The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya / Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1

by Unknown

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.—Sûtra 12 gives, according to Sa@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).—Râmânuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = matanam according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21).—The released jîvas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of Sa@nkara as well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents—or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,—of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sûtras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikaranas discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sûtras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sûtras on which the bulk of the interpretations of Sa@nkara as well as of Râmânuja are based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of Sa@nkara and Râmânuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sûtras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedânta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sûtras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Râmânuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sûtra, but where Sa@nkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Râmânuja is able to take the Sûtra as it stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sûtras which in clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which Sa@nkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sûtra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that Sa@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sûtras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.—We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of adhikaranas and Sûtras concerning whose interpretation Sa@nkara and Râmânuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikarana of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jîva, and where Râmânuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to Sa@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole adhikarana and to the wording of the single Sûtras. The adhikarana is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedânta is embodied in Bâdarâyana's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sûtras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedânta-sûtras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of Sa@nkara as well as Râmânuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sûtras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.

The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the Sûtras in any way favour Sa@nkara's doctrine that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The adhyâya first to be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According to Sa@nkara the three latter pâdas of that adhyâya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman. According to Râmânuja, on the other hand, the three pâdas, referring throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into the samsâra.

On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange that the concluding section of the Sûtras should be almost entirely taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the true sanctuary of Vedântic knowledge, while the fate of the fully initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sûtras. It is, I think, not too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sûtras would—before having allowed himself to be influenced by Sa@nkara's interpretations—imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sûtras conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious samsâra, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti. And this à priori impression—which, although no doubt significant, could hardly be appealed to as decisive—is confirmed by a detailed consideration of the two sets of Sûtras which Sa@nkara connects with the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sûtras are interpreted by Sa@nkara and Râmânuja has been stated above in the conspectus of contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Râmânuja more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to note, in the first place, the circumstance—relevant although not decisive in itself—that Sûtra 12 does not contain any indication of a new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be doubted that the text of Sûtra 13, 'spashto hy ekeshâm,' is more appropriately understood, with Râmânuja, as furnishing a reason for the opinion advanced in the preceding Sûtra, than—with Sa@nkara—as embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,' i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sûtra 13 would, on Sa@nkara's interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred, viz. the followers of the Kânva-sâkhâ (the two Vedic passages referred to in 12 and 13 being Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2, 11, according to the Kânva recension); while it is the standing practice of the Sûtras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,' members of Vedic sâkhâs, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in the preceding Sûtras. With this practice Râmânuja's interpretation, on the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the Mâdhyandinas, whose reading in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmât,' clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the Kânvas denotes the sârira, i.e. the jîva. I think it is not saying too much that Sa@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke' would denote the very same Kânvas to whom the preceding Sûtra had referred—so that the Kânvas would be distinguished from themselves as it were—is altogether impossible.