Castruccio was the scion of a Ghibelline stock, and was devoted to the Ghibelline cause; for four years successively he was freely elected to command the Lucchese with almost sovereign power. He knew men and how to govern them; knew what enmities to despise or punish, and what friendships to win and retain. As a daring soldier and skilful general he was beloved by the troops, for he was not blind to merit and knew how to reward it, but cared little about the morality of his followers if they only did their duty and quietly submitted to the rigid discipline that he established and enforced. No man was more beloved by the people or more generally popular with every class of citizen; they admired his talents and were proud of his fame. In 1320 he felt so confident of his position in the public mind that he ventured to expel the Avocati, who with about 180 great Guelfic families now bid adieu to their country, and then boldly demanded the supreme authority; out of 210 senators there was but one voice against him, and the people unanimously confirmed this election. He was therefore a legitimate ruler. His economical management of the public revenue was exemplary and productive; he had amassed great treasure, and his system of military honours and rewards heightened and improved the warlike spirit of the people until it had acquired a more professional character. All the neighbouring predaceous chiefs were allured to his standard by the hope of future conquests, and rough and unscrupulous as they were he made them all bend to his discipline.
Thus prepared on every hand to begin that career of ambition to which he felt himself more than equal, Matteo Visconti’s proposal was warmly received, and Philip of Valois’ expedition with the ready assistance of the Guelfic league were together considered an infringement of the general peace, or at least a sufficient excuse for retaliation on the part of the Ghibellines. Uguccione Faggiuola was dead, a circumstance that heightened the anxiety of both Castruccio and the Florentines, particularly the latter, whose dread of this veteran chief, blinding them as it did to the dangerous ambition of his successor, had never ceased since the disaster of Montecatini.
[1320-1321 A.D.]
Such was the state of affairs in April, 1320, when Castruccio Castracani with some Pisan auxiliaries suddenly occupying Cappiano, Montefalcone, and the bridges of the Gusciano, broke into the Florentine territory carrying death and devastation as far as Cerreto Guidi, Vinci, and Empoli; then, getting possession of Santa Maria a Monte by treachery, returned in triumph to Lucca. Afterwards, invading Lunigiana and Garfagnana, he dispossessed Spinetto Malespina of several places necessary for his own military operations and then marched with all his force to aid the siege of Genoa. This city still maintained a fierce and bloody struggle with its own exiles and the Lombard Ghibellines; war raged not only round the walls but throughout the whole Riviera, or coast district; it extended to Sicily and Naples and involved even more distant countries in its action, so that the siege of Troy itself, as Villani[d] asserts, was hardly equal to it for heroic deeds, marvellous exploits, and hard-fought battles by land and water, without any cessation either in summer or winter.
The Florentines determined to prevent a junction that would probably have settled the fate of Genoa, therefore made a powerful diversion in the Lucchese states which compelled Castruccio to return ere he had joined the besiegers; avoiding an action they retreated to the frontier at Fucecchio while the enemy halted in front of Cappiano, both armies remaining nearly inactive until the advancing season drove them into winter quarters. To make amends for this inglorious campaign, more vigorous measures were pursued and an alliance was concluded with the marquis Spinetto Malespina, who, although a Ghibelline, had been too much injured by Castruccio on account of his friendship for Uguccione not to seize the first opportunity of revenge. Florentine troops were despatched to his aid, yet Castruccio was not apprehensive of anything in that quarter, but prepared with the help of a powerful body of Lombard Ghibellines for a more serious struggle on the side of Florence and soon marched to raise the siege of Monte Vettolini at the head of sixteen hundred men-at-arms. The Florentines, having only half that number, immediately retired and allowed him to devastate their territory with impunity for the last twenty days of June, after which he retired to chastise the Malespini in Lunigiana.
Discontent ran high in Florence and the retiring seigniory were much censured for their feeble conduct; the Agubbio faction was still powerful, and probably the inconvenience of a fluctuating administration was beginning to be felt, as the foreign affairs with a more complex character embraced a wider circle; to remedy this, twelve counsellors, two for each sesto under the denomination of “Buonuomini” were added to the new seigniory, but to continue six months in office instead of two, and without whose sanction nothing important could be undertaken. To check also the increasing intimacy, and consequent favouritism between citizens and foreign officers of state, which led to great abuse, it was decreed that no stranger who brought a kinsman in his suite could have a place in the commonwealth, and that until ten years from his resignation of office he could not be re-elected. Some taxes were then reduced, the gold and silver currency reformed, and preparations made for a fresh campaign. Azzo of Brescia was appointed captain-general; one hundred and sixteen knights and one hundred and sixty mounted crossbowmen were enlisted and under the command of Jacopo da Fontana soon checked Castruccio’s incursions so as to protect the line of the Gusciana. But Philip of Valois’ expedition had in the meanwhile failed, and in Lombardy the Tuscans were defeated at Bardo in the Val-di-Taro, their captain the marquis of Cavalcabò was killed, Cremona recaptured, and Visconti everywhere victorious.
[1321-1323 A.D.]
In Florence one of the first public measures in 1321 was to complete the whole circuit of public walls and strengthen it by flanking towers fifty-five feet high at regular intervals of more than one hundred and eighty feet apart; a work that was doubtless accelerated by their apprehension of Castruccio, which had now taken a more alarming character from some recent proceedings at Pistoia.
This ever-vexed city, harassed by external war and inward troubles, finally elected the abbate da Pacciana de’ Tedici, a tool of Castruccio, as their ruler; he was a weak intriguing man who, catching at a popular opinion, was suddenly floated into power by the stormy multitude without ballast enough to steady him. Castruccio made good use of him, and a truce was suddenly concluded with that leader against all the influence of Florence, by which, according to Villani[d] (though unnoticed by the anonymous author of the Istorie Pistolese),[f] an annual tribute of three thousand florins was to be paid by Pistoia. The dread of Castruccio was rapidly and generally spreading.