The most brilliant period of the slave trade at Genoa and Venice corresponds to the most prosperous time at Kaffa and Tana. But, in 1395, Tamerlane struck a blow at the colony of Tana from which it never recovered; then came the taking of Constantinople by Muhammed II; then this same sultan forbade the Venetians, through the whole extent of his empire, to transport Mussulman slaves; he only permitted Christian slaves to be taken. These various blows caused the ruin of this branch of trade; in 1459, loud complaint was made in the Venetian senate of the increasing rarity of slaves. However, Felix Fabri estimated that, at the end of the fifteenth century, there were still at Venice about three thousand slaves, natives of the north of Africa and of Tatary; he only mentions Slavonian slaves, without giving the number.[h]
THE DECLINE OF VENETIAN COMMERCE
Venetian commerce was at its height in the fifteenth century, and Venice was the undisputed business centre of the world, but not long after this the prosperity of the city began to decline. There was no very sudden change, but a gradual alteration brought about by changed exterior conditions.[a] Other European peoples had become commercial, and naturally ceased to procure from Venice what they could themselves provide. They became rivals to Venice in every market where the natives carried on only a passive commerce. Asiatic merchandise changed its course and no longer flowed into the Adriatic. Finally those arts which contributed to the perfecting of industry progressed among other nations so quickly that the Venetians could not keep pace. After the fifteenth century many causes made the commerce decline pretty rapidly. The first of these causes was the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, and the policy of Sultan Suleiman, who, in 1530, undertook to make all Asiatic merchandise pass by Constantinople, even that coming to Europe by Syria and Egypt. They had succeeded in making the divan understand that there was no advantage in making the merchandise take a long détour, resulting only in augmenting the price without profit to the seller. Direct communication with Egypt and Syria was allowed, but when the Turks were masters of nearly all Greece and the Albanian coasts, they accustomed caravans to arrive there bringing all the divers productions from the East. Then the Venetians, always prompt to seize on this merchandise at its landing point, themselves established at Spalato—which offered a sure and convenient port—a bank, a hospital, and a fair. In the seventeenth century Spalato became a commercial town more abundantly furnished than any Levantine port, being particularly well situated to receive productions from Persia and the Black Sea.
The second cause of decadence was the ill treatment of European merchants by the Turks, who put a stop to the coming of the large Venetian fleets. A third was the discovery of America, and of a way to India by the Cape of Good Hope. A fourth was the ill-directed power of Charles V who, from the beginning of his reign in 1517, doubled the custom-house duties payable by the Venetians in his states, making them 20 per cent. on all goods imported or exported. This was practically a prohibitive tariff. Moreover Charles formally forbade entry to merchants who did not consent to stop direct trading with Africa and to bring into his town of Oran all merchandise they had to sell to the Moors. The new king of Spain wanted to make of this town, where there were already celebrated fairs, a central and general mart for all barbarian commerce. The Venetians would not submit, and had to choose between the commerce of Africa and Spain.
Under the reign of Philip II, son of Charles V, the jealousy of Spanish ministers against Venetian commerce continued to be shown. Many Venetian merchants were annoyed in their undertakings, many of their ships were retained in port or seized in open sea under various pretexts. It became necessary to take marines on board to protect them against this species of piracy. Finally, a fifth cause of the commercial decadence was the loss of the isles of Cyprus and Candia. One is perhaps surprised at the number of reasons which made for the downfall of Venetian commerce, yet we have not taken account of the rivalry of Hanseatic towns, leagued towards the end of the twelfth century. Their ambition was confined to creating a northern commerce, while that of Venice was to retain that of the south; the success of one meant partial failure of the other. The state of navigation was such that it was impossible to make a journey to the Baltic by the Mediterranean and return in one year. That is why the town of Bruges had been chosen as an intermediate mart, where merchandise from north and south could be exchanged.
THE BANK OF VENICE
It remains to say a few words on the Bank of Venice. Its antiquity, which goes back to the twelfth century, that is further than any other known bank, proves the priority of the Venetians in all commercial establishments. This bank was a depot which opened a credit to investors to facilitate payments and bills of exchange; that is, instead of paying real money, cheques could be drawn on the bank. Bills on this bank could be payable at sight, and the bank always justified public confidence. In the early days there had been plenty of private banks, supported entirely by public confidence. These were principally held by nobles. Later on the government profited by suppressing them, in accordance with the law which forbade commerce to aristocrats, and established a sole national bank, placing it under the care of a prince, and taking account of all funds deposited therein. This bank was a depository pure and simple. The banker held no right of retention or commission and paid no interest. In order to insure capitalists paying in, it was necessary that the credit of the bank should be such that notes on the bank should count in business as real money.
This is how it was managed. First there was an office where cheques presented were cashed promptly in coin. By proving themselves able to do this, fewer demands of the kind were made. There were in Venice several kinds of money. The best was chosen for the bank. It was ruled that it would only take or pay ducats of full value, whose quality was finer and alloy less common. It resulted then that drawers of a bill on private bankers had to run the risk of being paid in money of base alloy, whilst the holder of credit on the bank was sure of receiving the best value. This system won bank money a preference over that of current coin and augmented the credit of the establishment.
Little by little the government introduced the custom of making certain payments in bills on the bank instead of in coin. It began by admitting these bills in public depositories without difficulty, and when this usage was established a law regulated that money would be given at the bank for bills of exchange, whether from home or abroad, when these exceeded 300 ducats. It was forbidden to refuse these bills when there was no contrary convention. This was almost giving them a forced value, yet no violence was offered to public confidence. Thus specie was virtually multiplied by making bank bills do duty for it. The value of these bills being rigorously sustained, and their redemption in the best coin assured on demand, this convenient form of currency naturally became popular. As a result, the government found itself in possession of a large mass of funds which it could use for itself without paying interest. It would be very difficult to state the amount deposited in this central commercial bank. It necessarily varied. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century there were 5,000,000 ducats sterling; at the end of that century 14,000,000 or 15,000,000.[g]