I permitted my mind to dwell on these considerations, merely that I might, by the utmost degree of circumspection, endeavor to render the uprightness and propriety of my conduct as evident as possible.
My only difficulty arose from this single question. Whether I could prudently risk acting on a presumption, either that Spain did not already, or would not soon be acquainted with the contents of this instruction. If such a presumption had been admissible, I should, without the least hesitation, have played the game a little further, keeping this instruction in my hand as a trump card, to prevent a separate peace between Spain and Britain, in case such an event should otherwise prove inevitable. Had Spain been at peace with our enemies, and offered to acknowledge, guaranty, and fight for our independence, provided we would yield them this point, (as once seemed to be the case) I should, for my own part, have no more hesitation about it now than I had then. But Spain being now at war with Great Britain, to gain her own objects, she doubtless will prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for our objects. There was and is little reason to suppose that such a cession would render her exertions more vigorous, or her aids to us much more liberal. The effect, which an alliance between Spain and America would have on Britain and other nations, would certainly be in our favor, but whether more so than the free navigation of the Mississippi is less certain. The cession of this navigation will, in my opinion, render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other.
I say I should have played this game a little further, if the presumption before mentioned had been admissible, because it has uniformly been my opinion, that if after sending me here Congress had constantly avoided all questions about the Mississippi, and appeared to consider that point as irrevocable, Spain would have endeavored to purchase it by money, or a free port, but as her hopes of a change in the opinion of Congress were excited, and kept alive by successive accounts of debates, and intended debates on that question, and as Congress by drawing bills without previous funds had painted their distress for want of money in very strong colors, Spain began to consider America as a petitioner, and treated her accordingly. But as by the intervention of Dr Franklin, our bills for near six months were safe, and as after this resolution of the 15th of February, there was reason to expect that the subject of it would not soon be resumed in Congress, I should, in case I could have depended on this instruction's being and remaining a secret, have thought it my duty to have given the United States a fair trial for the Mississippi, or at least for a free port near it. With this view I should have appeared to give myself no concern about the bills, applied for no aids, made no offers, and on all proper occasion have treated an alliance with Spain as an event, which, though wished for by us, was not essential to our safety, and as the price demanded for it appeared to us unreasonable, it was not probable we should agree. I think we should then have been courted in our turn, especially as the Minister was very desirous of having our men-of-war on the stocks, and that thus dealing with them on terms of equality, would have produced some concessions on their part, as inducements to greater ones on ours. I am persuaded in my own mind, that prudent self-respect is absolutely necessary to those nations, who would wish to be treated properly by this Court, and I have not the least doubt but that almost any spirit will prosper more here, than that of humility and compliance. I had no doubt but that this plan of conduct would have been perfectly consistent with that part of the instruction, which orders me to make every possible effort to obtain from his Catholic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid, &c. For whatever might have been, or may be, my private sentiments, they shall never in mere questions of policy influence me to deviate from those of Congress.
But on the other hand there being abundant circumstantial evidence to induce a firm persuasion, that the Ministry were well acquainted with the contents of this instruction, this plan would have been idle. The moment they saw that the cession of this navigation was made to depend upon their persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose, that they would cease to persevere. All that remained for me therefore to do was, in the next conference to break this subject as decently as possible, and in such a manner as would account for my not having mentioned this instruction at our last meeting.
On Wednesday evening, the 23d of May, I waited upon the Count agreeably to his appointment. The Count seemed a little hurried in his spirits, and behaved as if he wished I had not come. He asked me rather abruptly, if I had anything particular to communicate to him, and whether I had received any further letters. I told him I had received some private ones from L'Orient, but that none from the President of Congress had as yet, reached me, though I had reason to expect one by that opportunity, as well as by the vessel lately arrived at Cadiz. I informed him of my having received from Mr Harrison a copy of his memorial to the Governor of Cadiz, complaining that letters brought for him by the Virginia, from Philadelphia, had been stopped at the gates, on pretence, that they must agreeably to an ordinance for that purpose be put into the post office, and charged with the like postage as if brought from Spanish America. He said he had not yet received a copy of the memorial, but that there was such an ordinance, and that it was highly proper the admission of letters into the kingdom, especially in time of war, should be under the direction of government. That letters from North America rendered new regulations necessary, and that he would turn his thoughts to this subject, and do what should appear equitable. This was another proof of what I before suspected, and looked like an indirect apology for opening my letters.
It surprised me a little that he said nothing of the remarks he had desired me to make on M. Gardoqui's going to America, especially as he had appointed this meeting for that purpose. To give him further time, I started a new subject, and begged he would take the earliest opportunity of completing the business of the Dover cutter. Notwithstanding all that had before passed between us about this affair, he affected to be very ignorant of it, and asked me a number of questions. I recapitulated the circumstances of the capture, my several applications to him on the subject, his promise finally to order the prize to be appraised, and the value to be paid to the captors, the arrival of one of them at Madrid, &c. &c. He replied, with some degree of quickness and perplexity, that it was not a lawful prize, the crew not having authority to do what they did; that he had sent to the Canaries for particular information respecting the value, &c. that two of the packet boats had been taken; that he would pay some gratuity to the captors, and wished I would give him another state of the whole case in writing, to refresh his memory, which I promised to do, and have since done.
He then resumed the subject of the letter, which I expected from Congress. He expressed his regret at its not having arrived, said he was preparing instructions for M. Gardoqui, who would certainly depart in June, and that until I could give him precise information of the dispositions of Congress, he could not enter into any further conversations on the subject of the proposed treaty. I joined in regretting the miscarriage of my public letter, and the more so, as my private ones gave me reason to expect instructions, which would enable me to comply so far with his Majesty's views, as that I hoped no further delays would intervene to prevent a perfect union between Spain and the United States. That my correspondence had given me to understand that Congress viewed the speedy accomplishment of this union as very important to the common cause; and, therefore, if Spain would consent forthwith to come into it, in that case they would gratify his Majesty by ceding to him the navigation of the Mississippi, below their territories, on reasonable terms.
He replied, that he earnestly desired to see all difficulties on this point removed, but that the treaties subsisting between Spain and other nations, as well as the particular policy and determination of Spain, rendered it necessary that she should possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. After a variety of other remarks of little importance, he made a very interesting observation, which will help us to account for the delays of the Court, viz. That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace than now, for that such a particular, and even secret treaty with us might then be made, as would be very convenient to both. That he nevertheless wished to know exactly the views and intentions of Congress, but that I must wait for the arrival of my letters, and that he would in the meantime finish M. Gardoqui's instructions, whose going to America, he did not doubt, would make a useful impression on the English Court. I was beginning to reply to what he said when he interrupted me, by mentioning his not having time at present to prolong the conference.
Throughout the whole of this conversation, the Count appeared much less cordial than in the preceding one; he seemed to want self-possession, and to that cause I ascribe his incautiously mentioning the general peace as the most proper season for completing our political connexions. I had, nevertheless, no reason to suspect that this change in his behavior arose from any cause more important than those variations in temper and feelings, which they, who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of business, or other such like accidental causes.
As I had not as yet received any letter from the President, either by the Virginia, or the vessel lately arrived at L'Orient, nor by Colonel Laurens, who, I was informed, had brought letters for me, I concluded it would be most prudent to wait ten days, or a fortnight, before I proceeded to act on the copy of my instruction received from Mr. Lovell, expecting that such other letters as might then have arrived in France or Spain for me, would reach me in the course of that interval, if at all. And I determined, in case I should receive none, to proceed, without further loss of time, to make a formal overture to the Minister for a treaty on the ground of this instruction. It happened, however, that the Minister was so occupied during the remaining time that the Court staid at Aranjues, by the expedition preparing to sail from Cadiz, under the Duke of Crillon, and other matters, that it was impossible to engage a moment of his attention to American affairs. The removal of the Court to Madrid necessarily consumed some time, and as soon as they were well settled there, I wrote the Count the following letter; none of the letters expected from America having come to my hands.