What is said applies not when war is waged for defense against enemies, but in other circumstances; for if it is for defense, such war is permitted to any governor or king, as the authors say, because vim vi repellere licet;[2] and thus the viceroys and governors of the Indias have authority to levy war against disturbers Page 193of the peace and quiet of the states of which they are in charge, without necessity of resorting to his Majesty for permission.
The second condition of righteous war is that the cause for which it is waged shall be a just one, as St. Thomas says: “Those upon whom war is waged deserve it for the offenses that they have committed, and the grievances that they have inflicted upon the one who makes war on them.” Thus says St. Augustine (lib. 83. Quæstionum super Josue, 9. 10), and Gratian quotes him (23, q. 2, c. Dominus noster): Justa autem bella solent definiri quæ ulciscuntur injurias, si gens vel civitas plectenda est, quod vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel reddere quod per injuriam ablatum est.[3] And as this injury and grievance may be of many kinds, so too, many and various are the just causes of war; but we will consider here only those which make for the matter in hand, confirmed by the authority of Scripture.
The first ground of a righteous war may exist when one is hindered from doing what he may by right do. This is matter of natural and divine law and on this ground Julius Cæsar, as Lucan represents him (lib. 1), made defense of his conduct in waging war against the Roman state—viz., that the state had blocked to him, a Roman citizen, the route to Rome; and so he said, arms in hand, Omnia dat qui justa negat.[4] On this ground, as St. Augustine says (in Quaest. Num. q. 43),[5] the children of Israel justly Page 194made war on the kings of the Amorites (Ut legitimum, c. 21), for having withstood their passage through their country when they were on their way to the promised land, although the Israelites had given assurance that they would do no damage to the lands, the crops, or the vineyards of the Amorites. And so says St. Augustine (and he is quoted ubi supra, last chapter), Notandum est sane quemadmodum justa bella gerebantur a filiis Israel contra Amoritas: innoxius enim transitus denegabatur qui jure humanæ societatis aequissimo patere debebat.[6] Upon which passage Joannes Andreas in his gloss well says: Licet enim transire per alienum agrum jus non sit, tamen quia necessarius et innoxius erat iste transitus illi prohibere non debuerunt; item quia via publica erat et nemo prohibetur via publica.[7]
The second ground, as I said, of a righteous war is the self-defense of the prince or of his subjects. This ground also is matter of both natural and divine right; for even as self-defense is a natural right, on which right is founded the rule of vim vi repellere, so too in the prince is the defense of his subjects—for the care which the prince has of his subjects is as essential on his part as is the care which each one of them has for himself; hence, if the subjects are aggrieved Page 195by their enemies, the prince may justly in their defense make war, and vim vi repellere. This is much better than that the individual should himself avenge the wrong; for the individual can lawfully defend himself and his property only in continente, as Sylvester declares (Bellum, 2 § 3), but he may not avenge past wrongs, nec sua repetere save by recourse to his judge and superior.[8] Whatever goes beyond that is contrary to law and good government and, as Cajetan says, is extra moderamen tutelæ,[9] it being an essential condition of the right vim vi repellere that it be done cum moderamine. But the prince and the state have the same authority with respect to their enemies at whose hands they have suffered injury, which they have with regard to their own subjects; and hence not only may they defend themselves lest either they or their subjects suffer injury, but they may avenge injuries by inflicting punishment, exact satisfaction for damage done, and take the enemies' lives, if so the quiet and safety of their subjects require. Under this head come the many wars waged by King David against the Philistines, mentioned in the Scriptures; as also the war of the Machabee captains against the kings Antiochus and Demetrius.
The third cause and ground is rebellion and disobedience of subjects. This was the ground of David's war with Sheba, son of Bichri, who raised a revolt, as you may read in II Sam. 20;[10] and this is Page 196what St. Augustine says (Contra Faustum Manichæum, I. 22, c. 74): Adversus violentiam resistentium sive deo sive aliquo legitimo imperio jubente gerenda ipsa bella suscipiuntur a bonis ubi eos vel jubere tale aliquid vel in talibus obedire juste ordo ipse constringit (in c. Quid culpatur, ubi supra.)[11]
The fourth cause and ground for a righteous war is when there is default of keeping faith or carrying out agreements; for in such case the party who has been wronged may lawfully make war on him who, by not keeping faith, has done him injury. This made Joran [Jehoram], king of Israel, wage war on Mesa [Mesha], king of Moab, for his having failed to keep the agreements and to pay the tribute which he had promised to pay to his suzerain, King Ahab; and that this war was just is clear, for that he was assisted therein by the holy and righteous Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, with the approval of the prophet Elisha—who in the name of the Lord urged them on to war, and promised them a sure victory—as is seen in II Sam. ch. 3. These four causes and grounds, or any one of them by itself, justify war; and there are other grounds also, but these are the most certain and the most applicable to the matter in hand.
The third condition which, as we have said, must Page 197be fulfilled to make a war righteous is a right intention on the part of him who wages it; because, failing this, even when the other two conditions concur—to wit, authority and just cause—a faulty intention may render and does render the war unjust. This condition is also laid down by St. Augustine (Contra Faustum), and he is quoted by Gratian (in c. Quid culpatur); and as his words are of great weight and define wherein a bad intention consists, it is well to quote them: Quid culpatur in bello? an quid moriuntur quandoque morituri ut dominentur in pace victuri? Hoc reprehendisse timidorum est non religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, impacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi et si quae sunt similia: haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur.[12] And what must be the right intention of the prince in levying war the same Augustine declares in the book De Verbo Domini; and the passage is found in c. A pud, ubi supra: Apud veros dei cultores et ipsa bella peccata non sunt quae non cupiditate aut crudelitate sed pacis studio geruntur ut mali coerceantur et boni subleventur.[13] Peace is the end that is to be sought in war, and so saith Aristotle (lib. 10 Ethicorum): Bellum gerimus ut in pace degamus.[14] And Augustine Page 198says the same (Epist. ad Bonifacium): Non quaeritur pax ut bellum exerceatur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur.[15]
But here it is to be noted that this right intention which is here required is a condition no more essential to a righteous war than to other good works, for in all these it is required, and without it no work is virtuous; and hence it is that if this right intention be wanting in the prince who levies war and in those who urge it, he would sin by wrong intention, but if the other two conditions be fulfilled, he, as Soto says, will not be held to make amends for the injuries that may be done in the war. So, too, if a judge orders a robber to be hanged, granted that ex odio suspendat,[16] he will not be held to restitution, if on the testimony adduced the man deserved hanging. Reply
Having ascertained the conditions required to make a war just, from them we shall be able clearly to decide whether such is the war against the Zambales at present under discussion. To this question we will answer affirmatively: that it is lawful without any scruple whatever, for in it the three conditions meet which are required for a just war, as we have already said.
And first, in this war is found the first condition, namely, authority in the one who wages it, for he is persona publica, the governor of these isles; and also he has a superior who is our king. But since the cause is self-defense, as will later be proved, he has Page 199no need of other permission to defend his state against enemies who molest it, as we have proved.