I cannot but persuade myself, that the two Imperial Courts are convinced of the justice of the American cause, of the stability of the American sovereignty, and of the propriety and necessity of an acknowledgment of it by all the powers of Europe. This, I think, may be fairly and conclusively inferred from the propositions themselves. Was there ever an example of a Congress of the powers of Europe to exhort, to influence, to overawe the rebellious subjects of any one of them into obedience? Is not every sovereign adequate to the government, punishment, or pardon of its own criminal subjects? Would it not be a precedent mischievous to mankind, and tending to universal despotism, if a sovereign, which has been proved to be unequal to the reformation or chastisement of the pretended crimes of its own subjects, should be countenanced in calling in the aid of all or any of the other powers of Europe to assist them? It is quite sufficient, that England has already been permitted to hire twenty thousand German troops, and to have the number annually recruited for seven years, in addition to her own whole force; it is quite sufficient, that she has been permitted to seduce innumerable tribes of savages, in addition to both, to assist her in propagating her system of tyranny, and committing her butcheries in America, without being able to succeed.
After all this, which is notorious to all Europe, it is impossible to believe, that the Imperial Courts mean to give their influence in any degree towards bringing America to submission to Great Britain. It seems to me, therefore, most certain, that the Imperial Courts perceive, that American independence must be acknowledged; and if this is so, I think there can be no objection against ascertaining the character of the American Minister before any Congress meets, so that he may take his place in it as soon as it opens.
But if any sentiments of delicacy should induce those Courts to think it necessary to wait for Great Britain to set the example of such acknowledgment, one would think it necessary to wait until that power shall discover some symptoms of an inclination that way. A Congress would have no tendency, that I know of, to give her such a disposition; on the contrary, a Congress in which Great Britain should be represented, and France and the United States not, would only give her an opportunity of forming parties, propagating prejudices and partial notions, and blowing up the coals of war.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Paris, July 21st, 1781.
Sir,
Since my letter of the 19th, another point has occurred to me, upon which it seems necessary, that I should say something to your Excellency, before my departure for Holland, which will be on Monday morning.
An idea has, I perceive, been suggested of the several States of America choosing agents separately to attend the Congress at Vienna, in order to make peace with Great Britain; so that there would be thirteen instead of one. The constitution of the United States, or their confederation, which has been solemnly adopted and ratified by each of them, has been officially and authentically notified to their Majesties, the Kings of France and Spain, and to their High Mightinesses, the States-General of the United Provinces of the Low Countries, and communicated to all the Courts and nations of the world, as far as all the gazettes of Europe are able to spread it; so that it is now as well and universally known as any constitution of government in Europe. By this constitution, all power and authority of negotiating with foreign powers is expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. It would, therefore, be a public disrespect and contempt offered to the constitution of the nation, if any power should make any application whatever to the Governors, or Legislature of the separate States. In this respect, the American Constitution is very different from the Batavian. If the two Imperial Courts should address their articles to the States separately, no Governor or President of any one of those Commonwealths could even communicate it to the Legislature. No President of a Senate could lay it before the body over which he presides. No Speaker of a House of Representatives could read it to the House. It would be an error, and a misdemeanor in any one of these officers to receive and communicate any such letter. All that he could do would be, after breaking the seal and reading it, to send it back. He could not even legally transmit it to Congress. If such an application, therefore, should be made and sent back, it would consume much time to no purpose, and perhaps have other worse effects.