The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07

by Unknown

Paris, February 5th, 1783.

Sir,

The resolution of Congress of the 12th of July, 1781, "That the commission and instructions, for negotiating a Treaty of Commerce between these United States and Great Britain, given to the Honorable John Adams, on the 29th day of September, 1779, be, and they are hereby revoked," was duly received by me in Holland; but no explanation of the motives to it, or the reasons on which it was founded, was ever transmitted to me by Congress, or the Committee of Foreign Affairs, or any individual member, nor has anybody in Europe, or America, ever once attempted, that I know of, to guess at the reason. Whether it was intended as a punishment to me, or with a charitable design not to lead me into temptation; whether it was intended as a punishment to the English for their insolence and barbarity; whether it was intended to prevent or remove suspicions of allies, or the envy and green eyed jealousy of copatriots, I know not. Of one thing, however, I am fully satisfied, that Congress had reasons, and meant well; but whether those reasons were founded on true or mistaken information, I know not.

When I recollect the instructions, which were given and revoked with that commission, I can guess, and only guess, at some considerations, which might, or might not, operate with Congress. In these instructions, Congress determined,

1st. That the common right of fishing should in no case be given up.

2dly. That it is essential to the welfare of all these United States, that the inhabitants thereof, at the expiration of the war, should continue to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise of their common right to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and the other fishing banks and seas of North America, preserving inviolate the treaties between France and the said States, &c. &c.

3dly. "That our faith be pledged to the several States, that without their unanimous consent no Treaty of Commerce shall be entered into, nor any trade or commerce whatever carried on with Great Britain, without the explicit stipulation hereinafter mentioned. You are, therefore, not to consent to any Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain, without an explicit stipulation on her part, not to molest or disturb the inhabitants of the United States of America, in taking fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and other fisheries in the American seas, anywhere, excepting within the distance of three leagues of the shores of the territories remaining to Great Britain at the close of the war, if a nearer distance cannot be obtained by negotiation. And in the negotiation you are to exert your most strenuous endeavors to obtain a nearer distance in the Gulf of St Lawrence, and particularly along the shores of Nova Scotia; as to which latter we are desirous, that even the shores may be occasionally used for the purpose of carrying on the fisheries by the inhabitants of these States."

These instructions are very decisive in favor of our indubitable right to the fisheries; and it is possible, that Congress might be of opinion, that commerce would be the strongest inducement to the English to make peace, and at the same time, that there was something so naval in the fisheries, that the dread of acknowledging our right to them would be the strongest obstacle in the way of peace. They might think, too, that peace was of more importance to the United States, than a British acknowledgment of our right to the fisheries, which, to be sure, would have been enjoyed by our people in a good degree without it.

Reasonings like these might influence Congress to revoke the commission and instructions in question. But whatever probability there might appear in them at that time, experience has since shown, that they were not well founded. On the contrary, arguments have been found to convince the British Ministers themselves, that it was the interest of their King and country, not only to acknowledge the American right to the fisheries, but to encourage the unrestrained exercise of it. These considerations, therefore, can be no longer of any weight against a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, or against accrediting a Minister to the Court of St James. Nor can I conceive of any motive now existing against this measure. On the contrary, so many advantages present themselves to view, that I think it my duty to recommend them to Congress as proper to be adopted without loss of time. If there are in Congress any of those gentlemen, with whom I had the honor to serve in the years 1775 and 1776, they may possibly remember, that in arguing in favor of sending Ministers to Versailles, to propose a connexion with that Court, I laid it down as a first principle, that we should calculate all our measures and foreign negotiations in such a manner, as to avoid a too great dependence upon any one power of Europe; to avoid all obligations and temptations to take any part in future European wars. That the business of America with Europe was commerce, not politics or war. And above all, that it never could be our interest to ruin Great Britain, or injure or weaken her any further than should be necessary to support our independence, and our alliances; and that as soon as Great Britain should be brought to a temper to acknowledge our sovereignty and our alliances, and consent that we should maintain the one, and fulfil the others, it would be our interest and duty to be her friends, as well as the friends of all the other powers of Europe, and enemies to none.

We are now happily arrived, through many tremendous tempests, at that period. Great Britain respects us as sovereign States, and respects all our political engagements with foreign nations, and as long as she continues in this temper of wisdom, it is our duty to respect her. We have accordingly made a treaty with her and mutually sworn to be friends. Through the whole period of our warfare and negotiations, I confess I have never lost sight of the principles and the system, with which I set out, which appeared to me to be the sentiments of Congress with great unanimity, and I have no reason to believe that any change of opinion has taken place; if there has not, every one will agree with me, that no measure we can pursue will have such a tendency to preserve the government and people of England in the right system for their own and our interest, and the interest of our allies too, well understood, as sending a Minister to reside at the Court of London.