Zachariah Chandler: An Outline Sketch of His Life and Public Services

by Unknown

Many subjects presented themselves for investigation, any one of which would, in ordinary times, have required the exclusive attention of a separate committee, and to follow out every line of inquiry suggested was manifestly a practical impossibility. Therefore the committee decided not to undertake any investigations into what might be considered side issues, but to keep their attention directed entirely to the essential features of the war, so that they could ascertain and comprehend the necessities of the armies and the causes of disaster or complaint, and the methods of supplying the one and remedying the other. Attempts were made repeatedly to use its power to punish enemies or to avenge private grievances, but its members adhered resolutely to the straightforward course originally marked out as the path of its duty.

The first subject which the committee carefully inquired into was the defeat at Bull Run. Many witnesses were examined, chiefly officers who were engaged in the battle—Generals Scott, McDowell, Meigs, Heintzelman, Butterfield, Fitz-John Porter, and others. The testimony was very voluminous, but the committee reached an early and unanimous opinion as to the causes of the disaster. Their report, written by Mr. Wade, said: "That which now appears to have been the great error was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad connections in all that section of the country.... The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was nearly expired. The enemy were allowed time to collect their forces and strengthen their position by defensive works.... There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even in regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in brigade movements, and none at all as divisions." General McDowell prepared a plan of campaign, which was approved by the Cabinet, and the 9th of July was fixed upon as the day for the advance; but the movement did not commence until a week later than the appointed time. Transportation was deficient, and there was much delay resulting from lack of discipline among the troops, and when the battle came the Union forces were fatigued and not in good fighting condition. "But," said the report, "the principal cause of the defeat was the failure of General Patterson to hold the troops of General Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah." Patterson had 23,000 men, while Johnston had but 12,000. Still, Patterson disobeyed the orders of General Scott, which were to make offensive demonstrations against General Johnston so as to detain his army at Winchester, and if he retreated to follow him and keep up the fight. Those orders were repeated every day for more than a week in the telegraphic correspondence between Scott and Patterson. Finally, General Scott heard of a large force moving from Patterson's front, and telegraphed, "Has not the enemy stolen a march on you?" To this Patterson replied, "The enemy has stolen no march upon me," while at that very time his large army was watching an empty camp and Johnston was far on his way to reinforce the rebels at Manassas. Patterson did not discover that Johnston had gone until he was miles distant, and the consequence was that McDowell had both Beauregard and Johnston to fight, while Patterson, with 23,000 men, was lying idle in his camp. This is the substance of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War on the battle of Bull Run, and was the official announcement to the country of the inefficiency of the organization and generalship of the Army of the Potomac.

But before the committee was organized the men who were responsible for this failure had been displaced, and General McClellan had been made the commander-in-chief. He had taken the reins of authority amid national acclamations, and was then at the height of a remarkable popularity, which it is now known was adroitly stimulated for political purposes by the conservative press. But on the investigation into the second subject taken up by the committee (the disaster at Edward's Ferry or Ball's Bluff) facts came to the knowledge of its members which created the suspicion in their minds that General Stone, who was charged with the blame of that defeat, and who, as the scape-goat, was arrested and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette, was not alone responsible for the calamity, but that the real fault would be found higher up. This suspicion they were never able to substantiate by absolute proof, and it was not expressed in any of their reports.

The third topic taken up by the committee was the military management of the Western Department, under General Fremont. This was an inquiry of special importance, for the reason that that officer, upon taking command at St. Louis, issued a proclamation declaring free all slaves whose masters were engaged in rebellion against the United States. This order caused a great excitement throughout the country, and the Republican party was widely divided in opinion as to its legality and propriety. President Lincoln was conservative on the question, and revoked the Fremont order, much to the disappointment of Mr. Chandler and the other more "advanced" Republicans. Hence the committee approached the subject with unusual interest, and, after a thorough investigation, made an elaborate report. That part of this document which relates to General Fremont's order in regard to slaves was signed by Messrs. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode, and showed the ground on which these gentlemen then stood with regard to emancipation; it was as follows:

But that feature of General Fremont's administration which attracted the most attention, and which will ever be most prominent among the many points of interest connected with the history of that department, is his proclamation of emancipation. Whatever opinion may be entertained with reference to the time when the policy of emancipation should be inaugurated, there can be no doubt that General Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard to the most effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof of that, it is only necessary to state that his successor, when transferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying the same principle, and the President of the United States has since applied the same principle to all the rebellious States; and few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vestige of treason and rebellion is destroyed.

The committee heartily endorsed General Fremont's administration, declaring it to have been "eminently characterized by earnestness, ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty." They also examined into various minor military matters and movements, including, particularly, rebel barbarities and the return of slaves to their masters by the army.

It was as a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the Thirty-seventh Congress, and from the evidence taken in its inquiries, that Mr. Chandler obtained the mass of information which enabled him to make the most important of his war speeches, that of July 16, 1862, in which he exposed so conclusively General McClellan's utter incompetence. Ample as was the foundation of facts upon which rested this effective arraignment of conspicuous incapacity, the attack was one requiring genuine boldness, for it defiantly invited a storm of denunciation and, if it had failed of justification by the event, would have certainly ended its maker's political career. Notwithstanding his tardiness, his timidity, his inefficiency as a commander in the field, and his political sympathy with the more unpatriotic classes of the Northern people, General McClellan was still strong with the people and entrusted with great powers. The Democracy warmly commended his sentiments and methods, and labored incessantly to prevent any diminution of his hold upon the public confidence. The Army of the Potomac yet regarded him as "the young Napoleon," and its corps commanders were, with but few exceptions, his personal adherents. The long-suffering President was submitting with patience to his unjust complaints, after having labored incessantly to stimulate into activity his chronic sluggishness, fearful, with characteristic over-caution, lest his summary removal should divide the North and breed a dangerous disaffection in the face of the enemy among his troops. Many who did not believe in the sincerity or ability of the man also smothered their distrust, for fear that criticism would only weaken the common cause and with the hope that even in his nerveless hands the mighty weapon of the national resources would at last fall—even if by its own weight only—on the enemy with decisive force. At this juncture, and under these circumstances, Mr. Chandler, with characteristic vigor of statement and plainness of speech, placed before the Senate and the country the demonstration of McClellan's imbecility.

Originally Mr. Chandler believed that McClellan's selection as the practical successor of General Scott was a wise one, and hoped to see his organizing capacity in camp supplemented by enterprise and courage in the field. Distrust first sprang up with the persistent inaction of the Army of the Potomac throughout the last months of 1861, and it was strengthened by contact with the man himself and the study of his character and his plans. An illustration of how this change of opinion was brought about is given in an incident which occurred in the room of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. That committee sent for General McClellan as soon as they took up matters relating to his command, in order to consult with him informally as to the situation. This was in January, 1861, while he was in Washington "organizing" his army, and while there was no little impatience felt because he did not move. He was not formally summoned before the committee then, but simply called in for general consultation. After the regular business was finished, Mr. Chandler asked him bluntly why he did not attack the rebels. General McClellan replied that it was because there were not sufficient means of communication with Washington; he then called attention to the fact that there were only two bridges and no other means of transportation across the Potomac.

Mr. Chandler asked what the number of bridges had to do with an advance movement, and McClellan explained with much detail that it was one of the most important features of skillful strategy that a commander should have plenty of room to retreat before making an attack. To this Mr. Chandler's response was:

"General McClellan, if I understand you correctly, before you strike at the rebels you want to be sure of plenty of room so that you can run in case they strike back!"