The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidyâ attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidyâ illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is 'non-different' from Brahman.
To this the Dvaitavâdin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self- illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyâ and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects—such as jars and waterpots—are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non- permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time other than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self is.—Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.— But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified!—Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c., producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.—Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect.—And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.
We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs; for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (ahamkâra), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.—Nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidyâ of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidyâ is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real.—Nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non- intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains.—You have further maintained 'Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious creations of my avidyâ; I alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless, for the Veda also is the effect of avidyâ, and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidyâ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyâ; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidyâ; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyâ; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non- differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidyâ; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyâ; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidyâ. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana).
Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need—for its cognition—other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge—such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects—this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non- differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyâ.
Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non- differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyâ, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non- differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such 'svayamprakâsatâ' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'—vyâvahârika), you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidyâ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidyâ, it is in no better case than the instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedânta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought.
Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyâsa), for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.
You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage; and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also infinite in number.—But do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?—True, but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).— Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non- intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.—You further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with all space and all time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to space and time, and its limitation in point of substance—which is due to the existence of other souls).—But mere substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is not infinite!—Well, then you yourself are in no better case; for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidyâ. From this admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that Brahman differs in nature from avidyâ, then Brahman's nature itself is constituted by avidyâ, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True, knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.—If the reality of 'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation; absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.— We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is different from Brahman.
Against this view the Sûtra now declares itself as follows.—The non- difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from 'what begins with the word ârambhana'—which proves such non-difference; 'what begins with the word ârambhana' means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with, viz. 'vâkârambhanam vikâro nâmadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)—it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters, that the Sûtra refers to. For these texts prove the non- difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to Kanâda's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience, 'vâkârambhanam vikâro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. Ârambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (â-rabh = â-labh; and 'âlambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Pânini III, 3, 113, as to the form and meaning of the word. 'Vâkâ,' 'on account of speech,' we take to mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikâra), i.e. a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (nâmadheya), viz. pitcher, and so on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mrittikâ), i.e. are of the substance of clay, only; this only is true (satyam), i.e. known through authoritative means of proof; only (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life—youth, old age, &c.—which he has reached.—The fact of our saying 'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Pûrvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.—But it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated!—This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkârya theory.— But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkârya theory!—If he, we retort, who holds the asatkârya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkârya theory; and if he holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a regressus in infinitum. According to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on, belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.
We now consider the whole Chândogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam agra âsîd ekam evâdvitîyam.' This means—That which is Being, i.e. this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non- difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause also,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e. the highest Brahman.
And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible; the text continues,'That deity thought—Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (jîva âtman) and distinguish names and forms'—which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things (for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the gîva, which is of the nature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the jîva entering into matter as its Self. There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together with the jîvas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient beings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state, constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman constitutes their Self—this is proved by the antaryâmin-brâhmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter together with the jîvas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body, and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be further elucidated under II, 1, 22.—The Chândogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this truth in 'Thou art that.'