"The recovery of America from the disasters and distresses of war will be rapid and sudden. Very unlike an old country whose population is full, and whose cultivation, commerce and strength, have arrived at their height, the multiplication of her numbers, and the increase of her power will surpass all expectation. If her sudden growth has already exceeded the most sanguine ideas, it is certain, that the increase of her strength, when supported and assisted by France, and pushed forward by the powerful motives arising from her separate interest, her own preservation, and the prospect of her own arising glory and importance among nations, will far outrun any idea we have had of her late population. Nor will it be the interest of America to check the ambition of France, while confined to Europe. Her distance, and the safety arising from it, will render her regardless of the fate of nations on this side of the Atlantic, as soon as her own strength shall be established. The prosperity or ruin of kingdoms, from whose power she can have nothing to fear, and whose assistance she can never want, will be matters of equal indifference. She can wish for no other connexion with Europe than that of commerce, and this will be better secured in the hands of an ally than in those with whom she holds no other connexion. (The word no is an evident error in the press.) So that it will be of little concern to her whether Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Germany, or Russia, shall be ruled by one or more monarchs. The new States are and will continue the allies of France, our natural enemy, unless reduced, and although at this time by far the greater part of the people wish and hope for an union with this country, and are ready to unite with us in reducing the power of their tyrants, in the moment the least encouragement shall be given for that purpose, which the infatuated policy of every commander has hitherto withheld, yet should they be disappointed in their hope, it will compel them to unite with the enemies of this kingdom.
"The mode of carrying on the war, more cruel to friends than to foes, added to the inhumanity and treachery of this country, in not exerting its powers for their relief, will not fail to create permanent enmity and resentment, and the obligations of gratitude to the nation, which shall save them from our ravages, will stamp impressions never to be effaced. Advantage will be taken of these dispositions by the policy of France, to establish treaties of alliance and commerce with them, which will be founded on two great principles, their own mutual interest and the subduing the power of Great Britain; and if she should be permitted to trade with them at all, it will only be to share with other nations in the worthless remains, after their own and the purposes of their allies are served."
Here Congress will see the extreme ignorance or deception of the writer, in affirming, that the "far greater part of the people wish and hope for a union with Great Britain, and are ready to unite in reducing," &c. But notwithstanding the bad faith of the writer, we see that such is the force of truth, that he cannot adduce an argument to persuade the English to continue the war, without producing at the same time a much stronger argument to persuade the Americans to adhere to the last to their sovereignty and their alliances. Of this nature are all his other arguments.
"With the Independence of America," says he, "we must give up our fisheries on the Bank of Newfoundland, and in the American seas." Supposing this to be true, which it is in part, but not in the whole, if Great Britain loses her fisheries, does not America gain them? Are they not an object then to America, as important and desirable as to Great Britain? Has not America then at least as strong and pressing a motive to fight for them as Great Britain? The question then is reduced to another, which has the best prospect of contending for them successfully? America, favored by all the world, or Great Britain thwarted and opposed by all the world. And to whom did God and nature give them? The English lay great stress upon the gifts of God and nature, as they call the advantage of their insular situation, to justify their injustice and hostilities against all the maritime powers of the world. Why should the Americans hold the blessings of Providence in a lower estimation, which they can enjoy, without doing injury to any nation or individual whatsoever?
"With American independence, we must give up thirtyfive thousand American seamen, and twentyeight thousand more bred and maintained in those excellent nurseries the fisheries. Our valuable trade, carried on from thence with the Roman Catholic States, will be in the hands of America. These nurseries and this trade will ever remain the natural right of the people who inhabit that country. A trade so profitable, and a nursery of seamen so excellent and so necessary for the support of her naval force, will never be given up, or even divided by America with any power whatsoever."
If Great Britain loses sixtythree thousand seamen by our independence, and I believe she will not lose much less, I mean in the course of a few years, will not America gain them? Are sixtythree thousand seamen a feebler bulwark for America than Great Britain? Are they weaker instruments of wealth and strength, of power and glory, in the hands of Americans, than in those of the English; at the command of Congress than at the command of the King of England? Are they not then as strong a temptation to us to continue the war, as to them? The question then recurs again, which has the fairest prospect of success? America, which grows stronger every year, or England, which grows weaker?
"The British islands," he adds, "in the West Indies must fall of course. The same power that can compel Great Britain to yield up America, will compel her to give up the West Indies. They are evidently the immediate objects of France."
The true political consequence from this is to stop short, make peace, and save the British islands while you can; once taken, it will be more difficult to get them back. The whole returns again to the question, are you able to keep peace at home and in Ireland, and the East Indies, to settle matters with the maritime powers, and go on with the war long enough to beat France and Spain, make them renounce the war, and after that reduce the United States of America to submission? Will your soldiers, your seamen, and your revenues hold out till this is done, and after it shall be done, be sufficient to keep up a force sufficient to keep down France, Spain, and America?
"France," he subjoins, "expects from the independence of America, and the acquisition of the West India Islands, the sovereignty of the British seas, if not of Great Britain itself."
Is not this the strongest of all arguments for putting an end to the war? Now you may make peace, and keep the West India Islands, and secure the neutrality at least of America for the future; and in this case you may at least maintain your own sovereignty, and the freedom of the British seas. France at present claims no more than freedom on any seas. If you make peace at present, you may have more of American trade in future than France, and derive more support to your navy than she will to her marine from that country, and consequently may preserve your liberty upon all seas; but by pushing the war you will weaken yourselves and strengthen France and Spain to such a degree, that they will have in the end such a superiority as may endanger your liberty. But if Great Britain is to lose the West India Islands, and the sovereignty of the seas, by the independence of America, surely France, Spain, or America, or all three together are to gain them. And are not these advantages as tempting to these powers as to England, and as urgent motives to pursue the war?