TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 19th, 1781.
Sir,
In my letter of the 18th, I had the honor to mention some things, which lay upon my mind; but still I am apprehensive, that in a former letter, I have not conveyed my full meaning to your Excellency.
In my letter of the 16th, I submitted to your Excellency's opinion and advice, whether an American Minister could appear at the Congress at Vienna, without having his character acknowledged by any power, more expressly than it is now. This was said upon the supposition, and taking it for granted, that it was the intention of the mediating Courts to admit a representative of the United States to the Congress, with such a commission and such a title as the United States should think fit to give him, and that during his whole residence and negotiations at Vienna, whether they should terminate in peace or not, he should enjoy all the prerogatives, which the law of nations has annexed to the character, person, habitation, and attendants of such a Minister. It is impossible that there should be a treaty at Vienna between Great Britain and the people of America, whether they are called United States or American Colonies, unless both nations appear there by representatives, who must be authorised by commissions or full powers, which must be mutually exchanged, and consequently admitted to be, what upon the face of them they purport to be. The commission from the United States for making peace, which has been in Europe almost two years, is that of a Minister Plenipotentiary, and it authorises him to treat only with Ministers vested with equal powers. If he were to appear at Vienna, he would certainly assume the title and character of a Minister Plenipotentiary, and could enter into no treaty or conference with any Minister from Great Britain, until they had mutually exchanged authentic copies of their full powers. This it is true, would be an implied acknowledgment of his character and title, and of those of the United States too; but such an acknowledgment is indispensable, because without it there can be no treaty at all. In consequence he would expect to enjoy all the prerogatives of that character, and the moment they should be denied him, he must quit the Congress, let the consequences be what they might.
And I rely upon it, this is the intention of the two Imperial Courts; because otherwise, they would have proposed the Congress upon the basis of the two British preliminaries, a rupture of the treaty with France, and a return of the Americans to their submission to Great Britain; and because I cannot suppose it possible, that the Imperial Courts could believe the Americans capable of such infinite baseness, as to appear upon the stage of the universe, acknowledge themselves guilty of rebellion, and supplicate for grace; nor can I suppose they meant to fix a brand of disgrace upon the Americans in the sight of all nations, or to pronounce judgment against them; one or all of which suppositions must be made, before it can be believed, that these Courts did not mean to protect the American Representative in the enjoyment of the privileges attached to the character he must assume; and because, otherwise, all their propositions would be to no effect, for no Congress at Vienna can make either the one or the other of the two proposed peaces, without the United States. But upon looking over again the words of the first article, there seems to be room for dispute, of which a British Minister, in the present state of his country, would be capable of taking advantage. The terms used seems to be justly exceptionable. There are no "American Colonies" at war with Great Britain. The power at war is the United States of America. No American Colonies have any Representative in Europe, unless Nova Scotia or Quebec, or some of the West India Islands, may have an agent in London. The word Colony, in its usual acceptation, implies a metropolis, a mother country, a superior political Governor, ideas which the United States have long since renounced forever.
I am therefore clear in my opinion, that a more explicit declaration ought to be insisted on, and that no American Representative ought to appear, without an express assurance, that while the Congress lasts, and in going to it, and returning from it, he shall be considered as a Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, and entitled to all the prerogatives of such a Minister from a sovereign power. The Congress might be to him and to his country but a snare, unless the substance of this is bona fide intended, and if it is intended, there can be no sufficient reason for declining to express it in words.
If there is a Power upon earth, that imagines that America will ever appear at a Congress, before a Minister of Great Britain, or any other power in the character of repenting subjects, soliciting an amnesty, or a warranty of an amnesty, that Power is infinitely deceived. There are few Americans who would hold their lives upon such terms. I know of none who would not rather choose to appear upon a scaffold in their own country, or in Great Britain. All such odious ideas ought to be laid aside by the British Ministry, before they propose mediations. The bare mention of such a thing to the United States by Great Britain would be considered only as another repetition of injury and insult. The proposal of a rupture of the treaty is little less to France. But it is possible, that in the future course of this negotiation, there may be a proposal of a Congress of Ministers of the several mediating and belligerent powers, exclusive of the United States, to deliberate on the question, in what character the United States are to be considered, whether a Representative of the people of North America can be admitted, and what shall be his title and privileges.
All that I can say to this case at present is this. The United States have assumed their equal station among the nations. They have assumed a sovereignty, which they acknowledge to hold only from God and their own swords. They can be represented only as a sovereign; and, therefore, although they might not be able to prevent it, they can never consent that any of these things shall be made questions. To give their consent, would be to make the surrender of their sovereignty their own act.
France has acknowledged all these things, and bound her honor and faith to the support of them, and, therefore, although she might not be able to prevent it, she can never consent that they should be disputed. Her consent would make the surrender of the American sovereignty her act. And what end can it answer to dispute them, unless it be to extend the flames of war? If Great Britain had a color of reason for pretending, that France's acknowledgment of American independence was a hostility against her, the United States would have a stronger reason to say, that a denial of their sovereignty was a declaration of war against them. And as France is bound to support their sovereignty, she would have reason to say, that a denial of it is a hostility against her. If any power of Europe has an inclination to join England, and declare war against France and the United States, there is no need of a previous Congress to enable her to do it with more solemnity, or to furnish her with plausible pretexts. But on the other hand, if the powers of Europe are persuaded of the justice of the American pretensions, and think it their duty to humanity to endeavor to bring about peace, they may easily propose, that the character of the United States shall be acknowledged, and their Minister admitted.