The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja / Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48

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30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists wherever the Self is; this being observed.

Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is, there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute. Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones, are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and' of the Sûtra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sûtra.

31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the case of virile power and so on.

The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above. Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self, we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (samjñâ; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so on, which in the Samsâra state is caused by the connexion of the Self with the elements—as described in the preceding passage, 'that great being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.' For the text as to the absence of samjñâ after death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain; the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born— seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).

The Sûtras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.

32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either.

On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non- consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.—If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both—i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness—and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non- consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.—The view, finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).

Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the knower.'

33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.

It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gunas. The primâ facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the Kathavallî, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2, 19). This means—if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna) of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self- conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' (Bha. Gî. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).—The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti—To this the Sûtra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit of the action—whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being—to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sâstra' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sâs, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhâna cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Pûrva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Pûrvapakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the guwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight.