The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 05

by Unknown

So that we come again to the old question, which is likely to hold it out longest? The immense inexhaustible resources of France, Spain, and America together, or the ruined, exhausted, or distracted kingdom of Great Britain. The writer goes on. "France has long struggled to rival us in our manufactures in vain; this will enable her to do it with effect." If England were to make peace now, it is very doubtful whether France would be able to rival her in manufactures, those I mean which are most wanted in America, of wool and iron. But if she continues the war, France will be very likely to rival her, to effect, as it is certain she is taking measures for the purpose and the longer the war continues, the more opportunity she will have of pursuing those measures to effect.

"We receive," says he, "from the West India Islands, certain commodities absolutely necessary to carry on our manufactures to any advantage and extent, and which we can procure from no other country. We must take the remains from France or America, after they have supplied themselves and fulfilled their contracts with their allies, at their own prices, and loaded with the expense of foreign transportation, if we are permitted to trade for them at all." Is it possible to demonstrate the necessity of making peace, now while we may, more clearly? We may now preserve the West India Islands, but continuing the war we lose them infallibly.

"But this is not all we shall lose with the West Indies," says the writer. "We must add to our loss of seamen sustained by the independence of America, at least twenty thousand more, who have been bred and maintained in the trade from Great Britain to the West Indies, and in the West India trade among themselves, and with other parts, amounting in the whole to upwards of eighty thousand; a loss, which cannot fail to affect the sensibility of every man who loves this country, and knows that its safety can only be secured by its navy."

Is not this full proof of the necessity of making peace? These seamen may now be saved, with the islands whose commerce supports them. But if we continue the war, will France and Spain be less zealous to conquer your islands? Because, by this means they will certainly take away from you, and divide among themselves, twenty thousand seamen. Taking these islands from you, and annexing them to France and Spain, will in fact increase the trade of France, Spain, the United Provinces of the Low Countries, the United States of America, and Denmark; and the twenty thousand seamen will be divided in some proportion among all these powers. The Dutch and the Americans will have the carriage of a good deal of this trade, in consequence of their dismemberment from you, and annexion to France and Spain; do you expect to save these things by continuing the war? Or that these powers will be less zealous to continue it, by your holding out to them such temptations?

"Will not Great Britain lose much of her independence in the present state of Europe," continues the writer, "while she is obliged to other countries for her naval stores? In the time of Queen Anne, we paid at Stockholm three pounds per barrel for pitch and tar, to the extortionate Swede; and such was the small demand of those countries for the manufactures of this, that the balance of trade was greatly in their favor. The gold which we obtained in our other commerce, was continually pouring into their laps. But we have reduced that balance, by our importation of large quantities of those supplies from America."

But what is there to hinder Great Britain from importing pitch, tar, and turpentine from America, after her independence? She may be obliged to give a somewhat higher price, because France, Spain, Holland, and all other nations will import them too. But will this higher price induce America to give up her independence? Will the prospect which is opened to the other maritime powers of drawing these supplies from America, in exchange for their productions, make them less zealous to support American independence? Will the increase of the demand upon the northern powers for these articles, in consequence of the destruction of the British monopoly in America, make these powers less inclined to American independency? The British monopoly and British bounties, it was in fact, which reduced the price of these articles in the northern markets. The ceasing of that monopoly and those bounties, will rather raise the price in the Baltic, because those States in America in which pitch and tar chiefly grow, have so many articles of more profitable cultivation, that without bounties it is not probable that trade will flourish to a degree, to reduce the prices in the north of Europe. Should a war take place between us and the northern powers, where are we to procure our naval stores? inquires the pamphleteer.

I answer, make peace with America, and procure them from her. But if you go to war with America and the Northern Powers at once, you will get them nowhere. This writer appears to have had no suspicion of the real intentions of the Northern Powers, when he wrote his book. What he will say now after the confederation of all of them against Great Britain, for I can call it no otherwise, I am at a loss to conjecture.

"Timber of every kind, iron, saltpetre, tar, pitch, turpentine, and hemp, are raised and manufactured in America. Fields, of a hundred thousand acres, of hemp, are to be seen spontaneously growing between the Ohio and the Mississippi, and of a quality little inferior to the European."

Are not these articles as precious to France, Spain, and Holland as to England? Will not these powers be proportionably active to procure a share of them, or a liberty to trade in them, as England will be to defend her monopoly of them? And will not America be as alert to obtain the freedom of selling them to the best advantage in a variety of markets as other nations will for that of purchasing them?

Will the coasting trade, and that of the Baltic and Mediterranean, with the small intercourse we have in our bottoms with other nations, furnish seamen sufficient for a navy necessary for the protection of Great Britain and its trade? Will our mariners continue as they are, when our manufactures are laboring under the disadvantage of receiving their materials at higher and exorbitant prices, and selling at foreign markets at a certain loss. Will these nurseries of seamen, thus weakened, supply the loss of eighty thousand, sustained by the independence of America, and the conquest of the West Indies?