Plan showing outer works of Manila, according to the plan approved by his Majesty in 1784–1785, drawn by the engineer Tomás Sanz
[From original MS. map (in colors), in Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla]
Of the forts of Manila and Cavite
No location like that of Manila could have been selected by the conquistadors of the island of Luzon for fortifying themselves and founding the capital of an infant colony. [Its position is described, with mention of its earlier fortifications; but these were only suitable for the defense of its inhabitants against piratical attacks. Its present condition is a dangerous one, for its fortifications are unable to withstand a siege by European troops; it has no bomb-proof magazine, and hostile batteries across the Pasig River could easily reduce the city to ashes. Manila is not suitable for a military center, and the efforts of the government ought to be bent toward the fortification of Cavite, which would render that place a first-class fortress; its advantages for this are enumerated in detail, and the measures which should be taken to render it impregnable.] The feeble fortifications of Manila and its citadel may be preserved for the present, in order to shelter the government and the property of the Spaniards from a sedition; but in case of war and the landing of an enemy let them be abandoned and destroyed, in order to proceed for safety to the impregnable point of Cavite. In this manner will be laid the foundation for the perpetual security of the [Spanish] government in those islands, and for their preservation against all enemies, whether within or without.
Of the piracies of the Moros
Longer tolerance of the piratical raids by the Moros is another cause which in time must compromise our secure possession of the islands, through the plundering of their maritime villages and the captivity of their inhabitants, and the stoppage of the commerce and the coasting trade. Much more is this true because some ports of the islands, which are in the possession of those pirates, are already frequented by foreign vessels, which provide the pirates with military supplies and firearms; and it is to be feared that later the foreigners will furnish them with plans, vessels, leaders, and other aids, like those which they have furnished to the disaffected peoples in the Americas, to wage steady war on the Spanish government. [The Spanish colony has carried on defensive warfare with the Moros ever since the conquest, but has gained no permanent advantage therein, while the enemy have increased in numbers and strength, inflicting ravages on the southern provinces that are “continually greater and more scandalous.” The Spaniards have spent enormous sums in forts, vessels, and other defenses; but with little effect, on account of the immense extent of the coasts of Filipinas and the great number of uninhabited places where the pirates can hide themselves from pursuit.] Their vessels, called pancos, are of extraordinary swiftness. The Moros make these of planks lashed together with rattans, without nails or any [other] ligature. Their masts are three bamboos, their rigging a few pieces of rattan or the bark of trees, their sails are certain petates, or mats, which they call saguran; and their provisions are reduced to the flour made from a tree, called yoro [i.e., sago] and dried shellfish. Nearly all their pancos have two banks of oars, and two men for each oar. And with this slight though warlike equipment, with their harpoons, javelins, campilans, and arrows (in handling which weapons they are very dextrous), and with their swarming crews—composed of their slaves, who row under the lash; and of a multitude of pirates, who thus make their living, and traffic in their booty—they attack, among many, with the odds on their side, surround, and jump aboard, any Christian vessel which cannot defend itself on account of a small crew or the inaccurate firing of its cannon. [If they are caught in some bay by the Spanish who pursue them, they abandon their pancos, hide in the mountains, where they find enough to live on, and, as soon as the Spaniards depart, the pirates easily construct new boats and resume their raids. The pirate marine with the forts, troops, and cannon supported by the Spaniards make a heavy burden of expense on the treasury and on the people; and the amount thus spent in half a dozen years is enough to equip a strong naval expedition which could humble the insolence of the pirates. In view of this, and of the importance of Joló—which is the headquarters of the Moro pirates and of their government, and the general market for the Christian slaves and property which they carry away—Bernaldez advocates the immediate conquest of that island, and its repopulation from the more thickly settled parts of the northern islands. This can easily be done. Thousands of families whose members have been enslaved, especially in Bohol, are ready to join such an expedition, if leaders and provisions are supplied to them; and there are a multitude of skilled inter-island pilots—mestizos who are efficient and rich—who would act as leaders for the sake of their own profit and reward in such an enterprise. For ships they could use the government armed vessels, and the multitude of boats which ply among the islands; and sufficient rewards could be furnished to the soldiers in the distribution of the conquered lands and of the plunder which they would obtain. By this plan, the Moro piracies could be suppressed, and the islands thus gain peace from those fierce enemies.]
Of the large Indian villages
Although the laws of the Indias endeavor to establish firmly the peace and good government, both temporal and spiritual, of the villages by placing limits to their extent and the number of their residents, the inattention of the governors of Filipinas in regard to this so important subject, on the one hand, and on the other the interested motives of the parish curas and the ministers of the doctrinas, have given rise to the abuse of the villages of excessive size which are now found established in Filipinas. These, as they cannot be properly governed by their respective local authorities, maintain within themselves a source of internal civil discord, and from time to time they have broken out in disturbances which have placed the islands in a very critical situation.
If the reports of their population be examined, it will be found that in a great number of villages it does not fall below 10,000, 11,000, or 12,000 souls; and it is impossible that so many can be well directed spiritually by the one parish cura alone which each village has, or in secular matters by only one gobernadorcillo or alcalde. In this class of towns the most notable are the following: Tondo, with 13,424 souls; Binondoc, 22,570; Tambobo, 21,378; Pasig, 14,465; Malolos, 19,655; Vigan, 17,320; Pavay, 14,840; Lavag [Laoag], 25,242; Bacarra, 13,064; Balayan, 18,631; Taal, 23,526; Banan, 17,438; Batangas, 19,566; Cabatuan, 17,359; Xaro, 14,911. In these populations which do not conform to the rule there has always been recognized more or less instability, for the class of the plebeians, or caylianes, is immense, and out of proportion to that of the timauas, or nobles; and likewise because the unarmed authority of a gobernadorcillo must necessarily be vacillating, at the mercy of that great mass of people, who are easily set in motion by a seditious person, a few drunkards, or the superstitious tale of some old man.