As I am charged by order of the king our sovereign to furnish information regarding the measures which can contribute to objects so important, it will be my plan to point out (but with that circumspection which is so necessary in matters of colonial policy and administration) the causes which today are antagonizing both the internal and external security of those islands and their successful administration—civil, economic, and commercial—proposing in regard to each one of these the correctives which have been impressed upon me by my experience as consulting attorney [asesor] and judge in all the public affairs of justice, army and navy, the government, revenues, and commerce; and my own observations under popular revolutions, changes in the system of government, and other vicissitudes and critical positions in which that colony has been seen during the long period of my residence therein.
OF THE CAUSES WHICH ANTAGONIZE THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE FILIPINAS ISLANDS, AND OF CORRECTIVES FOR THEM
Of the present composition of the divisions of the army
The army of the Filipinas Islands, in view of the class of men of whom it now consists, offers very little (if any) moral confidence for their resisting the force of the revolutions which may be formed in the very bosom of the islands. It is officered, in great part, by Spaniards of the country, and by some Americans and mestizos; and the disposition, tendencies, and education of the latter class are (with very rare exceptions) absolutely different from those of the other and European officers; consequently, there exists between the two classes, from the outset, a certain insuperable disunion of feeling, between not only individuals but the two classes. The officer who is a native of the country has all the lax characteristics which the climate induces. He lives in exclusive intercourse with his neighbors, and separated from the Europeans. He likes the military career solely for the conveniences connected with his office; he is incapable of a noble emulation, and limits himself in the service to the outside and very inexact fulfilment of the necessary obligations of his position; and when the cause of the legitimate government exacts on his part sacrifices incompatible with his own interests or those of his neighbors, he disowns and absolutely abandons his duties. For these reasons the officers born in that country have never come to merit the confidence of their chiefs; and if from the rank of cadets they have been promoted to that of captain, it has been more from the peremptory necessity of completing the military corps and protecting the service than on account of their fitness, military spirit, or appreciation of the confidence and honor which the king bestows on them. Such sentiments they can never possess until they undergo a rigid training moral and political, in the colleges of España. This mental divergence, and the natural contrariety of their temperaments, so mischievous in the ordinary service of military bodies, are much more lamentable in the crisis of a revolution. The officers of the country, being nearer to the Indian soldiers in their customs and language, make common cause with the latter, and seduce and lead them into their own faction, with a marvelous readiness; this I have repeatedly seen in the mutinies of military bodies which have occurred in the Americas, and especially in that of the troops in the kingdom of Guadalajara in the year ’21, and in that at Manila in the year ’23.
The army of Filipinas also contains a considerable number of Indian sergeants and corporals, and this is another of the causes from which have already arisen, and always will arise, seditions in the corps. Whoever has observed the natural disposition of the Filipino Indian will recognize two things: First, that he always imitates and obeys only that which is directly commanded, explained, and taught to him; and, second, that while he is kept in his simple condition of laborer, artisan, or soldier he is entirely void of ambition. The Indian soldier serves very contentedly during the eight years of his term, and returns to his own land without aspiring to anything; but when he is placed in command, of any degree whatever, he is filled with pride, and vehemently desires to be at the head [serlo todo], without changing, for all that, his station as an Indian. [The writer states that even these non-commissioned officers were formerly always Spaniards;[1]] the appointment of Indians to these posts has been only in these last years, in which a system of commerce which entirely separated those islands from their center of government has rendered impossible the despatch of reënforcements, so necessary to those islands. From that very time may be noted much laxity in the military service and discipline; and I have witnessed the insurrections and disorders which never were known in former days. In the popular uprisings in the suburbs of Manila, at the end of 1820,[2] the detachments commanded by Indian corporals who were sent out to pacify the villages took such part in the lawlessness that they even attacked houses, and it was by their gunshots that many foreigners were butchered. In the military insurrection of June 3, 1823, parties of troops commanded by only one officer (a Philippine Spaniard), without any previous plan or any combination, and simply by appearing before the barracks of their regiment and offering to make captains of the Indian sergeants, immediately persuaded them to revolt; and, directing the soldiers at their own pleasure, they committed the lamentable and horrible acts of that day, which ought to be kept well in mind. [This should be a warning against allowing the Indians any place of command, especially as they have more influence with the common soldiers than do the superior officers; and all military posts of command should be filled with competent and trained Spaniards. The writer urges the following measures of reform: (1) that a sufficient number of Spanish officers to fill all the posts of sergeant and corporal, and a surplus number to fill vacancies as they occur, shall be sent to Filipinas annually; (2) the class of cadets should be suppressed, who “have always been (with a few exceptions) very unsatisfactory officers; for, belonging to very poor and obscure families, and receiving no kind of education, in a country which so depraves and corrupts a youth, they demoralize the soldiers, and cause the military career to be held there in slight esteem;” (3) in future, no other officers except the heads of corps should be sent there from the Peninsula, so as to make room for promoting the lower officers, and to avoid demoralizing the young Spaniards; (4) that the Indian and mestizo sergeants or corporals who, after fulfilling their twelve years of all service, have to be replaced by Spaniards, shall be given places in the custom-house or revenue service, or in the monopoly shops, so as to recompense them for losing their posts.] In this manner the Indian soldier—who is docile, and always imitates the desires and opinions of his immediate superiors—will receive more disinterested treatment than he has hitherto had; he will make common cause with his leaders, in critical cases of popular revolutions; and the army will remain loyal and incorrupt in its opinions, always ready for its duty, and united in action and interests.
Of the enlargement of the army of the islands
The colonies are governed and maintained more by opinion, justice and example than by force of arms. When opinion in them becomes corrupted up to the point of forming great conspiracies, the offensive action of the army produces no other effect than to hasten the ruin of the legitimate government. [In the Filipinas Islands, the persuasions and example of the ministers of religion, and the measures taken by the civil authorities, have been usually sufficient to put down an uprising; but it is not well to rely too much on military force in such cases, since such action causes rankling resentment and unites the discontented in the common effort to throw off the yoke. It is impossible, in such a climate, to employ only Spaniards in the army, since they cannot endure it, and the expense of such an army would also be too great a burden on the royal treasury.] The army of Filipinas, then, ought not to have a greater force than is sufficient to defend and maintain, in any event, a post or locality that is impregnable, which can serve as a protection and defense to the government, its interests and employees, and the families of Spanish blood. A center of strength, ordered and disciplined, of this sort (the locality of which I will mention later), will be inaccessible not only to three millions of inhabitants who now people the islands, but to thirty millions who might inhabit them; and this idea alone in the mind of the Filipino Indian is the most efficacious for disconcerting, in its origin or progress, any plan for conspiring or taking by surprise. [In such a point of vantage, the government can use measures of policy,] which in revolutions are more effective than arms for reëstablishing order, without leaving in the minds of the people, as war does, deep feelings of resentment at being repressed; and the partial revolutions in the provinces will be always broken—as thus far have been those of Ilocos, Cebú, Bataan, and others—by the zeal and sagacity of the European religious and coöperation of the civil employees of the king. In such a crisis, the principle is, to disunite sagaciously the opinions and feelings of the people; and repression by force only unites them. [If the military forces, the forts, and the navy be augmented, the only results will be to demoralize the army, make unnecessary display of the government’s power, teach the Indians the art of war (which as few of them as possible ought to know), and impose unendurable burdens on the treasury. Plans of this sort ought to be postponed until the country can bear such burdens. The present permanent veteran force of the islands seems to Bernaldez sufficient for the above purpose;] it consists of four battalions of infantry, each containing approximately one thousand men; of a cavalry corps, recently increased to three squadrons; and a brigade of artillery, with a force of four hundred forty-four men, including a light-armed company. The following may also be regarded as permanent troops: a company, called the Pampanga, annexed to the service of the engineer corps; and three brigades called the “pirate marines” [marina corsaria], who have been in service twenty years. [The system of rewards is costly and useless. The soldier receives enough pay to live comfortably, in a country where living is so cheap; “it is equivalent for an Indian, and even for a Spaniard, to three times the same amount in Europa.” The rewards given to the soldiers ought to be reduced in such measure as the circumstances of the colony demand, “taking for a basis the fact that with four hard dollars a month any inferior employee can maintain himself and all his family comfortably in the provinces, and that all beyond that is extravagance.” The Pampanga company has no organization; it ought to be placed on a military basis, with European officers, and ranked as a company of pioneers, when it would be very useful in the service. The militia troops of the islands have been neglected, although they are (especially the pirate marines) so important in checking the Moro pirates. The commanders are “men of no force, arbitrarily chosen by the governor there, from the class of merchants and private citizens of Manila, who possess only honorary titles, without any military instruction or love for the military career.” The militia forces do not cost the government much, but they are of very little use. Bernaldez thinks that the pirate marines ought to be regarded as a part of the regular army, with the same pay, and with European officers. The cavalry corps of Luzon is untrained, and would be of little use in an invasion of the country; it ought to be replaced by light and irregular cavalry, and supplemented by a small body of veterans. Two squadrons in the corps of dragoons of Luzon would be sufficient to preserve order in Manila, and the third ought to be abolished as unnecessary.]
Of the artillery and its dependent branches
[The artillery corps is in better condition than any other part of the military force of the islands; it is under better discipline, and has always been under European officers. The Indians are in great terror of the cannon. When in the tumult of 1820 Folgueras ordered three pieces to be planted at various points outside the walls, the natives implored him to take the cannon away, as the inhabitants were so terrified that they did not dare to cross the streets; and in the disturbances of 1809 in Ilocos, “only one four-libra cannon, fired by a revenue-clerk, the ball from which hit a church-tower, was sufficient to curb and disconcert more than 10,000 insurgents.” To this corps might be added (but as footmen) the company which should be disbanded in the cavalry, since in so rough and broken a country as Luzon horsemen are of little use. The artillery in Manila is of wretched quality: almost all of it was cast there, at various periods, and by unskilled founders; not only the guns but their carriages are irregular, clumsy, unreliable, and are difficult to manage; and for these very reasons the foundry there has been abolished, but since that time no cannon save a small siege battery has been sent thither from Europe. The artillery cast in Manila is sufficiently good to provide for the defense of the provinces against the Moros; but measures should be taken to provide for the better defense of that city. The working of iron and the making of artillery are almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese of Manila,[3] and the Indians therefore are unskilled in this industry; some skilled masters should be sent over from Spain to teach them and oversee the manufacture of iron. The country abounds in rich mines of iron, but these have been barely scratched and then abandoned; only some common utensils are made there, and other iron articles are sold to the people at high prices by foreigners, who carry great sums of money out of the country. “The iron of Manila has been examined in the artillery workshops, and has been found to be very soft and fibrous.” Attempts have been made by the Spanish government to utilize the mines and introduce machinery into their operation; but the officials entrusted with these enterprises have been ineffective, caring only to draw their salaries. Bernaldez urges the encouragement of private capital to undertake these works, with concessions, privileges, and protection which shall be adequate to enlist their energies; this would lead to the development of the natural riches of the islands, the population would be increased by skilled artisans and mechanics, and the great increase thus obtained in wealth of the country would likewise bring incalculable benefits to the royal treasury—not only in revenues from the increased commerce and manufactures, but in the great saving in the expenses of furnishing the army with weapons, made in the country at so much less cost than before. In the arsenal reform is needed; all its workmen except the gunsmiths should be replaced gradually by Indians, who are so skilful and work for less wages than the Spaniards; and the gunsmiths should have a regular military organization. Better provision should also be made for a supply of gunpowder. At the beginning of the century, a powder factory was erected, which cost eighty thousand hard dollars, although it was made of only bamboo and nipa; with this a large supply of powder was made, but its quality was poor, on account of the impurities in the saltpetre, which they had to obtain from India. There has been talk of building another factory (the former one being apparently no longer in existence); it is likely to be as costly an enterprise, because the lack of a strong current in the rivers “has rendered impracticable the installation of hydraulic machinery.” The Spanish government ought to take measures to provide the large amount of powder needed for the use of the forts, army, navy, and revenue service. Bernaldez advises that this be done by making contracts (with either Spaniards or foreigners), by which they can secure powder of better quality and at lower prices; and besides this they ought to send immediately to the islands a scientist (whose salary ought to be paid from the funds of the Economic Society and the consulate of commerce)—“whose mission shall be not only to establish in the capital a chair of mineralogy (which is so necessary for exploring the hitherto unknown interior of the islands), but himself to make researches in the provinces of the archipelago for places where the saltpetre can be found—which he will find, without fail.” Then gunpowder can be made in the islands, and they will be independent in the means for their defense.]