Whilst the mind of Crœsus was thus occupied, the lands near his capital were infested with a multitude of serpents; and it was observed, that to feed on these, the horses neglected and forsook their pastures. Crœsus conceiving this to be of mysterious import, which it certainly was, sent to make inquiry of the Telmessian priests concerning it. The answer which his messengers received, explaining the prodigy, they had no opportunity of communicating to Crœsus, for before they could possibly return to Sardis, he was defeated and a captive. The Telmessians had thus interpreted the incident:—that a foreign army was about to attack Crœsus, on whose arrival the natives would be certainly subdued; for as the serpent was produced from the earth, the horse might be considered both as a foreigner and an enemy. When the ministers of the oracle reported this answer to Crœsus, he was already in captivity, of which, and of the events which accompanied it, they were at that time ignorant.
Cyrus was well-informed that it was the intention of Crœsus, after the battle of Pteria, to dismiss his forces; he conceived it therefore advisable, to advance with all imaginable expedition to Sardis, before the Lydian forces could again be collected. The measure was no sooner concerted than executed; and conducting his army instantly into Lydia, he was himself the messenger of his arrival. Crœsus, although distressed by an event so contrary to his foresight and expectation, lost no time in preparing the Lydians for battle. At that period no nation of Asia was more hardy or more valiant than the Lydians. They fought principally on horseback, armed with long spears, and were very expert in the management of the horse.
The field of battle was a spacious and open plain in the vicinity of Sardis, intersected by many streams, and by the Hyllus in particular, all of which united with one larger than the rest, called the Hermus. This, rising in the mountain, which is sacred to Cybele, finally empties itself into the sea, near the city Phocæa. Here Cyrus found the Lydians prepared for the encounter; and as he greatly feared the impression of their cavalry, by the advice of Harpagus the Mede, he took the following means to obviate the danger. He collected all the camels which followed his camp, carrying the provisions and other baggage; taking their burdens from these, he placed on them men accoutred as horsemen. Thus prepared, he ordered them to advance against the Lydian horse; his infantry were to follow in the rear of the camels, and his own cavalry closed the order of the attack. Having thus arranged his forces, he commanded that no quarter should be granted to the Lydians, but that whoever resisted should be put to death, Crœsus himself excepted, who, whatever opposition he might make, was at all events to be taken alive. He placed his camels in the van, knowing the hatred which a horse has to this animal, being neither able to support the smell nor the sight of it. He was satisfied that the principal dependence of Crœsus was on his cavalry, which he hoped by this stratagem to render ineffective. The engagement had no sooner commenced, than the horses seeing and smelling the camels, threw their own ranks into disorder, to the total discomfiture of Crœsus. Nevertheless the Lydians did not immediately surrender the day: they discovered the stratagem, and quitting their horses, engaged the Persians on foot; a great number of men fell on both sides; but the Lydians were finally compelled to fly, and, retreating within their walls, were there closely besieged.
The Siege of Sardis
Crœsus, believing the siege would be considerably protracted, sent other emissaries to his different confederates. The tendency of his former mission was to require their presence at Sardis within five months. He now entreated the immediate assistance of his other allies, in common with the Lacedæmonians.
Whilst the Spartans found themselves in a precarious situation, the Sardian messenger arrived, relating the extreme danger of Crœsus, and requesting their immediate assistance. This they without hesitation resolved to give. Whilst they were making for this purpose, preparations of men and ships, a second messenger brought intelligence that Sardis was taken and Crœsus in captivity. Strongly impressed by this wonderful calamity, the Lacedæmonians made no further efforts.
Sardis was thus taken: On the fourteenth day of the siege, Cyrus sent some horsemen round his camp, promising a reward to him who should first scale the wall. The attempt was made, but without success. After which, a certain Mardian, whose name was Hyræades, made a daring effort on a part of the citadel where no sentinel was stationed, it being so strong and so difficult of approach as seemingly to defy all attack. Around this place alone Meles had neglected to carry his son Leon, whom he had by a concubine, the Telmessian priests having declared that Sardis should never be taken if Leon were carried round the walls. Leon, it seems, was carried by his father round every part of the citadel which was exposed to attack. He omitted taking him round that, which is opposite to Mount Tmolus, from the persuasion that its natural strength rendered all modes of defence unnecessary. Here, however, the Mardian had the preceding day observed a Lydian descend to recover his helmet, which had fallen down the precipice. He revolved the incident in his mind. He attempted to scale it; he was seconded by other Persians, and their example followed by greater numbers. In this manner was Sardis stormed, and afterwards given up to plunder.
The Fate of Crœsus
We have now to speak of the fate of Crœsus. He had a son, as I have before related, who, though accomplished in other respects, was unfortunately dumb. Crœsus, in his former days of good fortune, had made every attempt to obtain a cure for this infirmity. Amongst other things, he sent to inquire of the Delphic oracle. The Pythian returned this answer:
Wide-ruling Lydian, in thy wishes wild,