Office of Foreign Affairs, March 18th, 1783.
Sir,
The important matter contained in the despatches lately received, renders me unwilling to reply to them without being well satisfied of the sentiments of Congress. But, as the subjects on which I wish to be informed, are of too delicate a nature to be rendered formal acts, I shall submit to them the drafts of my reply to the joint letter of our Ministers, now at Paris. Previous to this, it will be necessary that Congress come to some express determination upon points which arise out of the treaty, and which, if they see in the same light that I do, they will consider as the most embarrassing, as well as the most important that can claim their attention.
Congress have hitherto, in all their acts, both of a public and private nature, manifested the utmost confidence in the Court of France. In answer to every communication, they have reiterated their resolutions on that subject, and so lately as the 4th of October last, resolved unanimously, "That they will not enter into the discussion of any overtures of pacification but in confidence and in concert with his Most Christian Majesty;" and directed that a copy of the above resolution should not only be furnished to the Minister of France, but be sent to all the Ministers of the United States in Europe, and published to the world. Yet, Sir, it has unfortunately so happened, that the Ministers of these States have imagined they had sufficient grounds to suspect the sincerity of the Court of France, and have not only thought it prudent to agree upon and sign preliminaries with Great Britain, without communicating them, till after the signature, to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty, but have permitted a separate article to be inserted in their treaty, which they still conceal from the Court of France.
This reduces Congress to the disagreeable necessity, either of making themselves parties to this concealment, and thereby to contradict all their former professions of confidence in their ally, made not only to that ally, but to their own citizens, and to every Court at which they had a Minister, or of revealing it at the expense of the confidence they would wish to maintain between their Ministers and the Court of France, and that, too, when those Ministers have obtained such terms from the Court of London, as does great honor to them, and at least equals our highest expectations.
I feel the more pain on this subject, because, from the manner in which this treaty is drawn, as well as from the article itself, I am inclined to believe that England had no other view in its insertion, but to be enabled to produce it as a mark of the confidence we reposed in them, and to detach us from our ally, if the nation could be brought to continue the war.
The preamble, drawn by our Ministers, contained professions of attachment to the alliance, and declared that the treaty should not be obligatory till His Britannic Majesty shall have agreed to accept the terms of a peace between France and Britain, proposed or accepted by his Most Christian Majesty, and shall be ready to conclude with him such treaty. The preamble, agreed to, and, as there is reason to conclude, framed in England, is so expressed as to render it very doubtful whether our treaty does not take place the moment France and England have agreed on the terms of their treaty, though France should refuse to sign till her allies were satisfied. This construction is strongly supported in the House of Commons by the administration.
The separate article is in itself an object of no moment; the territory it cedes is of little importance, and if, as our Ministers assert, it made a part of West Florida previous to the war, it will, on the peace, be annexed to the nation that shall retain that Colony; but it is extremely well calculated to sow the seeds of distrust and jealousy between the United Stales and their allies. It demonstrates a marked preference for the English over the present possessors, and seems to invite Britain to reconquer it. Though this may promote our particular interest, it never can consist with our honor to prefer an open enemy to a nation engaged in the same cause with us, and closely connected to our ally. This article would, in my opinion, if avowed by the United States, fully justify Spain in making a separate peace without the least regard to our interest.
But this, Sir, is an inconsiderable evil, compared with those which may result from its having been concealed from the Court of Versailles. Mr Laurens informs Congress (and that too from letters of a late date from London,) "that the people of England still retain the idea of our late Colonies and of reconciliation; that Government gives every possible encouragement to this humor; that it has been their incessant endeavor to detach us from our ally, and that it is given out in London, that, by signing the late preliminaries, they have out-manœuvred the Court of France; that every engine had been set at work; that every degree of craft, under the mask of returning affection, will be practised for creating jealousies between the States and their good and great ally." Mr Adams's letters of November, speak the same language. If, Sir, we suppose these gentlemen to have been well informed, how much reason have we to apprehend that this secret article will prove in the hands of Britain a most dangerous engine. They may reveal to the Court of France the jealousies our Ministers entertain, the confidence they repose in them, with such falsehoods and additions as will best serve their purposes, and, by producing this secret article, gain credit for all they advance. This line they certainly pursued with respect to France, revealing all that they learnt from the Count de Vergennes, relative to his opinion of the first commission; nor is there room to doubt, that Marbois' letter was received through the same channel. And there is no reason to believe, if (as our Ministers suppose) the Court of France had put themselves more in their power, that they would neglect such promising means of increasing the suspicions our Plenipotentiaries already entertained.
Add to this, that this article may be used in Parliament, and with the British nation at large, as a most powerful argument for continuing the war, adducing, from the resentment it discovers to Spain, and the distrusts it manifests of France, that the quadruple knot is untied.