14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going to explain, every good Spaniard will be convinced of the necessity of preserving these islands—even though it shall be at greater expense, and without the powerful incentive of religion—on account of the great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us, as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces
1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them, which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable—to place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege of this fort, by some glorious successes—so complete that they were extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout India—in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity and valor—by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar—ought not to lull us into living in excessive confidence that, in another invasion (which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles, and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may aid them.
2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form, in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.; but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by which to make ourselves respected.
3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and leave this place in a condition conformable thereto—devoting all attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.
4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any enemy who attempts to capture this town [of Manila] can secure the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port; and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money), and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done, the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do; more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port; and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great extent of the walls of Manila—which, according to intelligent persons, needs a garrison of at least three thousand men.[9]
Plan of the citadel of Santiago at Manila
[From MS in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]