The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja / Sacred Books of the East, Volume 48

by Unknown

12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavâya, there results a regressus in infinitum from equality.

The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the acknowledgment of samavâya.—Why so?—Because the samavâya also, like part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing to establish it—from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain. The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavâya relation, defining it as 'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now, if such a samavâya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact that things observed to be inseparably connected—as, e.g., class characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which they belong—are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to be searched for why the samavâya, which is of the same nature as those things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further reason has to be postulated, and so on, in infinitum. Nor can it be said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the essential nature of samavâya (so that no further reason need be demanded for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities, and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavâya needless for them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen entity such as the samavâya is, and then to assume for it such and such an essential nature.—These objections apply to the samavâya whether it be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sûtra urges a further objection against it if viewed as eternal.

13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.

The samavâya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.

14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed.

From the view that the atoms of four kinds—viz. of earth or water or fire or air—possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts—and this is the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.—Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Sûtra refers.

15. And as there are objections in both cases.

A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sûtra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.

16. And as it is not accepted, it is altogether disregarded.

Kapila's doctrine, although to be rejected on account of it's being in conflict with Scripture and sound reasoning, yet recommends itself to the adherents of the Veda on some accounts—as e.g. its view of the existence of the effect in the cause. Kanâda's theory, on the other hand, of which no part can be accepted and which is totally destitute of proof, cannot but be absolutely disregarded by all those who aim at the highest end of man.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the big and long'.