25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.
There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!—Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.' And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Prânas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).—The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.—In the next Sûtra the Sûtrakâra proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.
26. Or on account of its quality as light.
The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place—such as gems, the sun, and so on—is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Sûtra.—But it has been said that the Self is mere knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality— which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?—This the next Sûtra explains.
27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.
Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject—which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'—is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'
28. On account of the separate statement.
Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30).—It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next Sûtra elucidates.
29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent (prâjña) Self.
The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality. Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).—Or else the analogous case to which the Sûtra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).