Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.
Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to Sa@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Râmânuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.
Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.
Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.
Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.
Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.
PÂDA II.
The task of the second pâda is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedânta view.—The first adhikarana (1-10) is directed against the Sâ@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhâna of the Sâ@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.—The second adhikarana (11-17) refutes the Vaiseshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrishta.—The third and fourth adhikaranas are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvâstitvavâdins, or bâhyârthavâdins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vijñânavâdins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last Sûtra of this adhikarana is treated by Râmânuja as a separate adhikarana refuting the view of the Mâdhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.
The last adhikarana of the pâda (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas or Pâñkarâtras. But Sa@nkara and Râmânuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sûtrakâra's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.—Sûtras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sûtra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vâsudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarshana, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sûtra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarshana there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.—The Sûtra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'—This means, according to Sa@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarshana, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sûtra 42 against the Bhâgavata doctrine).'—According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the Sûtra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pañkarâtra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarshana and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pâñkarâtra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.—The form of the Sûtra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'vâ' and of the 'tat,' implied in Râmânuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from Sa@nkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pâda with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objections—has to be viewed as the true one.