The historians' history of the world in twenty-five volumes, volume 02

by Unknown

The first duty of the satraps and their deputies (ὕπαρχοι) undoubtedly was the collection of the revenue, whether in kind or in money; their office, however, was not limited to this, but they were at the same time commissioned to promote agriculture and the improvement of the soil; and the remarkable attention which was devoted to these objects constitutes the chief merit of the Persian administration. The code of Zoroaster, as has been already remarked, insisted upon the duty of cultivating the soil, by gardening, rearing of cattle, and tillage, as one of the most sacred duties of his disciples, everything impure being banished from the land where his law was received, and nothing allowed there but pure men, pure animals, and pure vegetables. This idea of the legislator, when applied to a whole empire, presents, doubtless, a magnificent picture, which, though it must needs remain for the most part an ideal picture, was nevertheless, to a great extent, realised under the Persian monarchy. Those parks or paradises, which surrounded not only the palaces of the monarch, but those of his satraps, were so many lively images of the pure kingdom of Ormuzd, realised as far as was possible by the most illustrious of his servants. When the younger Cyrus led the admiring Lysander through his pleasure grounds, and displayed their regularity and beauty, “All these,” he informed him, “I have myself planned, and even planted many of the trees with my own hands;” and when the Spartan general replied by an incredulous glance at his splendid robes, and chains, and armlets of gold, he sware to him by Mithras, as a good servant of Ormuzd, that he never tasted food till he had fatigued himself by labour.

These precepts, therefore, of their religion, made it the sacred duty of the rulers of the provinces to further the cultivation of their several districts; and as the military establishment underwent a review every year, so also did the civil department. Xenophon tells us, that “The king visited every year some part of his empire, and wheresoever he was not able to proceed himself he sent a delegate for the same purpose. Those magistrates in whose territory the ground was found to be well cultivated, and covered with trees or crops, had an augmentation of territory allotted to them by the king, and were rewarded with presents; and those whose provinces were found to be ill cultivated and depopulated, whether through neglect or in consequence of oppression, were rebuked and deprived of their command, and others appointed in their place.”

If these institutions had not been broken down by the abuses which hastened the fall of the Persian monarchy, they would have formed a considerable set-off against all the inevitable evils which accompany despotic governments. However considerable might be the expense occasioned by the maintenance of the king, his satraps, and forces, it cannot have been oppressive in countries blessed with such singular fertility, where the imposts were chiefly paid in kind, so long as wise enactments for the cultivation of the soil tended to lighten these burdens; but the extravagance and luxury of the great, and their frequent revolts and intestine wars, caused these sage laws to fall into disuse, and frustrated the benevolent intentions of the Median legislator.

The disposal of the government of provinces rested with the king, who usually appointed kinsmen of his own, his brothers, or his sons-in-law. The court of the satrap was formed on that of the monarch, and all its ceremonial the same, only less magnificent. The satraps also had their harems, entrusted, like that of the monarch, to eunuchs, and a numerous attendance of household troops, distinct from the king’s soldiers, and consisting in part or altogether of Persians: their residences, like those of the monarch, were surrounded by parks; and occasionally, in the finer months of the year, they (like the monarch) migrated from one place to another, attended by their courts, and spent the summer under tents.

History has afforded us a remarkable instance of the manner in which the imposts were collected by these officers. When the Persians had subdued Ionia the second time, the whole territory was measured out by parasangs, and the tribute apportioned accordingly. In this case it was evidently a land tax, which, however, was paid, it is probable, for the most part in produce. The satrap received these imposts, whether in kind or in money, and after providing for his own expenditure, the support of the king’s troops, and the maintenance of the civil magistrates, the remainder was handed over to the king. The personal interest of the satrap, if he wished to retain the king’s favour, prompted him to make this return as considerable as possible, even if no precise amount was fixed.

To take care of the king’s interests there were also attached to the court of each satrap royal scribes, to whom were issued the king’s commands, and by whom they were communicated to the satrap. The commands thus conveyed required the most prompt obedience, and the smallest resistance was accounted rebellion. Even the suspicion of anything of the kind was sufficient to cause their ruin, and, as in the Turkish empire, their punishment was unaccompanied by any formality whatever. The sovereign despatched an emissary, who delivered the order for the execution of a satrap to his guards, who put it in execution by hewing him down upon the spot with their sabres.

To further the speedy communication with the provinces, a system was adopted which has been compared, but very improperly, with the European institution of posts. Messengers were appointed at different stations, distant from each other a day’s journey, for the purpose of conveying the king’s mandates to the satraps, and the despatches of the latter to the court.

Institutions of this kind are peculiarly essential to despotic governments, in which it is excessively difficult to maintain the dependence of the prefects or governors, and occur in almost every one which possesses anything like an internal organization. The same existed under the Roman monarchy, and was established, at still greater expense, in the empire of the Mongols, by the successors of Jenghiz-Khan.

Another plan was also adopted by the Persian monarchs for securing the allegiance of their satraps. A commissioner at the head of an army was sent every year, with authority, according to circumstances, to uphold or chastise those officers; and Xenophon assures us that this custom, which dated from the commencement of the empire, subsisted in his time. The design at first undoubtedly was, as in other kingdoms similarly governed, to collect the outstanding tribute; but when we consider the power and arrogance of the satraps during the latter half of the Persian monarchy, we may well believe that the custom may have died away.

We have already described in general the causes of the presumption of the satraps and the revolts to which it led. Besides the union in their persons of the civil and military powers, one main cause was the greatness of the command entrusted to some by joining together two or more satrapies. An example of this, and of the arrogance to which it gave rise, occurs as early as the reign of Darius Hystaspes in the person of Orœtes, who was at the same time satrap of Phrygia and Lydia; and in succeeding reigns this practice became still more frequent, especially in the case of the satrapies of Asia Minor. Cyrus the younger was governor of the greater part of that peninsula, and, after his death, Tissaphernes was allowed to hold the governments possessed by him in addition to those which had been all along his own.