Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would be treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I would lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until they had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their coffins." Mr. Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview, and the Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee had another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at his residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate with him in an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace McClellan or to compel him to commence an active campaign at once. On the 25th of February this conference with the President was held, and it was followed by others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally threatening to make the laggardness of the commander of the Army of the Potomac a subject of debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution directing the President to order an advance forthwith. The first result was what the committee were so anxious to accomplish. In March, the armies commenced to move, and McClellan, at last taking the field in person, pushed out to Centreville, and then followed up this delayed advance by his flank movement to the Peninsula, driving the rebels out of Yorktown by a month's work with the shovel, and following General Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody victory was won, but its fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was short, bloody, and blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which was also deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr. Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the rebel capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war would have been shortened by two years.
When it first became evident that General McClellan was, by sullenness and incapacity, throwing away advantages gained by the heroism of his troops on the Peninsula, Mr. Chandler determined to denounce him on the floor of the Senate, but was restrained by Mr. Stanton, who urged that, while the campaign was still in active progress, there was yet some hope of a change for the better, and that to destroy confidence in a commanding officer under such circumstances might injure the army in the field. After Malvern Hill these reasons ceased to have force, and Mr. Chandler commenced the careful preparation of his speech. This time the Secretary of War endorsed the timeliness as well as the truth of the expose, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War by formal vote authorized the use of the testimony taken before it and not yet made public. After he had gathered and grouped the facts which formed the basis of his arraignment, Mr. Chandler submitted them to a friend upon whose good judgment and sincerity he greatly relied, and asked:
"Knowing all these facts, as I do, what is my duty?"
The answer was: "Beyond all question, these facts ought to be laid before the country, for the knowledge of them is essential to its safety. But they will create a storm that will sweep either you or McClellan from public life, and it is more than probable that you will be the victim."
Mr. Chandler said: "I did not ask your opinion of the consequences, but of my duty."
To this it was replied: "The speech ought to be made, and no one else will make it."
Mr. Chandler simply said: "It will be made to-day; come and hear it." And he did make it, in the midst of a running discussion on a bill "to provide for the discharge of state prisoners and others," which was the special order in the Senate for that day (July 16, 1862).
Mr. Chandler commenced by briefly reciting the history of the appointment of the committee, and then gave from the evidence taken at its sessions a compact summary of the causes of the Bull Run disaster, fortifying each point with citations from the testimony. After closing this part of his speech he proceeded to review the Ball's Bluff catastrophe, saying:
Were the people discouraged, depressed? Not at all. Untold thousands rushed into the shattered ranks, eager to wipe out the stain and stigma of that defeat (Bull Run). From the East, the West, the North, and the Middle States, thousands and tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands came pouring in, until the government said, "Hold, enough." The Army of the Potomac, denuded in August of three-months' men and scarcely numbering 50,000 efficient men, swelled in September to over 100,000, in October to 150,000, in November to 175,000 and upward, until, on the 10th day of December, the morning rolls showed 195,400 men, and thirteen regiments not reported, chiefly intended for the Burnside expedition, but all under the command of General McClellan. During the months of October, November, and December, the weather was delightful and the roads fine. The question began to be asked in October, when will the advance take place? All had the most unbounded confidence in the army and its young general, and were anxiously waiting for a Napoleonic stroke. It came, but such a stroke! That a general movement was being prepared the whole country had known for weeks; but when the terrific blow was to be struck no one knew save the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The nation believed in its young commander; the President relied upon him, and all, myself included, had the most unbounded confidence in the result of the intended movement. It came! On the 21st of October, McCall's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to Drainesville upon a reconnoissance. Smith's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered to support him. McCall's reconnoissance extended four miles beyond Drainesville, and to within nine miles of Leesburg. Stone, on Sunday, was informed of McCall's and Smith's advance, and directed to make a slight demonstration upon Leesburg. How? He could do it in but one way, and that was by crossing the river and moving upon it. [Mr. Chandler here introduced a mass of testimony and official orders to show that Col. E. D. Baker, whom General Stone sent across the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, had ample reasons to believe that he would be sustained in that advance, and reinforced if necessary. He proceeded:] Thus it is shown that Colonel Baker had reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy were to be pushed upon their flank by General Gorman.
At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel Devens crossed the river upon a reconnoissance with 400 men at Ball's Bluff, opposite Harrison's Island, as directed by General Stone. At daylight Colonel Baker was ordered to cross to the support of Colonel Devens. I have read his orders. One scow and two small boats were their only means of transportation. At eight o'clock on Monday morning the fight commenced by Colonel Devens, and Colonel Baker was placed in command, as is alleged, with discretionary orders. Colonel Baker knew that Smith and McCall were at Drainesville, or within striking distance, that our troops were crossing at Edward's Ferry, or, in other words, that 40,000 effective men were within twelve miles of him, and that at least 30,000 were upon the Virginia side of the Potomac, and that, in the nature of things, he must be reinforced. He did not know that at half-past ten A.M., of Monday, or two and one-half hours after Colonel Devens commenced the fight, the divisions of Smith and McCall commenced their retreat by the express orders of General McClellan. He knew that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly superior forces, and, like a gallant soldier as he was, he hastened to his relief with all the force he could cross with his inadequate means of transportation.
Colonel Baker has been charged with imprudence and rashness; but neither the facts nor the testimony support the charge. Instead of rashly or imprudently advancing into the enemy's lines, as was alleged, he did not move ten rods from the Bluff, and the only sustaining witness to this charge was one officer, who swore that he thought Colonel Baker imprudently exposed himself to the enemy's bullets. This kind of rashness is usually pardoned after the death of the perpetrator. At two o'clock P. M. Colonel Baker found himself in command of about 1,800 men upon Ball's Bluff, including Devens's men and three guns, and the fighting commenced. The alternatives were fight and conquer, surrender, or be captured. That noble band of heroes and their gallant commander understood these terrible alternatives as well upon that bloody field as we do now, and nobly did they vindicate their manhood. During all those long hours, from two o'clock P. M. until the early dusk of evening, the gallant Baker continued the unequal contest, when he fell pierced by three bullets and instantly expired. A council of war was called (after the frightful death-struggle over his lifeless remains and for them), and it was decided that the only chance of an escape was by cutting through the enemy and reaching Edward's Ferry, which was at once decided upon; but, while forming for the desperate encounter, the enemy rushed upon our little band of heroes in overpowering numbers, and the rout was perfect.... How many were killed in battle, how many drowned in the relentless river, will never be correctly known; suffice it to say, our little force was destroyed. Why was this little band permitted to be destroyed by a force little more than double its numbers in presence of 40,000 splendid troops? Why were McCall and Smith ordered back at the very moment that Baker was ordered to cross? If we wanted Leesburg, McCall could have taken it without the loss of a man, as his movement in mass had already caused its evacuation, and the enemy did not return in force until after McCall had retreated. If we did not wish to capture Leesburg, why did we cross at all? Of what use is "a slight demonstration" even, without results? These are questions which the people will ask, and no man can satisfactorily answer. Why were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry to Colonel Baker? The distance was only three-and-a-half miles. We had 1,500 men across at two o'clock on Monday, and the universal concurrent testimony of officers and men is that a reinforcement of even 1,000 men—some say 500, and one gallant captain swears that with 100 men he could have struck them upon the flank,—would have changed the result of the day. Why were not reinforcements sent? Stone swears, as I have already shown, that there were batteries between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff which would have utterly destroyed any force he could have sent to Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. But Stone was not sustained by a single witness; on the contrary, all swear that there were not, to their knowledge, and that they did not believe there were any, and a civilian living upon the spot, and in the habit of passing over the ground frequently, swears there were none; and again, Stone, when questioned as to the erection of forts under the range of his guns upon his second examination, swears positively that there is not a gun now between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff, and never has been. Why, then, were not reinforcements sent from Edward's Ferry? Let the men who executed and planned this horrible slaughter answer to God and an outraged country. General Banks swears that his orders were such from General McClellan, that, upon his arrival at Edward's Ferry, although his judgment was against crossing, he did not feel himself at liberty to decline crossing, and he remained upon the Virginia side until Thursday.... So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's Bluff.
Mr. Chandler next attacked General McClellan's disastrous procrastination. Describing the lapse of an army of 150,000 men into a state of chronic inaction in its intrenchments about Washington after the Ball's Bluff disaster, he laid before the Senate and the country documents which proved these facts: In October, 1861, the Navy Department requested that 4,000 men might be detailed to hold Matthias Point on the lower Potomac, after the gunboats should have shelled out the rebels, who were then in possession, and thus in control of the navigation of that important river. General McClellan agreed to furnish the infantry; twice the Navy Department prepared its vessels for the expedition, but the troops did not report for duty, so that, finally, the gunboats were necessarily detailed for other service, and the unnecessary, expensive and humiliating blockade of the Potomac continued for months. Mr. Chandler then proceeded: