Even if it were admitted that the Pradhâna is established by Inference, the Sânkhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the Pradhâna is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in the passage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhâna and become isolated' (Sânkhya Kâ. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhâna is fruition and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible. For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless, and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release which consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere nearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it follows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation.
9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
The Sânkhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.— The Sânkhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual superimposition (adhyâsa), works towards the creation of a world and subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.—'Since the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an opposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence; since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sânkhya Kâ. 17); 'And from that contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral, cognising and inactive' (18).—And after having stated that the activity of the Pradhâna is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it migrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e. with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although all agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent. In order that the soul may know the Pradhâna and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (20, 21).—Now to that which is eternally unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other hand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution, on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to another thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.— They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the soul!—Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4. And if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is eternally released? That she does so the Sânkhyas distinctly assert, 'By manifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is thankless and not composed of the gunas' (Sânkhya Kâ. 60).—The Sânkhyas further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true nature, at once retires from that soul—'As a dancer having exhibited herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from the soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing "I have been seen" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to itself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since she is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change which consists in seeing or knowing.—Let it then be said that the 'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!— But this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity. Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.—Moreover, if you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage—so that bondage and release would both be permanent.—Let it then be said that what causes bondage is wrong seeing—while intuition of the true nature of things is the cause of Release!—But as both these kinds of seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and Prakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on ad infinitum.—Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!—As the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that bondage and release would be alike permanent.—On account of all these contradictory views the system of the Sânkhyas is untenable.
We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than the Sânkhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be subject to adhyâsa, and so on. There is, however, the following difference between the two theories. The Sânkhyas, in order to account for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on, assume a plurality of souls. The Vedântins, on the other hand, do not allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational. The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedântins) between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedântins hold Prakriti to be something unreal, while the Sânkhyas consider it to be real, is unfounded; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing, cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'
10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
We have shown that the theory of the Pradhâna being the universal cause is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable' must be supplied from the preceding Sûtra; 'or' has to be taken in the sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sûtra is—in the same way as the big and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is untenable; or, in other words—as the theory of the world originating from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is likewise untenable.—Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different kinds of extension—minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.—would never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.— But, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not themselves consist of parts).—Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.—But what, then, are we to do to get out of this dilemma?—You have only to accept the Vedic doctrine of the origination of the world.
Others explain the above Sûtra as meant to refute an objection against the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit the arrangement of the Sûtras, and would imply a meaningless iteration. The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been disposed of in the preceding pâda, and the present pâda is devoted to the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sûtra, therefore, is none other than what we stated above.—But what are those other untenable views to which the Sûtra refers?—To this question the next Sûtra replies.
11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being (of the origination of the world).
The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the aggregation of atoms—such aggregation resulting from the motion of the atoms. The primary motion of the atoms—which are the cause of the origination of the entire world—is assumed to be brought about by the unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas are caused by the unseen principle.'—Is then, we ask, this primary motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could, the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of motion originating in the atoms.—Let it then be assumed that motion originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls in which the adrishta abides!—If this were so, we reply, it would follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of the souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only; and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the origination of the world does not take place at all times.—But this reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time (so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a dviparârdha.—Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any action on the part of the atoms.