In this war, the third condition, too—we shall speak of the second later—is fulfilled, namely, right intention; for its end is the peace and security of the subjects, disturbed by these their enemies. And this peace it has not been possible to secure by means of our benevolent efforts, although such means have been tried—as appears from our labors to that end last year in sending religious of our order, and persons known to the Zambales, to persuade them to desist from wrongdoing and be our friends, granting them a general pardon for the wrongs they had committed against us; and although the Zambales promised, and made oath in their fashion, they have defaulted utterly, committing since then many atrocious wrongs against our people, as appears from the reports on that matter which have been drawn up. And, forasmuch as nothing has been gained through kindness, comes now, as a last and drastic remedy, the resolution to win peace and security for the king's subjects by waging war on his enemies; and this is the right intention that is required according to Aristotle and St. Augustine, as before quoted. But even suppose this intention to be lacking, it is already said and proved above that this condition is not in such sort essential as to oblige to indemnification.
It remains that we look into the second condition of just warfare, to wit, that just cause exist for waging it. This condition, in which might be presented greatest difficulty, is the clearest and plainest part of the matter before us; for not only are some of the four causes and grounds pointed out by us, as being any one of them in itself sufficient, but all the just Page 200causes are here concurrent. The first condition is fulfilled in that these Zambales impede the general traffic by sea and land of those who go to Pangasin and Ylocos and Cagayan. And, albeit the traffic works damage neither to them nor to their lands, but uses a common highway, yet they sally out upon the highways and kill and rob passengers, as appears from the reports.
Concurs also the second cause; for, although these Zambales are not molested by our people, they assault and murder them, not only falling upon them in the highways, as already said, but also seeking them out in the settlements while they are laboring in the fields; so that neither in their fields nor their homes are our people safe—which also is shown in the reports.
Furthermore, after promising obedience to our king and to the governor on his behalf, they have rebelled and renounced obedience, as we have said; and this is the third of the reasons which, as we said, justify the war.
Finally, the war is justified by their failure to keep their word and their pledges of friendship; for, as is well known, they have again and again, in the time of previous governors, been reconciled and have promised friendship, and thus have obtained pardon for their acts. And in the year just past this was done with greater formality and more solemn assurances, as appears from the record; but notwithstanding this, breaking the compact of peace, they have since then inflicted other and graver injuries—sallying out as robbers into the public routes by land and by sea, making descents on our settlements and murdering everyone on whom they can lay hands, be they Page 201Indians or Spaniards, seculars or ecclesiastics. Indeed, it is well known that last year they murdered a religious of our order, and they were tracking our provincial and two others, his companions; but all these, thanks to their own watchfulness, escaped.
From what has been said it stands amply proved that the war to be waged against the Zambales is a just one, and, beyond all scruple, as well on the part of him who sets it on foot as of those who take part in it.
But it may be that some one will, in opposition to what has been said, cite to us certain law texts to the effect that when a number of persons or a town sins, even if all or most of them are guilty, yet they should be pardoned. In the Decretum (dist. 50, c. ut constitueretur) St. Augustine says, writing to Bonifacius: Ubi per graves dissentionum scissuras non hujus aut illius hominis periculum sed populorum plurimorum strages jacet, detrahendum est aliquid severitati ut majoribus sanandis malis charitas syncera subveníat.[17] And (1 q. 7 c. Quoties) Pope Innocent, as cited by Gratian, says: Quoties a populis auta turba peccatur, quia in omnes propter multitudinem vindicari non potest inultum solet transire.[18]
Much to the same effect is what is said by Alexander III (c. Extra, De clerico excommunicato), and also by Honorius III (in the last chapter, De transact.). And the reason for this is that in a multitude Page 202or in a town are many innocent persons, and it were a grave injustice to require that they shall suffer the rigorous punishment awarded to the guilty; while it is certain that in a war one suffers as much as the other; and hence, lest the innocent be punished, the guilty should be pardoned. To the objection which cites these testimonies in proof that parcendum est multitudini[19] Castro makes apt reply (lib. 2 De justa haereticorum punitione c. 14), that the proposition is true and applies when the multitude or town purposes amendment, and there is fair hope of the same; but if the case is otherwise, and they persist in their evil ways after being admonished, reason says they shall be punished rigorously. The opposite course would only give them occasion to go on and become more hardened in their sin and misdoing, and cause others, after the example of these, to do the same—that appearing to them to be lawful, when they see that it is not punished. And such is the teaching of c. Qui vult, de Pænitentia, 3. 6., attributed to St. Augustine: Cum enim tot sunt qui labuntur ut pristinam dignitatem ex authoritate defendant et quasi usum peccandi sibi faciant, rescindenda est spes ista.[20] Then, as these Zambales have many times been warned, and have promised and sworn peace and amends, and have totally defaulted, as we have already said, and have taken occasion, from the lenity shown them, to do greater mischiefs with more boldness—mistaking for timidity the kindliness that we have used toward them—it follows that, numerous Page 203though they are, we ought no longer to dissemble with them, but must punish them sternly; for the more numerous they are, the more mischief they do.
What we have stated in enforcing our thesis affords us occasion for explaining here the mode of procedure in this war, and—assuming it to be a lawful war, as has been sufficiently proved—for inquiring what considerations may be urged by those who carry on the war. And, for the sake of brevity and clearness, we will resolve the matter into a few points, without any arguments, for these points are corollaries of a just war.
First: If, to attain what is purposed—to wit, to bring the said Zambales under control—it becomes necessary that we burn their crops, their houses, and their other properties, and even kill those who make resistance, even if the presumption be that among them are some who are guiltless—it is lawful to do all this during war, until the final victory is won which is purposed. We say “if necessary,” for unless the purpose of all that is done in the war is the final victory, such deeds will be impious and tyrannical. And hence the matter should not be left to the arbitrary will of the soldiers, but should be directed by the order of him who governs them.