"Or in case you get scared," added Senator Wade.
The commander of the Army of the Potomac manifested indignation at this blunt way of putting the case, and then proceeded at length to explain the art of war and the science of generalship, laying special stress upon the necessity of having lines of retreat, as well as lines of communication and supply, always open. He labored hard to make clear all the methods and counter-methods upon which campaigns are managed and battles fought, and, as he was an accomplished master of the theory of war, succeeded in rendering himself at least interesting. After he had concluded, Mr. Wade said:
"General, you have all the troops you have called for, and if you haven't enough, you shall have more. They are well organized and equipped, and the loyal people of this country expect that you will make a short and decisive campaign. Is it really necessary for you to have more bridges over the Potomac before you move?"
"Not that," was the answer, "not that exactly, but we must bear in mind the necessity of having everything ready in case of a defeat, and keep our lines of retreat open."
With this remark General McClellan left the room, whereupon Mr. Wade asked:
"Chandler, what do you think of the science of generalship?"
"I don't know much about war," was the reply, "but it seems to me that this is infernal, unmitigated cowardice."
The committee, after this interview, made a careful inquiry into the strength of the rebel forces confronting the elaborate intrenchments about Washington, and became convinced that the army at and about Manassas was a handful compared with the magnificent body of troops under McClellan's command. They submitted these facts to the President and his Cabinet at a special session held for that purpose, and urged the importance of an instant advance. With one single exception (a Cabinet officer) the heads of the departments and the committee agreed that an offensive movement from the line of the Potomac into Virginia was important and must be made. General McClellan promised that his army should start, but it did not. Toward the close of the winter the President ordered a general advance, but the Army of the Potomac still remained immobile. Finally, on March 10, under the peremptory orders of the President, it did advance to Centreville and found there deserted camps, wooden guns, weak intrenchments, and traces of the retreat of not more than a single full corps of rebel troops. It was during this most aggravating delay that members of the committee had another characteristic interview with General McClellan. On the 19th of February a sub-committee waited upon the Secretary of War[23] to ask why the army was idle, and why the city of Washington and the North side of the Potomac river were crowded with troops when the enemy was all in Virginia. Mr. Wade said that it was a disgrace to the nation that Washington was thus allowed to remain to all intents and purposes in a state of siege To this Secretary Stanton replied that the committee could not feel more keenly upon this subject than did he, that he did not go to bed at night without his cheek burning with shame at this disgrace, and that the subject had received his earnest attention, but he had not been able to change the situation as he wished. General McClellan was then sent for, and Secretary Stanton stated to him the object of the visit, and repeated the inquiries as to why an advance movement was not made into Virginia, the rebels driven away from Washington, and the soldiers who were idle in their camps in and around the city sent to active duty.
General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but that instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would soon be able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what time he would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended upon circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the troops about Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac without having their rear protected more fully, and better lines of retreat open; that he designed throwing a temporary bridge across the river as soon as possible, and making a permanent structure of it at his leisure. That would make three bridges, and then the requisite precautions would be completed.