We had better give in extenso the conversation which immediately followed; because we think that Sir Hamilton Seymour might, without any breach of propriety, have used more decided language than he did employ, with regard to the view likely to be taken by the British Cabinet. We are quite aware of the difficulties of an ambassador in such a situation; still we cannot avoid the conclusion that Sir H. Seymour was unnecessarily timid, and not nearly decided enough in the tone which he assumed. He objected, indeed, but the objection was rather feeble; which was unfortunate, as his principal in England immediately adopted the like inconclusive tone.
“‘Sir,’ I replied, ‘your Majesty is so frank with me that I am sure you will have the goodness to permit me to speak with the same openness. I would then observe that, deplorable as is the condition of Turkey, it is a country which has long been plunged in difficulties supposed by many to be insurmountable. With regard to contingent arrangements, her Majesty’s Government, as your Majesty is well aware, objects, as a general rule to taking engagements upon possible eventualities, and would, perhaps, be particularly disinclined to doing so in this instance. If I may be allowed to say so, a great disinclination (répugnance) might be expected in England to disposing by anticipation (d’escompter) of the succession of an old friend and ally.’
“‘The rule is a good one,’ the Emperor replied, ‘good at all times, especially in times of uncertainty and change, like the present: still it is of the greatest importance that we should understand one an other, and not allow events to take us by surprise; maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en gentleman; si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l’Angleterre et moi, pour le reste peu m’importe; il m’est indifferent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l’Angleterre songe à s’établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement; de mon côté, je suis également disposé de prendre l’engagement de ne pas m’y établir, en propriétaire il s’entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d’occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l’on doit tout laisser aller au hazard.’
“I thanked his Majesty for the frankness of his declarations, and for the desire which he had expressed of acting cordially and openly with her Majesty’s Government, observing at the same time that such an understanding appeared the best security against the sudden danger to which his Majesty had alluded. I added that, although unprepared to give a decided opinion upon questions of such magnitude and delicacy, it appeared to me possible that some such arrangement might be made between her Majesty’s Government and his Majesty as might guard, if not for, at least against certain contingencies.
“To render my meaning more clear,” I said, further, “I can only repeat, Sir, that in my opinion her Majesty’s Government will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of Turkey, but it is possible that they may be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements which might, in that event, be attempted.”
We have no desire whatever to reflect upon the conduct of the prudence of Sir Hamilton Seymour, but we cannot help saying that he seems to have missed one very material point—that being a distinct explanation of the quarter from which the anticipated danger to Turkey was to arise. Sir Hamilton was perfectly justified in intimating that Britain did not intend to subvert the integrity of Turkey, and that she would not be passive if France were to manifest such a design. There was no earthly danger from either quarter; and certainly Austria, whatever she may wish to have or is ready to receive, would not have dared, under existing circumstances, to disturb the peace of Europe. Turkey itself was in a far better position than it ever had been. “L’homme gravement malade,” was exhibiting every symptom of convalescence, and the only danger to be apprehended was from the Muscovite doctor, who, without being summoned, was preparing to administer his pills. Therefore, we think that the rejoinder to the Emperor’s confidences—subject, of course, to the official Cabinet approval—should have been in the shape of a query as to the nature of the apprehended danger. The Czar had protested, in the most emphatic language, that he was “eager for the prolonged existence of the man;” and, if that were the case, his dissolution was an event much less likely than that of many a dynasty of Christian Europe. With Russia and Britain as determined protectors, who was to give him the coup-de-grace? Surely Sir Hamilton Seymour erred in not putting that point more forcibly and distinctly in his confidential conversations with the Emperor.
We say this, because the last paragraph in Sir Hamilton Seymour’s despatch, of 22d January 1853, to Lord John Russell shows that he was not altogether uninfluenced by the Imperial blandishments and affectation of perfect sincerity.
“A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilisation of the nineteenth century if the void left by the extinction of Mahommedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey.”
Precautions indeed! Precautions which would have made Russia, without assuming the name of proprietor, the virtual and absolute occupier of Constantinople, with the power of the keys of the Bosphorus! It is marvellous that so acute a minister as Sir Hamilton Seymour—who otherwise deserves great praise for his lucid exposition of the designs and motives of the Czar—did not perceive that any approach to an arrangement for disposing of the inheritance, was tantamount to a declaration of the immediate dissolution of Turkey.
In answer to these communications, Lord John Russell, on the 9th February, forwarded a despatch, of the wisdom of which it is for the public to form their own opinion. It commences with an acknowledgment of “the moderation, the frankness, and the friendly disposition of his Imperial Majesty.” Why the first of these terms should have been employed, we really do not comprehend. Then Lord John, adverting to the indirect proposal of the Emperor, observes that—“In considering this grave question, the first reflection which occurs to Her Majesty’s Government is, that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem”—that “there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours”—and that “it occurs further to her Majesty’s Government to remark that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time.” After pointing out the impropriety as well as the impolicy of devising a partition for providing for a settlement under such circumstances, Lord John intimates, in tolerably distinct terms, that “neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia.” He then draws the following conclusions:—