The profits from the mines, great as they ought to be if we do not strangle the goose right away, are ephemeral profits—thirty to fifty years will see the last of them. Possibly the high-water mark of production will be reached twenty years hence, and from that time the decline will begin as in the case of the Australian and Californian mines. It is obvious, therefore, that a heavy war debt must press disastrously on the industry during its growth and during its decline. Taxation seems to have been proposed on the basis of the anticipation, as if it were already an accomplished fact, of the most prosperous days possible of attainment by the industry, and in entire obliviousness of the fact that no sooner is the zenith reached than gradual decline, ending in extinction, must supervene. Unjust taxation would be a suicidal policy; it would retard the flow of capital, render all but a few higher-grade mines unprofitable, with the result that the budgets of the new colonies would show deficits year after year. Not only would capital awaiting employment be frightened into other channels, but schemes of federation would remain sterile schemes; and the hope of a prosperous and united South Africa would continue a mere day-dream, impossible of accomplishment.
I have put this question of the taxation of the Transvaal in the forefront of this paper, because it is of pressing importance and immediate interest. Scarcely less important, though the subject will probably be dealt with more fully by another pen, is the question of land settlement. We are approaching this matter too parochially and timidly. If the land companies and burghers will not part with suitable land to settlers on reasonable terms, they must be made to do so. The example of New Zealand must be followed. It is absolutely essential that we should plant out settlers on a large scale; especially is it essential in view of the fact that the loyalty of the dwellers in Johannesburg and other mining centres is not to be counted on confidently. With these men commercial considerations are certain to be dominant. Even if they are not given the solid reasons for discontent already foreshadowed, reasons, real and imaginary, in plenty are certain to crop up. Hence their loyalty will not be a matter of sentiment, but one of calculation. Further, every help and encouragement must be given to the right kind of settlers; the country which spent over two hundred millions sterling in making South Africa a possible place for Englishmen to live in, should not grudge another ten, twenty, or if necessary thirty millions to make the conditions of life sufficiently attractive to the emigrating English agriculturist. The conditions underlying land settlement have been carefully studied by Mr. Arnold Forster’s Land Commission, and they were lucidly set forth in the report of that Commission. It remains for the Imperial Government to make them operative, by coming to the country for generous support. I can do no more here than record my absolute conviction, for what it may be worth, that if land settlement in the new colonies is to find its own level, so to speak; if we are trusting to men with the necessary capital, some £300 or more, to come forward in anything like sufficient numbers to affect appreciably the question of British versus Boer in favour of the British, or the problem of self-seeking Cosmopolitanism (purely commercial interests) versus sentimental and patriotic Imperialism, we are building our hopes on sand. The drawbacks to farming in Africa are many: absence of transport (and obviously without well-devised and speedily carried out railway schemes the internal development of South Africa is impossible); absence of navigable rivers; recurrent droughts (here again I may say that nothing less can avail than grand schemes of organised irrigation such as those favoured by Mr. Hedger Wallace and by Mr. Willcocks in his luminous report); cattle disease and locusts. The ignis fatuus of the Rand, it must always be remembered, is ever present to lure away the settler when he has once been induced to settle. To the Englishman the love of isolation is not generally the strongly developed vice or virtue it is with the Boer. Consequently, we must go before the settler and prepare the way for him. Large and well-organised schemes of planting families on communal principles, freely scattered over the land in the midst of the Boers, both from an economic and political point of view, are absolutely necessary if we are to retain our hold on the country, or ensure its permanent prosperity. Under proper conditions and safeguards, generous schemes of female immigration must be initiated. It has been said, and I do not gainsay it, that South Africa requires almost immediately 70,000 more women. Also the Children of the State, the waifs and strays, the foundlings, those who are physically and morally fit, of course, should be sent out to South Africa, there to be carefully prepared in proper establishments for colonial life. In this matter we may well learn wisdom from the early Dutch settlers, who, under an arrangement with the Amsterdam authorities, received into their midst a number of foundlings. From these the present race of sturdy burghers has sprung. The subject is too vast for detailed treatment here; else much might be said about the policy of obliging all male settlers to bind themselves to a course of military training and contingent service, and as to the expediency of encouraging a respectable number of Canadians and Australians to make their home in South Africa. It is, in any case, obvious that no tentative tinkering with the question of land settlement can avail.
The sooner we face this necessity the better; since the sooner it is in a fair way to being faced, mastered, and provided for, the sooner can those electoral and legislative concessions we have promised the Boers, and which honour, justice, and expediency oblige us to grant at the earliest possible date, be granted. As things now are, we have a British autocracy in power, alternating in turn between the desire to repress the clamant demands of the one great industry of South Africa—the gold mines, and dread of that powerful confederacy—the Rand magnates. The methods and example of the great financial corporations and financial princes are not, to write temperately, conducive to the elevation of public morals; nor do they tend to give to the public life of a colony a high or healthy tone. Students of Mr. Cecil Rhodes’ career cannot fail to notice the disintegrating effect on that great patriot’s manners, and on his public and private procedure, which resulted from his close association with, and inexplicable reliance on, men, most of whom (it would be invidious to specialise the exceptions) lived and moved and had their being on a plane infinitely lower than Rhodes’ natural one. The destinies of the new colonies are for the moment nominally in the hands of British officials. These officials have practically nobody to go to for counsel but the mining and financial experts. This is not as it should be. The sooner there is a free play of interests and opinions between the Boers, British settlers, and Johannesburgers the better. These divergent classes, all colonial, however antagonistic their interests and prejudices, must fight out their differences among themselves as best they may. The British official, excellent as he is in dealing with subject races, is not seen at his best in controlling men of his own flesh and blood—men, I should say, of his own colour—when these men are in a position of political inferiority to himself.
The mention of this subject reminds me, that one of the most effective arguments in favour of granting representative institutions to the new colonies as quickly as may be is to be found in the native question. In this matter, as indeed in every matter, colonial opinion asserting itself through the necessarily imperfect, but only possible, system of parliamentary institutions, must be respected. As to the native question, an enormous majority of British South Africans, though it may reprobate certain tendencies to undue harshness, brutality even, still observable in the conduct of Boers of the baser sort, is nevertheless convinced that the Dutch attitude toward the native is, in its essence, the only possible or safe one. There is not the smallest fear that anything in the shape of compulsory labour will be sanctioned by any legislature in South Africa. But that the principles and provisions of that most statesmanlike Act, the Glen Grey Act, will be further extended there can be no doubt.
That the labour question throughout South Africa, and especially as it affects the mining industry, is among the more difficult problems of the future, most persons are aware. It is said that in five years’ time 320,000 natives will be required at Johannesburg to work the mines, irrespective of enormous domestic requirements there. To this total we must add the hundreds of thousands needed for industrial and household work throughout South Africa. It is estimated that in five years’ time there will be no more than 600,000 working Kaffirs south of the Zambesi. It is obvious that under the most favourable computation the supply is certain to continue to be totally inadequate to the demand. This is the more apparent when it is remembered, that it is only possible to get a small proportion of able-bodied Kaffirs to work at all, and that the average service of these willing ones is not more than four months a year, taking one year with another. Doubtless the new laws as to capitation tax, and the modifications in the direction of greater stringency in the hut tax, alterations which must have the effect of reducing the economic evil of polygamy, will effect some amelioration in the conditions now obtaining. But the lowering of wages and the prohibition of the liquor sale have retarded the immediate supply. I have had to listen before now to arguments in favour of the unrestricted sale of liquor to the natives, and in advocacy of establishing drinking booths from one end to the other of the Rand. This would be as suicidal, politically and socially, and in the long run as uneconomic a policy as could well be devised, to say nothing as to its cynical immorality. Of course, when schemes of organisation are perfected, and labour is largely drawn from Central Africa, the employers will enjoy some measure of relief; but in the end, unless relief comes from that highly debatable source—the importation of coolie labour—the prejudice against white labour in Africa will have to break down: a way out, I am sure, always provided the whites can be differentiated and segregated from the blacks, which cannot but be fraught with results of lasting benefit to the country, in procuring for it a solid substratum of Caucasian settlers who will become the industrial backbone of the country. The indirect advantages of such an innovation cannot be reaped, however, if schemes of heavy taxation are to be sanctioned. The margin between loss and profit in working most of the mines—they are what are called in city slang “low-grade propositions”—is so small, that a slight increase even in the price of labour would often make mining unprofitable.
The employment of white labour would have the effect of disabusing the minds of the natives of the growing conviction that they are necessary to our well-being and existence. The truth is not so far short of this; but we must not make it apparent: we must try to make it less true than it is. During the war the native, spoiled by the military, did not gain respect for the Englishman. He is a shrewd fellow, and although our arms were victorious in the end, he cherished no delusions. Man for man, he has seen for himself how much more effective as a fighter the Boer was than the Briton. Enjoying special advantages—his knowledge of the country and his control over the Kaffirs—the Boer was enabled to make the best use of his superior marksmanship, tactics, and mobility; with the result that it was easy for him to inflict much greater damage on his opponents than that opponent, with all his courage and spirit, could inflict in return. The native has seen our men lying in ghastly, mutilated masses. He has seen few such spectacles on the Boer side. The native is no sentimentalist. He is much like a prevalent type of modern young woman—fond of laughing, enjoyment, gew-gaws and sweets, while viewing everything from the standpoint of self-interest. In brief, despite his jollity he is as hard as nails. It is perfectly right that we should show him some consideration as the descendant of tribes who conquered the land some century or so earlier than we conquered it; for, except so far as being an inhabitant of the continent is concerned, it is absurd to talk of the existing South African tribes as aborigines. But if the “nigger” will not work, he must in the long run give place to men who will, to British and Continental labourers and to other British subjects—the coolies of India, for instance—men who will work, and who are now starving, or are on the brink of starvation, for the want of it. That this step is not to be taken lightly I am free to admit. It is fraught with grave difficulties and dangers—political, economic, and ethnical—considerations which are by no means to be minimised even if for a larger good—South Africa cannot be allowed to languish for lack of labour—they will have to be ignored.
LORD MILNER
By Mortimer Menpes.
From “War Impressions,” by arrangement with Messrs A. & C. Black, London.
There can many, indeed in most directions, the civil administration of the new colonies, so far as it has been provided, is highly creditable to Lord Milner and the able men associated with him. So excellent and so thorough is the work accomplished—in education, in replacing the machinery of the higher civil administration throughout the colonies—that, without hyperbole, it may be said to fill one with admiration and wonder. If one could always be sure of getting such a man as Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, and such a man as Alfred Milner as High Commissioner, one would be strongly in favour of retaining permanently as much power as possible in the hands of the holders of these two offices. But it is not possible to count upon a succession of such ministers. It is noteworthy, and I would especially emphasise the point in view of what is to follow, that the appointment of Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain to their respective offices may be said to have been in defiance of precedent. Since the institution of the Colonial Secretaryship half-a-century ago, ministers appointed to the office have almost invariably been noblemen of little or no importance. Again, Lord Milner’s earliest career was not official. He was quite out of the groove in which the men who become colonial governors usually run. It is regrettable, that the success of these two statesmen does not give the Government heart of grace to put appointments in the new colonies more largely into the hands of men of proved initiative and originality—men who have not had any good which may have been in them strangled by red tape and flummery in the public offices. The complaint as to the appointments made in the Transvaal—appointments of untried striplings and callow fledglings from the universities, is doubtless exaggerated; but it is well to remember that putting power into the hands of the “curled darlings of the nation” was one of the chief causes, among many contributory causes, of the failure of Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s policy; the reason why the annexation of the Transvaal, with the tacit consent and approval of the majority of its people, was subsequently repudiated by them.