The English Government, however, decidedly vindicated the course taken under the circumstances by Victor Emmanuel and his advisers. Lord Russell, who was Secretary of Foreign Affairs under Lord Palmerston, wrote, on October 27, 1860, an admirable despatch to Sir James Hudson, the English minister at Turin, who was allowed to give a copy of it to Count Cavour. In that despatch Lord Russell gives good reasons for dissenting from the views expressed by the Governments of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France; he justifies the action of the Government of Turin, admits that Italians themselves are the best judges of their own interests, shows how in times past they vainly attempted regularly and temperately to reform their governments, says such attempts were put down by foreign powers, and concludes by declaring that "Her Majesty's Government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties and consolidating the work of their independence amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe."

It is gratifying to remember that at this very critical juncture in the cause of Italian unity and independence, the English Government gave its very cordial support to that cause, and ably defended the course pursued by King Victor Emmanuel, his ministers, and his people.

The cause of Italian unity and independence had indeed made prodigious strides, due not only to the marvellous victories of Garibaldi, which had brought him in four months from Marsala to Naples, but also to the skilful campaigns of Generals Fanti and Cialdini in Umbria and the Marches. Cavour now followed up these successes by advising a course calculated to give them consistency and endurance. He counselled the immediate assembling of Parliament, the acceptance by Victor Emmanuel of the sovereignty of the Papal, Neapolitan, and Sicilian Provinces, if such were the will of their inhabitants, and the departure of the King from Turin to take the command of his troops now advancing toward Capua. Victor Emmanuel entirely agreed with his minister's advice. On October 2, 1860, Cavour asked Parliament for full powers to annex all the new provinces of Central and Southern Italy if they desired it. He contended that the events which had taken place were due to the initiative of the people, the noble audacity of General Garibaldi, and the constitutional rule of Victor Emmanuel, united to his devotion to the cause of Italian freedom.

Even those deputies who represented the views of the extreme Left, some of whose members avowed a preference for Republicanism—in theory at any rate—supported the Government. One of them, Signor Bertani, declared he would not now raise any point of difference, and frankly acknowledged that in reality all Italians wished the same thing—"Italy one and free, under Victor Emmanuel." Cavour further satisfied the Chamber by saying that Rome and Venice must in the end be united to the mother country, though the questions involved in such union must, out of deference to Europe and France, be postponed for the present. A vote of two hundred ninety against six confirmed the policy of the Government and gave full expression to the wishes of the country.

Garibaldi had in the mean time pushed on his forces from Naples toward Capua and the line of the River Volturno. On September 19th his troops took Caiazzo, from which, however, they were dislodged on the 23d of the month. After this success Francis II determined to take the offensive and attack in force the Garibaldian lines with the object of driving them back to Naples or cutting them off from that city. This attempt was well planned and conducted on October 1, 1860. The struggle was hotly maintained on both sides throughout the day. Some companies of bersaglieri arrived from Naples and united in resisting the attacks of the Bourbon troops, who were in the end repelled and compelled to retire. But though beaten they had fought well and still held the fortresses of Gaeta and Capua, to which they had retreated. The army of Victor Emmanuel, however, led by the King in person, was now rapidly advancing, easily overcoming whatever resistance the Bourbon troops were able to offer. Francis II, unable to prevent the junction of the King's forces with those of Garibaldi, withdrew with the bulk of his soldiers to Gaeta, leaving four thousand men in Capua, who were soon obliged to capitulate.

On October 26th Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi met near the little town of Teano. They greeted each other with great cordiality, for though Garibaldi had little faith in ministers or diplomatists, and could not forgive their cession of Nice to France, he felt the utmost confidence in the King himself. Victor Emmanuel on his part had the greatest regard for the heroic patriot who had ever been so devoted to his country's cause and whose marvellous exploits had now given freedom to Sicily and Naples. As they grasped each other's hands Garibaldi cried, "Behold the King of Italy! Long live the King!" The soldiers of both leaders shouted, "Long live Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy!"

On November 7th the King entered Naples with Garibaldi at his side. The reception was enthusiastic in the extreme; it reached its culminating point as Victor Emmanuel entered the royal palace. Long had it been the abode of those who hated and betrayed both constitutional liberty and national freedom; now it was taken possession of by one who had risked life and crown in their cause. The King issued a proclamation, in which he called to mind the increased responsibilities which fell henceforth upon himself and his people alike; nor did he fail to remind them of the necessity for union and abnegation: "All parties must bow before the majesty of Italy which God has raised up. We must establish a government which gives guarantees of liberty to the people and of severe probity to the public at large." In the succeeding days his majesty received the deputations of the newly acquired Provinces of Umbria, the Marches, Naples, and Sicily, which came to present to him officially the result of the plebiscite by which the inhabitants of those provinces declared their wish to be united to the rest of the King's dominions and so form a single Kingdom of Italy.

Many other receptions there were of societies belonging to several ranks and classes of men. Particularly impressive was the welcome given to the deputation which came from the Senate and Chamber at Turin in honor of so great an event as the union of Southern with Northern Italy under the constitutional rule of one sovereign. On December 1st Victor Emmanuel embarked for Palermo, where he was received with an enthusiasm at least as great as that which marked his arrival in Naples. In the capital of Sicily all orders of citizens pressed forward to pay him their willing homage.

These great results were not, however, achieved without difficulty, for there was considerable diversity of opinion and not a little jealousy between those that surrounded Garibaldi and those that followed the lead of Cavour in Parliament and in the country. Nor can it be denied that faults and mistakes may fairly be laid to the charge of both those parties, despite their sincere attachment to the cause of their common fatherland. A mistake was made by Garibaldi himself when he wished to postpone the immediate annexation of the Southern Provinces to the Northern Kingdom, and asked to be named Dictator of Naples for two years by Victor Emmanuel, whom he further requested to dismiss Cavour and his actual advisers.

The King rightly refused to agree to a course so subversive of all constitutional proceedings and liberties. He could not even entertain the idea of dismissing ministers at the request of any citizen, however illustrious, or however great the services he had rendered his country. It was for the national representatives alone to decide to what minister the King should give his confidence, and what course should be taken as to the annexation of Naples and Sicily. Garibaldi's good sense and honesty of purpose led him to give in to the King's judgment. Victor Emmanuel took the right view of the course to be pursued in this matter, just as he had taken the right view of the course to be pursued at the moment of the Peace of Villafranca. In the one case he showed himself wiser than Cavour, and in the other wiser than Garibaldi. The single-minded patriotism of the latter, and the statesmanship of the former, combined with the remarkably sure judgment and unfailing honesty of the King, gradually overcame all the difficulties of the situation. Victor Emmanuel ever kept aloof from political coteries, while deferring to the advice of his responsible ministers so long as they had the confidence of Parliament. He ever showed himself to be the head of the nation, not the head of a party.