(Herewith the section comprising the four Sûtras is finished[89].)
So far it has been declared that the Vedânta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sâ@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhâna and the like, and thereupon interpret the Vedânta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedânta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhâna with the souls (purusha). The followers of Kanâda again infer from the very same passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyâsa)—thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means of proof—proceeds to state as primâ facie views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedânta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.
The Sâ@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhâna consisting of three constituent elements (guna) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedânta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhâna being the general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhâna in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the guna of Goodness[90], according to the Smriti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gîtâ XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhâna) are known as all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhâna, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gunas, comprises also in its pradhâna state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedânta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhâna, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedântin) also who assume an all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhâna, as consisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.
To these conclusions he (Vyâsa) replies in the following Sûtra.
5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhâna) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.
It is impossible to find room in the Vedânta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhâna, the fiction of the Sâ@nkhyas; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch. Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw), may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or 'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Prâna.' By 'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sûtra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense; just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'
The argumentation of the Sâ@nkhyas that the pradhâna may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the guna Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhâna-condition the three gunas are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhâna is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gunas, we term the pradhâna all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Darkness.
Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sâkshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradhâna is destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhâna all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].—Well then (say those Sâ@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradhâna possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is imparted to an iron ball by fire.—No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhâna having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sâ@nkhya, is Brahman's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent.—But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.—Why not? we reply; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'—But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel.—This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,' &c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.—What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world?—Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-sâstra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition—as the sun's nature is eternal luminousness—can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (samsârin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person' (Sv. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).